Malian terrorist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s tactic of blockading roads and burning convoys of trucks appears designed to undermine the legitimacy of the Malian government, following a model used by other terrorists.
Those roads are crucial lifelines of fuel, food and other resources for the population. Over the last year, JNIM has attacked convoys entering from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal as part of an economic blockade. JNIM also has developed a pattern of blockading communities deemed loyal to the government while rewarding communities that it views as collaborators. It also recruits new members from rural communities where young men lack economic opportunities.
Taken together, JNIM appears to be following the path laid out by other terror groups, including al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaida in Syria and the Taliban in Afghanistan, according to analysts.
“They are already imagining themselves as the new government in Mali,” Nigerian security expert Bulama Bukarti told the BBC. “They have already called on Russia to become their ally if they take over the government.”
Following the model of other Islamic groups, JNIM seeks to portray itself as a legitimate alternative to the ruling junta in Bamako. Nonaggression agreements with local communities frequently put JNIM in the position previously held by the government, while subjecting residents to its strict interpretation of Islam.
In the meantime, the government’s heavy-handed approach toward JNIM and other groups has killed thousands of civilians suspected of belonging to terrorist groups, alienating the population. The most notorious example of the government’s approach is the 2022 Moura Massacre, when soldiers and Russian mercenaries killed hundreds of Fulani men over three days.
JNIM’s blockades echo the tactics used by al-Qaida and the Taliban to undermine government control in Syria and Afghanistan. The blockades also help JNIM to isolate communities, even to the point that Malian security forces abandon the communities or remain sequestered on their bases.
So, could JNIM take over Mali the way the Taliban has Afghanistan or al-Qaida has in parts of Syria?
“Although JNIM may be following a playbook similar to those of other groups, these groups have different capabilities and operate in different local contexts,” analyst Liam Karr wrote recently for the Hudson Institute think tank. In other words: What worked for al-Qaida or the Taliban may not work for JNIM.
For the moment, JNIM sees its blockade of fuel convoys as its chief way to pressure the junta either to surrender or to impose Sharia, strict Mulim law, across the country. Imposing Sharia is not popular among the Malian citizenry, according to Karr.
Meanwhile, the government sends soldiers and Russian Africa Corps fighters to protect convoys. However, as recently as May 19, JNIM had set fire to a convoy traveling to Bamako from Guinea.
“While JNIM may not capture cities, it can impose conditions that could collapse the junta,” Karr added. That could put new leaders in power that are more likely to accede to JNIM’s demands.
Despite their pledge to create a regional force to combat terrorism, the military leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have never funded such a force, leaving each country to deal with JNIM and other groups largely on its own, according to Bukarti.
JNIM has begun extending its reach beyond the Sahel states into northern Benin and in northwestern Nigeria.
Should the Malian junta collapse or give in to JNIM’s demands, the results would likely cascade across the region, Bukarti said.
“Mali is at serious risk of falling,” Bukarti said. “If that happens, Niger will be in serious danger, as will Burkina Faso. It can become a wider West African crisis.”