Asymmetric Threats + Responses at Sea

Case Studies from Iran, Sri Lanka and Somalia

BY FRANCOIS VREŸ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PH.D., FACULTY OF MILITARY SCIENCE, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA

This article was adapted from a paper the author wrote while on exchange to the faculty of the Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen.

Asymmetry can be used to describe several types of conflicts, but it’s a mistake to associate asymmetry exclusively with irregular opponents fighting conventionally structured military forces. Another mistake is to focus only on land-based asymmetry.

Asymmetry is generally understood as the outcome of a process in which weaker actors look for ways to blunt or minimize the effect of superior power employed by a stronger opponent. Superior technological capabilities, for example, can be countered with lesser technologies employed creatively. Asymmetry of actors involves an inferior opponent using a different or unexpected approach. This leads to the view that asymmetry is either a given circumstance or an option exercised by an actor who must decide how to respond or not to respond. Actors can decide to prepare for and employ asymmetry or merely harness it to survive within a given scenario. In some cases asymmetry may well be a cultural aspect emanating from historic ways of operating when confronted by aggressors, as found in the confrontation between Russian forces and Chechen rebels.

The following discussion turns the attention to three asymmetric threats that complicate and add to the busy schedule that modern navies face to uphold order at sea. Of particular relevance to Africa is that the asymmetric strategies form a general backdrop to African armed threats, and it is possible that irregulars could extend their asymmetric capabilities creatively as a strategy to inflict damage upon current and upcoming African navies, as well as Africa’s emergent maritime infrastructure at sea.

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS NAVY

As one can distill from the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence report “Iran’s Naval Forces, From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Stategy,” the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN)  poses a threat to a superior navy by combining asymmetry and revolutionary zeal. The latter attribute forms an important catalyst for swarming and suicide missions against superior forces. The threat plays out in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which has an estimated 17 million barrels of oil passing through it every day. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Tanker War that played out simultaneously in the Persian Gulf attested to the then-inferior position of the Iranian naval forces, which had to tolerate the dominant presence of other big navies (the U.S., Britain, France and Russia). These navies traversed the Persian Gulf to protect their interests, and so limited Iranian leeway to bring pressure upon Iraq by controlling shipping in the Gulf. The Iranians subsequently restructured to form a parallel second and smaller navy alongside the conventional Iranian Navy. The smaller navy was staffed, trained and equipped exclusively for asymmetric warfare.

Bringing together revolutionary zeal, speed and firepower in a maritime theater well-suited for smaller vessels appears to be a practical combination against opponents who have to respond within the confines of conventional doctrine using standard naval vessels. In 2014, the Iranian naval threat in the Persian Gulf remained a parallel revolutionary navy that had readied itself for more than 25 years for an asymmetric confrontation. Western powers have acknowledged the physical and emotional dangers posed by mines, small submarines, coastal batteries and numerous heavily armed small craft.

The IRGCN is primarily directed at opposing naval forces in the Persian Gulf and, in this way, brings asymmetry to any navy-on-navy confrontation, but it may also be used against commercial shipping. Here the IRGCN demonstrates asymmetric capabilities through tactics and naval hardware further infused with a religious and ideological drive with the Persian Gulf as its primary area of operations.

Although the Iranian case reflects a state-driven regular-irregular profile, the lesson for African decision-makers and naval officials is twofold. First is a general lesson on the utility of an irregular naval capability to offset a regular opponent, but also of naval asymmetry to deal with an irregular opponent at sea. Second, and even more important, the asymmetry at sea crafted by opponents is particularly dangerous for African navies that are prone to be confronted by such asymmetry first, rather than naval warfighting of a traditional kind.    

THE SEA TIGERS OF THE LTTE MOVEMENT IN SRI LANKA

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) separatist movement fought the Sri Lankan government from 1983 to 2009 on land and at sea. According to “A Guerrilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War” in Small Wars Journal, establishing the group’s naval arm known as the Sea Tigers was a significant matter for political and military decision-makers. The insurgent force achieved successes against the conventional Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), which was unprepared for the offshore shift of counterinsurgent operations. However, the SLN adjusted over time to successfully oppose the asymmetric threat from an insurgent foe.

Initially, the SLN was ill-equipped to deal even with the basics of the irregular threat at sea posed by the Sea Tigers. The Sea Tigers managed to inflict significant damage on the SLN — especially on the Israeli-built Dvora fast-attack craft; they managed to sink about eight during skirmishes at sea. The impact of the Sea Tigers’ asymmetric tactics made the waters around Sri Lanka dangerous. In effect, the LTTE insurgents successfully challenged the maritime jurisdiction of the official Sri Lankan authorities for quite some time and seriously threatened the order at sea.

The maritime shift by the LTTE movement depended on key elements. The first was its construction of small fast boats with sufficient range and in significant numbers for suicide attacks through swarming tactics. The second was the acquisition of mother ships (civilian freight vessels) that remained on the open ocean and, when required, shipped crucial supplies under armed escort by the Sea Tigers to the LTTE through Sri Lankan territorial waters. Their training and indoctrination provided for suicide attacks at sea performed by the Black Sea Tigers (a special unit of the Sea Tigers), which even managed to sink an SLN patrol vessel. In this way, the LTTE established insurgent sea control over a sector of the northern territorial waters of Sri Lanka. Much of the success of the Sea Tigers was a result of the lack of readiness of the SLN in terms of equipment, training and doctrine, and the general inability of a conventional navy to fight a de facto asymmetric military threat in its territorial waters.

One of the ways the SLN adapted to the asymmetry was by developing its own use of small boats. The SLN could thus expand its presence over the northern coastal waters of Sri Lanka to counter the relative freedom of the Sea Tigers. The SLN eventually effected its own swarming upon the Sea Tigers with its rapid small-boat building program. It also used larger naval craft to establish a reaction capability and a permanent presence at sea with a better mix of vessels and specially trained crews more attuned to the asymmetry they faced. The mobilization of SLN vessels and commercial oceangoing liners led to the eventual destruction of LTTE mother ships. Combined with a determination to bring in better equipment and well-trained crews and response units, the SLN systematically blunted the asymmetric threat and shut down the freedom enjoyed by the Sea Tigers. This contributed to the eventual military defeat of the LTTE on land in 2009.

For African naval decision-makers, the SLN case demonstrates the hotly debated topic of military change by showing how a regular navy can adapt to fighting an asymmetric but existential threat at sea. The adaptation has a negative consequence in that the navy later must readjust its training, equipment and objectives back to that of a regular navy, but this is perhaps a second-order challenge that is much easier.

SEA PIRATES OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA

The IRGCN and the Sea Tigers constitute asymmetric threats in pursuit of a political agenda, but piracy off the Horn of Africa is reflected in Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare by the Rand Corp. as a transnational crime with a financial incentive. The piracy weakens the Somali state and is linked to prominent actors in Somalia and its neighboring countries. The significance of the piracy threat comes primarily from its disruption of shipping in an international sea route. In response, international and national naval task forces now patrol this stretch of ocean. However, the naval contingents found that stemming the piracy threat is complex and requires a significant effort at sea and on land by multiple parties to establish security for the safe passage of maritime traffic. This land-sea interface of responses to an asymmetric threat composed of local and transnational interests brought about an unprecedented international counterresponse.

The anti-piracy effort has brought together an extensive profile of countries and organizations. The naval intervention could not quickly suppress the piracy threat due to different or ill-understood rights and rules of engagement that constrained operations. For a period, asymmetry benefited from international rule constraints for one party and the culture of no self-regulation by the other (the pirates).

The United Nations, in partnership with nongovernmental organizations and industry, did much to muster the desired intergovernmental cooperation at sea. Of particular significance are the U.N. Security Council resolutions that have emerged since 2008 and temporarily lowered the Somali maritime sovereignty barrier to offer foreign navies more leeway to engage pirates, called for naval cooperation to protect aid flows to Somalia, and for international assistance with prosecution. The counterpiracy patrols protected merchant shipping and convoys bringing food into Somalia by apprehending pirates or preventing them from attacking ships. Incidents gradually declined by 2014, and the drop is attributed to a combination of an international willingness to respond, significant naval interventions, and merchant shipping adopting best-security practices for its own protection.

The naval response was complicated by inappropriate domestic legislation and the risk of asylum demands if prosecution was not successful, as well as arduous arrangements to get suspected pirates to host countries and into court. Good intentions initially foundered upon the ill-prepared institutions in East Africa to extend maritime security governance. An asymmetric threat posed by a criminal grouping also made the tasks of the naval forces difficult. Pirates could shift their activities into the Indian Ocean and avoid the naval concentrations or make additional deployments too expensive. The global anti-piracy response nonetheless demonstrated the strengths and shortcomings of international cooperation. Cooperation by responding through numerous agencies slowly constricted the pirates’ free rein. On the negative side, the asymmetry of the piracy threat allowed many to avoid prosecution and shift their operations to waters where U.N. resolutions lost their impact. This shift stretched the available naval forces to the maximum by increasing costs.

The slow progress to overcome the asymmetric advantages embedded in the piracy threat had several consequences. It endangered merchant shipping through delays, detours and costs. Food shipped to the Somali people remained threatened, exacerbating the crisis on land. The threat precluded a quick solution, which also had regional implications for neighboring countries and island states like the Seychelles that were drawn into costly prosecutions, attacks and responses in their own waters. Since early 2011 the South African Development Community began to patrol its eastern waters in a sector roughly demarcated by Mozambique, Tanzania and Madagascar to prevent the maritime insecurity from spilling farther south.

Events off the Horn of Africa (HOA) present African decision-makers with three important lessons. First, piracy became the most prevalent African maritime threat when governments let irregular foes exploit ungoverned spaces at sea. Second, given the turn of the African Union toward recognizing the importance of Africa’s surrounding oceans, deliberate or tangible responses at sea by way of maritime agencies are indispensable. Third, fighting piracy off the HOA offers a primary knowledge hub for African naval leaders to draw upon in responding to extremist threats such as the Islamic State in Libya, which expands so rapidly into any weakly governed spaces on land and at sea.

CONCLUSION

All three cases show how asymmetric threats find their way into the maritime security domain along conventional, insurgent and criminal pathways. The Iranian case demonstrates the reality of introducing asymmetry alongside a conventional navy to offset the advantages held by the blue water navies of powerful governments. However, Iran must now essentially maintain and employ two navies, since each is based upon a fundamentally different culture, platform and doctrine. The case of Sri Lanka shows that insurgent movements can mimic at sea the traditional asymmetry on land that regular forces so often fail to subdue. Navies are not immune to irregular threats at sea and, as demonstrated by the Sea Tigers, become primary targets. The symbolism of modern naval vessels being sunk by flexible insurgent forces is a particularly powerful image of success and thus enticing to insurgent forces. The SLN, however, demonstrates that a navy can adapt when insurgents shift operations offshore by temporarily prioritizing the irregular risk over the symmetry (navy-upon-navy) preferred by conventional naval culture. Finally, the Somali case breaks the military-on-military mold because it depicts the specter of transnational criminal threats from the sea requiring almost disproportionate international responses. In all probability, the Somali case demonstrates a learning curve for what African decision-makers must prepare for in their maritime domains. Causes of Somali piracy, its outfall and responses form complex clusters of variables. The single-most important lesson stems from the impact of coordinated cooperation between multiple agencies and countries as the best practice to contain the effects of bad maritime governance. In the end, the problem requires astute leadership — a phenomenon that still has to mature on land, but shows more progress at sea.