ADF STAFF
As it seeks to expand its territory, the Sahelian terror organization Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has launched violent attacks in the border areas of multiple Gulf of Guinea countries with one exception: Ghana.
Ghana’s northern region next to Burkina Faso is a place of porous borders, light governmental presence and high economic insecurity. Residents of both countries routinely cross the border outside of formal crossing points.
Experts call the light governmental presence a “sovereignty gap.” It has created a haven where JNIM fighters rest, recuperate from injuries at local hospitals, and restock food and weapons. They then cross the border to fight military and volunteer forces in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and potentially launch attacks into Benin, Nigeria and Togo.
Some analysts describe Ghana’s approach toward JNIM as a “nonaggression pact.” Others see the arrangement as JNIM wanting to avoid losing a key rear base by taking actions that would provoke a heavy response from Ghanaian security forces.
“The absence of real attacks on Ghanaian soil seems to result from JNIM’s calculus of not disturbing supply lines and places of rest as well as not provoking a relatively strong army,” analysts with the Netherlands-based Clingendael wrote in a 2024 report, “A Beacon of Democracy?”
Critics note that security in northern Ghana ebbs and flows with the political season, increasing during election years and reducing at other times. Ghanaian authorities say they have chosen an approach designed keep northern Ghana from turning into another Sahelian battlefield.
On the ground, that approach means border towns such as Hamile and Bawku have become markets through which JNIM fighters launder stolen cattle, taken by force as payment, or “zakat,” from residents of Burkinabe communities they control. The cattle result in a loss of money and nutrition for rural Burkinabe families.
Frederick Appiah Afriyie, founder of the Ghana-based Center for African Security and Strategic Studies (CASSS), sees Ghanaian authorities’ willingness to accommodate JNIM as a dangerous choice that leaves the country vulnerable to attack.
“The conceptual risk of JNIM expansion has now become a practical and imminent risk,” Afriyie wrote recently. “The brewing crisis on Ghana’s northern borders is shaping up to be a major test of the country’s national security and democratic fortitude.”
Northern Ghana’s complex mix of porous borders, economic insecurity and interethnic tensions create an environment ripe for JNIM to exploit, according to Afriyie.
In northeastern Bawku near the border with Togo, for example, a decades-long leadership dispute between Mamprusi and Kusasi ethnic groups creates an environment that JNIM could exploit to sow more division and violence in the region, security analysts say.
“The dynamics observed in the Sahel provide important lessons for coastal states,” Jessica Moody of the Global Terrorism Index wrote recently. “Jihadist groups have consistently exploited local grievances and communal tensions, particularly between herder and farming communities.”
However, heavy-handed security actions could lead to exactly the kind of support for JNIM that the Ghanaian government wants to prevent, he added.
Boosting security in northern Ghana must incorporate community members to serve as the “eyes and ears of the state” to avoid creating the feeling of military occupation, Afriyie wrote.
Beyond that, authorities should continue to invest in vocational training for the region’s young people as part of an economic development strategy and establish a way for ethnic communities to address their differences through dialogue, he added.
“The lessons from the Sahel are harsh,” Afriyie wrote. “Enduring security is not possible without legitimate governance and real economic prospects.”