Franchises of Fear

The al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin carried out a sweeping coordinated attack on seven military locations in western Mali, including near the borders with Senegal and Mauritania, in mid-2025.

The terrorist group, better known as JNIM, was responsible for a surge in attacks at that time across several West African nations, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The group has become a major force in regional instability and was used as justification for military coups in the three Sahel countries over the past five years.

JNIM is just one of Middle East-based al-Qaida’s terrorist franchises in Africa and elsewhere. The rival Islamic State group, or IS, also is based in the Middle East and has franchised similar groups.

JNIM formed in March 2017 when four Mali-based terrorist groups merged and pledged their allegiance to al-Qaida. Authorities are hesitant to speculate about the number of fighters in JNIM’s ranks, but they say it could be several thousand, according to the BBC.

Although such franchises have emerged from the Middle East, that region no longer is the terrorist safe haven it once was. Al-Qaida and IS once dominated the region, where at its peak IS had about 80,000 terrorists, including more than 42,000 foreign fighters from 120 countries, according to terrorism consultant Adrian Shtuni. Researchers estimate that only about 1,500 to 3,000 IS fighters remain in the Middle East, with pockets of fighters remaining in Syria and Iraq.

Since losing ground in the Middle East, the two terrorist networks have shifted their emphasis to Africa. Terrorism is viewed as the most significant threat to peace, security and sustainable development across the continent today, and Sub-Saharan Africa now accounts for nearly 60% of all terrorism-related deaths globally. The Sahel is “ground zero” for terrorist violence, with deaths exceeding 6,000 for three consecutive years.

Religious fanaticism, chronic political instability, local grievances, poverty and ineffective governance have driven the creation of African franchises, experts say. 

The rough terrain and distance from population centers allow for terrorist operations to flourish. Nigeria is plagued by groups that attack towns and villages, then retreat to the Sambisa Forest. Remote areas in the Sahara and Sahel, Lake Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province offer terrorist hiding places, the United Nations says. Some parts of Africa are virtually inaccessible during rainy seasons.

Some franchises begin as local insurgent groups that gain the attention of IS or al-Qaida. Groups join for the perceived prestige, training and resources the two organizations can offer. Loyalties among the extremist groups ebb and flow, with some groups changing sides because of such things as excess violence or a lack of support and money.

Al-Qaida and IS use a “decentralized franchise model” to gain followers and transform local grievances “into regional jihadist projects, more or less trading on brand legitimacy,” Dr. Sergio Altuna, a senior research fellow for the Program on Extremism at The George Washington University, told ADF. “Local leaders say they receive this symbolic capital, a global name, a global brand.”

Franchises for both organizations have considerable leeway in how they operate. Although they use the names of the parent organizations to give themselves legitimacy, affiliates adapt to local conditions, including ethnic politics and grievances. Without a central structure, they are less vulnerable to attack by counterinsurgency forces.

Research groups such as the Hoover Institution say al-Qaida and IS brands have practical and symbolic value to their affiliates. But individual groups have different objectives and strategies.

“Claims of allegiance to al-Qaida or IS hide the fact that insurgent groups in Sub-Saharan Africa are essentially local insurgencies, which receive little or no external support,” reports a 2023 Armed Conflict Survey by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “There is very little evidence that al-Qaida or IS has any capacity to provide meaningful support to these self-proclaimed franchises. These jihadist groups are, instead, largely self-financed.”

Although the two groups use violence to topple governments and control society using a strict interpretation of Shariah, their methods and tactics can differ. Unlike IS, al-Qaida has emphasized a long-term insurgency with local alliances and safe havens, according to the Brookings Institution.

FRAGMENTED GROUPS

As terrorist group franchises evolve, their agendas can change, according to the 2023 Armed Conflict Survey.

“Jihadist groups in the region have been evolving, becoming much more localized and intertwined with community and ethnic conflicts,” editor Irene Mia wrote on the institute’s website when the survey was published. “Their international ties to the Islamic State and al-Qaida have weakened, and connections between insurgent groups now appear to be limited to intra-regional collaborations.”

Despite the differences and rivalries between IS and al-Qaida, both want to establish governments with “an unwavering religious regime, and everything modern and liberal is forbidden,” said Dr. David Doukhan in a 2025 report titled “The Birth of a Jihadist State is Closer than ever in West Africa.”

Doukhan said that in West Africa, the organizations are not content with the areas they already control but are “heading towards the Gulf of Guinea countries.”

The Global Coalition Against Daesh formed in 2014 to take on the IS and its affiliates. The 85-country coalition, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) says, has significantly weakened the IS in Iraq and Syria and has now turned its attention to the terrorism groups in Africa. It calls the groups an “evolving threat.”

The coalition says there are five established approaches to anti-terrorism drives:

• Defeating and destroying IS through military action.
• Taking on the groups’ financing and economic infrastructures.
• Preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across borders.
• Supporting stabilization and the restoration of essential public services.
• Countering the groups’ propaganda.

“With the unprecedented spread of violent jihadism on the African continent, the Coalition is right to make Africa its new priority,” the ICCT reported in 2022. “But importantly, the Coalition’s efforts to degrade the Islamic State in Africa cannot be rinse-and-repeat of its previous activities in other parts of the world. The goals, capabilities, and patterns of violence of the Islamic State’s affiliates in Africa present new challenges that must give rise to new strategic outlooks.”  

CURRENT GROUPS

Terrorist groups are difficult to track. Allegiances constantly shift, and groups regularly change their names and tactics. The U.N., terrorism research groups and such organizations as the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center believe these groups remain active on the continent:

• Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is based in Mali and is active across much of West Africa, including parts of Burkina Faso and Niger.
  It exploits local grievances and differences to expand its support in the region. It pays for its operations by ransoming hostages, taxing locals, smuggling weapons, and extorting human and drug traffickers.
  In late 2025, it made its first raids in Nigeria.
  

• Al-Shabaab pledged loyalty to al-Qaida in 2012. The group wants to overthrow the Somali government and expel foreign forces. As of 2025, the group is al-Qaida’s wealthiest component.
  It is estimated to have between 7,000 and 12,000 members. It has become particularly skilled at using radio broadcasts, websites and social media to disseminate its propaganda to local and global audiences.
  Al-Shabaab maintains a stronghold in southern Somalia and mainly conducts operations there, but sometimes also in Kenya and Ethiopia.

• Ansaru, also known as al-Qaida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel, originally was intended to act as a special kidnap-for-ransom wing of Boko Haram. It split off in January 2012 to align with al-Qaida, protesting Boko Haram’s use of indiscriminate attacks. Its membership is unknown.
  It operates in northwest Nigeria and the Benin-Niger-Nigeria tri-border area. The group recruits from local populations by providing services and protection in areas underserved by national governments.

• Boko Haram wants to establish an Islamist state in Nigeria free from Western-style education and influence. Since its founding in 2002, Boko Haram has been associated at times with al-Qaida and IS, but it is not affiliated with either group, researchers believe.
  It operates primarily in northeast Nigeria and also stages raids in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Since 2021, Boko Haram has lost many of its fighters and some territory to a rival IS group, but it continues its assaults in the Lake Chad region. It has about 1,500 members.

• IS-Central Africa (IS-CA) began as an antigovernment insurgency group in Uganda and became a branch of IS in 2019. It is one of the most lethal terrorist groups in Africa, having killed thousands of civilians. IS touts the branch’s attacks in its propaganda.
  It operates primarily in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and also conducts attacks in Uganda. It is believed to have 1,000 to 1,500 members.

• IS-Libya is one of several terrorist groups that emerged in the aftermath of Libya’s two civil wars, seeking to establish an anti-Western caliphate. The group has conducted attacks, kidnappings and executions against a wide range of targets in North Africa. It also has tried to expand IS into other African countries.
  It once had as many as 6,000 members, most of them having served as foreign fighters in Syria. It now reportedly has about 100 to 500 fighters operating in decentralized guerrilla-style desert brigades and networked cells. Some researchers say the organization has been inactive for some time.

• IS-Mozambique, or Ansar al-Sunna, wants to overthrow the Mozambican government and expel foreign influences. Altuna said the group started “just like an Islamist insurgency, not linked to any global jihadist organization” but became big enough to get “somehow accepted under the wing of the caliphate.” IS publicly recognized the branch in 2019 and provides it with technical assistance and financial support, and boosts its attacks in its propaganda.
  It has about 300 fighters and operates primarily in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Since 2021, it has threatened liquid natural gas projects in the region, causing some companies to cease operations.

• IS Sahel Province operates primarily in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It originally was associated with an al-Qaida-aligned group and broke away in 2015 to pledge allegiance to IS, which acknowledged it as a branch in 2022. It has significantly expanded its territorial control into some rural areas, including the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
  Shtuni says it has 2,000 to 3,000 fighters. “By comparison, the strength of this affiliate was estimated at 425 combatants in late 2018,” he said.

• IS-Somalia supports global IS operations by raising money, recruiting fighters internationally and plotting attacks outside Africa. It was formed by al-Shabaab defectors. It pledged allegiance to IS in 2015 and gained its recognition as a branch in 2018.
  It is one of the most profitable IS branches, earning millions of dollars each year from extortion. With 700 to 1,500 fighters, it operates primarily in the Golis Mountains of the Bari region in Somalia’s semiautonomous Puntland State.

• IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) is one of the largest and most lethal IS branches. It controls broad swaths of territory and has killed or displaced thousands of people in Nigeria and neighboring countries. The branch formed in 2015 after splitting from Boko Haram. It collaborates with IS Sahel Province.
  With an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 fighters, it operates primarily in northeastern Nigeria, with pockets throughout the Lake Chad region on the border of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

Map data from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, showing violent events involving the listed groups, July 1, 2024-June 30, 2025, and ACLED showing other attacks. JNIM attacks also include attacks attributed to related terror groups.