A War of Words

Countering extremism online requires credibility and persistence

ADF STAFF

It is a heated battle in which emotions run high and shots fly back and forth. But in this confrontation, participants use words instead of weapons, and they are limited to 140 characters per volley.

For several years, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, a public affairs officer for the Kenya Defence Forces, has been fighting an informational war on Twitter with the terrorist group al-Shabaab. He uses the social media site to antagonize his opponents, to correct misinformation and, most important, to speak directly to civilians, keeping them informed about the fighting on the ground in Somalia. The ultimate goal, he said, is to win a battle of ideologies.

“We have used the same platform as al-Shabaab to undermine its agenda,” Chirchir said in an interview with Sabahi Online. “Establishing our presence and command in cyberspace was critical for us in fighting the enemy.”

Sometimes, the tweets are humorous. In one, Chirchir wrote to the al-Shabaab Twitter account, HSMPress, telling them they must stop “denying women to wear bras.”

Other times his tweets seek to point out the hypocrisy of the group. After a bombing raid left 30 al-Shabaab militants dead in 2013, Chirchir wrote: “If only [Médecins Sans Frontieres] were still operating in Somalia.” Al-Shabaab had forced the aid group out of the country in August 2013 through repeated attacks that jeopardized the safety of the doctors.

Chirchir, widely known as “the Tweeting Major,” said he is online from 6 a.m. until past midnight each day and finds it vitally important to push back in real time against the claims made by al-Shabaab.

“The old traditional way of doing things is getting overtaken,” Chirchir said in an interview with NTV. “By embracing social media at this particular time of the operation, we want to show everybody, give them a clear picture of what is happening right from the battlefield to their homes and their laptops and their phones.”

A new frontier

In the war against extremism, the Internet is a vibrant space for recruiting adherents and refuting extremist ideology and false claims. Counterterror experts have found that it is cheaper to win the battle of ideas online than to fight a hardened fanatic on the battlefield or in a metropolitan area.

But the war of ideologies requires stepping outside what many consider a comfort zone. It requires engaging the enemy on fairly equal footing. Neither side controls the medium of expression, and attempts to stifle online speech tend to be ineffective. For instance, after the terror attacks in Kenya at the Westgate Shopping Mall, Twitter shut down numerous accounts linked to al-Shabaab. The strategy failed. New accounts quickly sprouted to take the place of the banned ones, and the accompanying attention may have benefited al-Shabaab.

“Given their largely porous structures, censorship of their media messages cannot be properly focused,” wrote analyst Jamie Kerr. “If seriously intent on limiting the online operations of al-Shabaab on their network, Twitter will struggle and end up in a ‘cat and mouse’ scenario where they close one offending account and a new one simultaneously opens.”

Furthermore, efforts to shut down terror websites or social media accounts can obscure a valuable tool for intelligence gathering. The tweets often include kernels of important information, and the lists of people who follow an extremist Twitter feed sometimes include terror sympathizers or financiers. 

So, how can one craft an effective anti-terror message? Researcher Michael Pizzuto determined that any campaign to combat terrorist ideology first must succeed on two levels. It must be credible, and it must be compatible. A credible message comes from a source that the audience perceives as trusted and authentic. For example, a religious scholar will have instant credibility on matters of religious doctrine. A compatible message is spread in a voice and a medium that is accessible and understandable to the audience. For instance, an online-only message would not be compatible with a population that gets its information from radio. Likewise, a dense academic study probably would not be compatible with an uneducated youth.

The aim, wrote Pizzuto, “is to disable a terrorist’s most powerful weapon –– ideology –– and not only prevent future recruits from joining the ranks of terrorist organizations, but also implant an alternative message within a terrorist organization itself, causing an increase in defectors.”

This strategy, which Pizzuto calls “alter-messaging,” must have a clear objective in mind. Analyst Liat Shetret of the Global Center on Cooperative Security said an effective messaging campaign has four important goals:

1. Weaken cult personalities 

Many terror groups are able to recruit the young and impressionable by promoting attractive “cult” figures. The groups take great pains to portray these figures as wise, just and nearly invincible. Past personalities of this type used by al-Qaida have included Anwar al-Awlaki and Osama bin Laden. Mokhtar Belmokhtar played a similar role for the North African group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. 

These figures release recruiting videos, are discussed in chat rooms, and often disseminate religious and political diatribes on the Internet. But the same technology can be used to point out the hypocrisy of these figures. This can be accomplished by demonstrating a disparity between their avowed beliefs and the way they live their lives. For instance, the reputation of the late founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was damaged by revelations that he lived lavishly, was highly educated and drove a Mercedes-Benz. This lifestyle was at odds with his public statements, in which he rejected Western culture and education.

2. Challenge extremist doctrine

Many fanatical groups rely on a twisted interpretation of Islam to motivate and ensnare recruits. These interpretations tend to be easy to refute and, in the hands of a credible messenger (such as a religious scholar or ex-fighter), a doctrinal challenge to extremist groups can swing some fighters intellectually. Mauritania has had some success with this through its program of sending imams into prisons to debate captured Salafist fighters awaiting trial. Some of these debates were broadcast on public television.

3. Dispel the glory of the terrorist lifestyle

The terrorist cause is typically portrayed by its supporters as honorable, glorious and just. The reality of day-to-day life is far different. Effective countermessaging should emphasize the isolation, physical pain of the participant, and the pain inflicted on victims by these groups. In 2012, The Associated Press interviewed al-Shabaab fighters who had fled the group and recounted horrible conditions. They said food was scarce and al-Shabaab leaders killed some of their friends in front of their eyes. “I felt like I was caged like animals,” one ex-fighter said. “We weren’t even allowed to call our parents.”

Terror groups also go to great pains to dehumanize those they target. Effective countermessaging gives voice to these victims and confronts terror adherents with the true, human cost of their actions. Organizations including the Global Survivors Network, which has collected testimony from victims of terror attacks on six continents, have successfully highlighted the pain caused by terror.

Some organizations have found that defectors make the best messengers because they have instant credibility with the audience. Terror expert Dr. Omar Ashour of Exeter University in the United Kingdom said these voices are powerful and persuasive to young ears. “For the first time in the history of Jihadism we are provided with a ‘critical mass’ of former militants who rebelled, not only against the current jihadists’ behavior but also against the ideology that motivates them,” Ashour wrote. “Their message to the younger generations of potential sympathizers and recruits is quite powerful: ‘We were the pioneers of Jihadism and the authors of a large part of its literature. Here are our experiences and here is what went wrong.’ ”

4. Offer a voice that is “street smart” and locally developed

Terror groups tend to recruit on the margins of societies. Recruiters often target young people who feel disconnected from the mainstream and are financially desperate. This explains why slums in many parts of the world have been fruitful ground for future extremists. To sway this at-risk population away from terror, a narrative that is written in the voice of academics or the elite will not be effective. It must sound authentic and resonate with this group.

A successful example of this is Waayaha Cusub, a group of Somali hip-hop artists based in Kenya that has gained a following of young people who connect with the group’s music and its lyrics that denounce al-Shabaab. The group also earned respect because some of the musicians have been attacked by the terror group but refused to be silenced.  

Governmental role

Government agencies, the military and police are clearly capable of producing a counterterror message that reaches a large audience. They have access to sophisticated public relations infrastructure and can spread their message online, in print, by radio or television in most cases. The question is: Can they be credible? 

In the eyes of extremists, a message from a military or government source denouncing terror is almost equivalent to an endorsement. They believe that their cause is just and that the government or the military is the enemy. To be denounced by those organizations is a badge of honor.

So, what can security professionals do to push back? Pizzuto says that where credible messengers such as terrorist dropouts exist, governments can support them so they are better able to spread their message. “Efforts should focus on external elements that do not influence the message or messengers in any way, such as providing resources (e.g., financial, housing) to defecting terrorists,” he wrote. “These individuals may face unforeseeable financial hardship and estrangement from their family after leaving a terrorist organization and, in some cases, assistance to defectors has been ‘highly effective’ in terms of preventing recidivism.”

Pizzuto feels it is best, however, for the government to stay in the background in messaging campaigns. Public awareness efforts about the harm terror visits upon victims and the economy are most effective when organized by civil society groups and do not have an explicit government or military seal of approval.

Recent history shows that too much government involvement can backfire. The British Quilliam Foundation, which advocates against Islamic extremism, was discredited in the eyes of some when news spread in 2011 that it was partially funded by the British government.

With that in mind, security professionals may find it most effective to stick to facts when they engage extremists online. Chirchir of Kenya has regularly used his platform to dispel myths pushed by al-Shabaab, including pronouncements that the militants shot down a Kenyan fighter jet and sank a Navy vessel.

Chirchir also lists the daily successes of the Kenyan Defence Forces and African Union Mission in Somalia troops, complete with numbers of al-Shabaab fighters killed or captured. “We broadcast our gains and hit the minds of its fighters blow by blow,” he said.

One of Chirchir’s most popular tweets warned Kenyans and Somalis against selling donkeys to al-Shabaab because the animals were being used to carry weapons.

It is difficult to calculate the effect of this type of online engagement, but on January 9, 2014, al-Shabaab leaders issued a statement that some perceived as a white flag of surrender in the information war. Beginning in 15 days, the group said, all Internet and mobile phone service would be banned in areas al-Shabaab controlled. The group, which once prided itself on being tech savvy, began walking door to door and confiscating Internet-enabled mobile phones in Somali villages.