More than 1,000 kilometers separate Islamic State group (IS) affiliates in the Lake Chad Basin and the Liptako-Gourma corner of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). However, analysts say the two groups increasingly are able to work together because of porous borders and a lack of regional security cooperation.
In recent months, Lake Chad-based Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) has invested time and manpower supporting the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which is based where Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger come together.
That help includes plans to send 100 ISWAP fighters to buttress ISSP in the Ménaka region after Malian troops retook the region from ISSP control.
Additionally, videos of ISSP’s January attack on Niger’s Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 suggest that ISWAP fighters were involved in that assault. ISSP took credit for the attack, which included its first use of armed drones, but IS propaganda videos reveal fighters speaking Kanuri, a language commonly spoken around Lake Chad, according to Ladd Serwat, senior analyst for Africa at the Armed Conflict Locator and Event Database project (ACLED).
“While ISSP militants come from diverse areas, this may indicate that more experienced drone operators from [ISWAP] …supported the attack,” Serwat noted in an ACLED analysis.
The use of armed drones also suggests that ISWAP was heavily involved in planning and executing the January attack, according to Serwat.
“ISWAP has been the most prolific IS affiliate in Africa to engage in drone warfare,” Serwat noted in the report.
ACLED has recorded 16 ISWAP drone-related actions since 2024. Of those, 10 were attacks. The rest were surveillance missions ahead of attacks on military targets.
Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) shows that northwestern Nigeria has become a new hot spot for ISSP actions as fighters cross from southern Niger into Sokoto and Kebbi states. The point where Benin, Niger and Nigeria meet is home to multiple armed groups, including ISSP.
Niger’s 2023 military coup strained its security relations with Nigeria, as did the decision by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to abandon the Economic Community of West African States to form their own regional bloc, the AES.
Further complicating matters, Niger withdrew from the Multinational Joint Task Force in 2025, leaving a regional counterterrorism gap against ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin.
The AES created a 6,000-member joint security force, but that force remains largely underfunded and ineffective. It is headquartered at the same base that ISSP and ISWAP attacked in January.
Nigerian authorities have said the lack of security among AES nations is increasing insecurity in Nigeria.
Nigeria has increased military operations against ISWAP and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin in recent years. Analysts say it’s unclear whether that approach will reduce the violence ISSP and other terrorist groups are spreading across Nigeria’s western states.
“Continuing to respond narrowly and reactively risks repeating the shortcomings of the Lake Chad Basin counter-terrorism campaign,” researcher Taiwo Adebayo wrote for the ISS earlier this year.
Reactive military approaches fail to target conditions that underpin terrorists’ operations, resilience and financing, Adebayo wrote.
Nigeria’s experience is emblematic of the troubles facing the entire region, according to analysts. The lack of collaboration with its AES neighbors has made it difficult to quell the spreading violence, according to Adebayo.
“Any sustainable progress against common threats across these regions needs cooperation,” Adebayo wrote recently.