One of the challenges in Nigeria’s war on terrorism has been the blurry lines between combatants and civilians. Militant groups use human assets and combine local knowledge with a growing use of surveillance technology.
Boko Haram and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are strongest in the restive northeast, where espionage and on-the-ground information-gathering form the backbone of their intelligence networks.
Attacks by the rival groups in the past year have increased in frequency and intensity in the Lake Chad Basin, which straddles the borders of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Célestin Delanga, a researcher with the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies think tank, said both groups have bolstered their ability to gather and analyze information.
“These offensives by the Boko Haram factions, sometimes on the same targets in one week, are generally preceded by espionage, which is rapidly evolving with new technologies,” he wrote.
While people act as the “eyes and ears” on the ground, the terrorist groups are increasingly using technology to reveal threats and target military and civilian vulnerabilities.
“Boko Haram uses advanced technologies including drones and other specialized electronic devices for eavesdropping, surveillance and photography to collect and process information,” Delanga wrote. “Fighters use satellite and cellphones, social media, high-definition digital cameras and other technologies for propaganda and to gather intelligence for attacks.”
Boko Haram and ISWAP primarily rely on networks of family members, friends and ex-combatants to supply information. Former fighters told the institute that in planning attacks, their leaders typically designate several men to infiltrate target communities days in advance to collect information.
“Many fighters lead double lives,” Delanga wrote. “They live between their communities and insurgent camps, collecting information for the terror group.
“Interviews with ex-combatants reveal that several active combatants do business with their family members, sending them money for subsistence, including support for farming or other agricultural tasks, small-scale trade and livestock farming.”
Borno State Gov. Babagana Zulum made headlines last year when he claimed that the terrorist groups have infiltrated much of society.
“[They] have informants and collaborators within the Nigerian armed forces, within the politicians and within the communities,” he said on Lagos-based News Central TV in May 2025. “What we shall do is to strengthen our intelligence and to deal with them ruthlessly.”
He admitted that Nigeria’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are rife with double agents and dissatisfied ex-combatants who return to Boko Haram and ISWAP with information and contacts.
“Among the 500,000 or more that have repented, I cannot rule out the possibility of a few of them going back to the bush,” Zulum said. “I cannot completely say that 100% of those people who have surrendered are doing the right thing, but I want to assure you that over 99% are doing well and are not participating in the ongoing terrorism.”
Nigeria can improve its DDR programs with more oversight and a greater focus on countering extremist ideologies, Delanga said.
“Many non-deradicalized ex-combatants are back in their communities without any supervision and continue to provide information to active fighters,” he wrote.
Nigeria has invested heavily in military intelligence, but Delanga said the other members of the Lake Chad region’s Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) must do the same and work to improve intelligence sharing.
“Governments in the region should invest more in human, open-source and imagery intelligence,” he wrote. “This would help counter and dismantle Boko Haram’s information-gathering system, improve counter-espionage and strengthen the MNJTF’s intelligence capabilities to neutralize the groups and their camps — and the ideology and rhetoric attracting youth to these groups.”