A Deadly Quest

Extremist groups seek CBRN weapons, but what is the likelihood of an attack?

ALEXANDER DETERT/ALUMNUS OF THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

Instability in the wake of the Arab Spring and a new crop of aggressive terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have prompted some to announce that we are entering a new era of extremism. This means it is necessary to look at old threats from new angles, such as the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorist organizations.

Has extremism changed to a degree that contemporary terrorist groups may pursue CBRN? Previously reluctant groups could overcome what counterterrorism researcher Adam Dolnik calls “motivational constraints” to using CBRN weapons due to the allure of media attention and a desire to prevail in competition with other terrorist organizations. They also might take advantage of changes in CBRN weapon availability, method of delivery and degree of complexity. To examine the threat, it is important to look at the three main aspects of a terrorist attack which have been defined by terrorism expert James Forest as intention, capability and opportunity.

TERRORIST MOTIVATORS

Media attention

Terrorists use violence as a form of communication to influence their audience. Therefore, media attention is a central goal of many terrorist organizations. The media are most attracted to high-casualty terror incidents, such as aircraft hijackings and attacks against targets associated with Western countries. Conversely, attacks in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan are perceived as normal and receive less international media attention and public interest.

To maintain or regain media attention, terrorists “must heighten the threshold for the spectacular assault,” according to Robert Kupperman of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This helps to explain the tendency of terrorists to focus on maximizing the number of victims by acting indiscriminately against civilian targets and by increasing the use of suicide attacks. Compared to conventional terrorist tactics, CBRN attacks would provide the needed stimulus to attract media attention. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been called “weapons of mass disruption” due to their wide-ranging impact on society.

WMD use by terrorists is the highest threat to the security of the West and is its greatest fear. Therefore, it may be enough for terrorist organizations to simply threaten to use such weapons. For example, on December 24, 1998, Osama bin Laden stated in an interview with Time magazine that “acquiring weapons (WMD) for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty,” a statement that drew the attention of global media organizations and Western governments.

One could argue that the use of CBRN weapons would discredit a terrorist group, especially when people identify with the victims. But extremist groups believe the intense media coverage and massive audiences are worth that risk. An attack would facilitate the spread of fear and bring a net increase in customer interest enabling perpetrators to broadcast their message on an unprecedented scale.

A desire to stand out amid the steady flow of terrorism reporting is a strong potential motivator for contemporary extremist organizations to use CBRN weapons.

Competition between extremist organizations

When al-Qaida issued a statement on February 2, 2014, that it had no connection to ISIS, it was a sign that the fight for the world’s top position among the extremist organizations had reached a new level of intensity. Al-Qaida’s fear of losing global influence and credibility among extremist followers and affiliated groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, which are favoring ISIS, could be regarded as a potential motivator to stage another spectacular terror attack. Al-Qaida could use the publicity it would gain to demonstrate its capabilities to a global audience and reclaim its leadership position among extremist organizations. To achieve the needed psychological impact and harm the greatest number of victims, al-Qaida is now more likely to attempt a CBRN attack than in the past. It will assess the feasibility of CBRN in this context. Most analysts agree that such an event would likely bear al-Qaida’s signature of simultaneous and well-coordinated suicide attacks on multiple targets associated with the West.

CBRN TERROR POTENTIAL

Acquisition of chemical weapons

The acquisition of ready-to-use military-grade chemical weapons in a quantity that would allow for an effective terrorist attack and of the necessary delivery systems would be possible only for nonstate actors under three circumstances: (1) through transnational organized crime channels (TNOC); (2) through a rogue state in possession of chemical weapons, as could happen with Hezbollah and the Syrian Assad regime; or (3) by forcefully seizing weapons from state-owned stockpiles, as may have already happened during the Syrian insurrection, or during the ISIS seizure of the disused Iraqi chemical weapons complex in Muthanna.

The development and manufacture of chemical weapons in an adequate quality and quantity would most likely be too complex and expensive for most terrorist organizations, as demonstrated by Aum Shinrikyo, the group that released the nerve agent sarin into train cars on the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 and injuring about 6,000. It is easier to acquire toxic dual-use chemical substances meant for industrial or agricultural applications than military-grade chemical weapons.

Usability of chemical weapons

The simplest method of chemical weapon delivery is to release chemical agents in the target area, as was done in the 1990 attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on a Sri Lankan military base in East Kiran. Extremists could also use a structure’s heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system to disperse the chemical.

Improvised chemical weapons made from conventional explosives and dual-use chemicals, such as toxic industrial chemicals or pesticides, are the most likely type of CBRN weapon for terrorism. The low degree of complexity and widespread availability of the necessary components make this kind of chemical weapon attractive to extremists with budget constraints.

The 2004 al-Qaida plot to use chemical weapons against official buildings in Amman, Jordan, and the 2003 al-Qaida New York City subway plot, both involving dual-use chemicals, show that terrorist organizations have already explored such methods. Another possible CBRN terrorism scenario would be the release of toxic substances through an attack on, or sabotage of, an industrial installation containing toxic chemicals situated close to the intended target area. A terrorist attack of this kind could have the same impact as the 1984 Bhopal, India, industrial gas leak that killed thousands and injured half a million.

Acquisition of biological weapons

The pathogens necessary to construct a biological weapon could be harvested in nature, acquired through TNOC networks or stolen from medical research facilities. Although terrorist organizations could produce pathogens themselves, the process would involve high-tech production facilities capable of turning out adequate quantities and the proper means of storage, transportation and delivery of the specific agent. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, was unable to successfully develop and utilize biological weapons, despite massive investment, and decided to use chemical weapons instead.

Usability of biological weapons

Biological pathogens can be dispersed through a ventilation system, the food or water supply, through objects like the mail, or can be placed in an improvised explosive device (IED). The problem with the IED method is that up to 50 percent of the pathogen is destroyed by the dispersal explosion, according to Forest’s research.

There is less risk of biological weapons use in contemporary terrorism because of the inherent complexity of acquisition, storage, transport and delivery. In addition, once the problems of identifying the specific agent are overcome, its effect on human targets can usually be medically mitigated, according to research by Edward Hoffer.

The high degree of complexity related to development and delivery, in comparison to other types of CBRN weapons, and the lack of instant impact on the target population due to the pathogen-specific incubation time, make biological weapons a poor choice for a contemporary terrorist group, according to Forest.

Acquisition of radiological weapons

Several highly radioactive elements suitable for the construction of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or radiation-emitting devices (RED) are widely obtainable because of their use in medicine and industry. Terrorists can acquire these materials through criminal networks or by stealing them from unsecured medical or industrial facilities.

Although the construction of a radiological device is a rather simple mechanical process, personnel risk exposure while handling radioactive substances during the acquisition of the materials, the construction of the device, and its storage, transport and delivery.

Usability of radiological weapons

RDDs can be constructed in any form currently used for conventional IEDs. The radiological substances would increase the secondary effects of the IED, such as contamination of the target area and radiation poisoning of victims and first responders.

Despite increased security measures and built-in safety mechanisms against direct and indirect attacks for nuclear power plants worldwide, a terrorist attack on such a facility to turn it into a huge RDD should not be ruled out.

REDs are delivered by placing a radioactive substance where radiation will affect many people, such as a subway station or airport, an indoor stadium, a church, a government center or an office building. The 1995 Moscow Ismailovsky Park incident, which remains the only known attempt to use radiological weapons, demonstrates the potential of a RED. Radiological weapons will most likely cause widespread fear and panic, especially when the target population becomes aware of the contamination. “The psychological effects would be the most devastating, mainly because of the automatic association of the word ‘radioactive’ with the word ‘nuclear’ in the minds of the majority of the world population,” Adam Dolnik wrote in 2008 when he was director of research programs at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention in Australia. “In reality, however, more people would probably die in stampedes and car accidents resulting from the panicking population’s desire to leave the affected area immediately, than from direct effects of radiation.”

Because of the high psychological impact on the target population, the use of a radiological weapon in a terrorist attack is possible. This type of CBRN weapon could be used for a large-scale, high-impact terrorist attack by a well-funded extremist organization.

Acquisition of nuclear weapons

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was concern that terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-grade material from one of the former Soviet republics. Al-Qaida made several attempts to acquire weapons-related materials and knowledge from elements in former Soviet republics, Pakistan and sources in Africa, according to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Besides the risk of nuclear proliferation posed by the arsenals of Pakistan and India and the weapons programs of North Korea and Iran, TNOC networks remain the most likely sources for nuclear weapons, components and radioactive materials.

The Umma Tameer-e-Nau, run by Bashiruddin Mahmood, or Abdul Qader Khan’s network, are two examples of TNOC networks that were active in this field before being shut down.

Usability of nuclear weapons

The United States and other nations consider a nuclear armed terrorist group to be the worst-case scenario. Al-Qaida has obviously also recognized this potential since it is known to have run a nuclear weapon program under Abdel Aziz al Masri since 1999, though it has not pursued this type of weapon recently, Mowatt-Larssen wrote.

The use of nuclear weapons as a terrorist weapon is very unlikely. It’s generally assumed that nonstate actors don’t have the capacities to acquire weapons-grade material in the required quantities, manufacture the weapons parts in isolation, construct a working device from these parts, and maintain the device properly during storage to keep it operational.

Extremist organizations intend to acquire CBRN weapons of all types to a certain degree. The capability of an organization to acquire or construct CBRN weapons depends on the specific group and the type of weapon. The CBRN capabilities of an established, well-funded, experienced group such as al-Qaida are higher than those of less established groups in Africa or parts of the Middle East.

Intent to acquire and use biological and radiological weapons is comparatively low. Extremist organizations can acquire or produce biological weapons, but they are severely limited by the complexity and costs. Acquiring materials and components for radiological and nuclear weapons was easier after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but opportunities are limited today. Although al-Qaida displayed the intention to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1990s and early 2000s, it seems to be less of a priority now.

The nuclear capabilities of nonstate actors, including extremist organizations, can be regarded as very low to nonexistent.

There is no evidence of a significant change in capabilities for any of the different CBRN technologies in recent years. The acquisition and use of chemical weapons seems to be of a higher priority than other types of CBRN weapons. The agents and materials for chemical weapons are generally more affordable, easier to acquire, and safer and simpler to construct, handle and deploy. The ongoing war in Syria, where there are still military-grade chemical weapons, has undoubtedly facilitated the acquisition of such weaponry.

There have been several cases in recent years in which extremists attempted to acquire and use chemical weapons, usually toxic dual-use chemicals, that are easier to obtain and less complex to use in improvised weapons. The case of ISIS seizing the unused Iraqi chemical weapons complex in Muthanna is an alarming indicator for this trend.

As a result, the most likely extremist CBRN terrorism scenario involves improvised chemical weapons attacks. There is incentive and opportunity to use this affordable and unsophisticated type of CBRN weapon to gain the attention of international media in an attempt to establish dominance in the current extremist infighting and power struggles. Considering all the above, the use of certain types of CBRN weapons by contemporary extremist organizations has become more likely.  q

Alexander Detert is an alumnus of the George C. Marshall Center’s master’s program in international security studies with a counterterrorism concentration. He served in the German Armed Forces in the field of special operations, as an Army aviator and as a U.N. military observer. He earned a master’s degree from the University of the German Armed Forces in Munich and is a graduate of both the Marshall Center’s Program on Terrorism Security Studies and Program on Applied Security Studies.