CMDR. OWONAM EQUERE, NIGERIAN NAVY
Africa has witnessed a troubling surge in coups d’état, reminiscent of the early postcolonial decades when they were common. From 2020 to 2023, there were nine successful military coups in Africa, with six taking place in West Africa: two in Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), one in Guinea (September 2021), two in Burkina Faso (January 2022 and September 2022), and one in Niger (July 2023). Within the period, reports of attempted coups in The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger and Sierra Leone show the potential for further political instability.
West Africa faces multiple security challenges such as terrorism, violent extremism, intercommunal violence and banditry. There is evidence that the spate of coups is worsening the region’s fragility. Burkina Faso saw a doubling in fatalities from extremist violence in the year after its coups. Niger saw a 60% rise in fatalities from extremist violence in the year after the coup. Mali experienced a 70% surge in terror attacks in the year after the 2021 coup.
Key Drivers of West African Coups
Several factors played a role in this coup resurgence. First is the geopolitical climate. Many of the recent coups took place in former French colonies, allowing coup leaders to take advantage of anti-French sentiment and present themselves as heroes fighting colonialism. Related to this is the geopolitical rivalry in the Sahel of the West, Russia and China for resources and influence. The juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger received tacit or explicit support from Russia that bolstered legitimacy of their regimes, undermined the anti-coup responses and emboldened other military plotters in the region seeking to disrupt constitutional democracy. Most of the nations under military rule have moved into Russia’s orbit of influence and welcomed Russian mercenaries to operate on their territory.
Another factor is the lack of good governance by elected political leaders in coup-affected countries. The failure of many African leaders to honor social contracts with their citizens and use democratic power for public good creates the conditions for popular support of military coups. Pervasive corruption, extreme poverty, widespread unemployment and insecurity characterize the four countries recently affected by military coups. It’s little wonder that most of these coup leaders were welcomed by citizens who were desperately looking for a leadership alternative. It further highlights the crisis in the state-society relationship.
Coups in the region have been enabled by the crisis in civil-military relations and a politicization of the security sector. Some leaders use the military for regime protection or “coup proofing.” This strategy includes the creation of presidential guards with enormous power and authority beyond the military institution. In most cases, these guards are established outside the recognized military chain of command without accountability and transparency. They are packed with soldiers believed to be loyal to the regime. The result is the erosion of the core military values of professionalism, loyalty to the constitution and organizational discipline. It is thus unsurprising that most coups in the region have been led by elements of the presidential guard, while the military as an institution remained aloof.
Similarly, the perceived inability of the government to guarantee the security of its citizens creates favorable conditions for coups. The dynamism of the security environment has exposed the huge gap between the capacity of national security institutions and the increasing activities of terrorist groups. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel now accounts for 43% of global terrorism deaths. Ineffective civilian leadership, coupled with the limited capacity of security forces to discharge their responsibilities, increases public pressure on the military and provides justification for coups.
A Region in Peril
The nexus of instability in the Sahel is the tri-border area shared by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This is the epicenter of a fast-growing crisis with unprecedented levels of armed violence and insecurity. More than 12.8 million people need humanitarian assistance across these countries. Millions have been displaced, and there are widespread disruptions to schools, health care and agriculture. All three countries are ruled by military juntas.
Coup leaders often cite this insecurity to justify their actions, but coups have tended to worsen the problems instead of addressing them.
Diminished state capacity: The first obvious impact of coups d’état is the weakening of national political leadership and state capacity. Coups often result in fractured and weak political leadership that might not prioritize cooperation on regional security. Military leaders often lack the international credibility, political will and experience needed to address security challenges. For instance, before the coup in Niger, the democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum played a significant role in rallying international support in the regional fight against terrorism and irregular migration. He also attracted funding for developmental initiatives in the Sahel. However, since his overthrow in 2023, the junta’s priority has been to consolidate power and protect itself. Similarly, in Burkina Faso and Mali, the political transition challenges have distracted from efforts to fight regional insurgencies. In the same vein, the international sanctions imposed after coups weaken state capacity to respond to insecurity. For instance, in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, there was a cessation of defense and security assistance by Western allies, which was exacerbated by the diplomatic, trade and financial sanctions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This international isolation not only affects states’ ability to contribute to regional security efforts but also lessens their capacity to address humanitarian needs. The resulting vacuum lets terrorists ingratiate themselves to local populations by providing basic services and goods and promising to provide the protection that the central government failed to deliver.
Broken security partnerships: Coups also are derailing security partnerships. In recent years, the challenges posed by terrorism and insurgency in the Sahel have spurred several security cooperation initiatives, including the Multinational Joint Task Force, the French-led Operation Barkhane, the European Union-led Takuba mission, the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali. Coups have undermined nearly all of these cooperative arrangements. Since taking power in Mali in August 2020, the military junta has taken steps to alienate its regional and international security partners. These include detaining Ivoirian Soldiers sent to support the U.N. mission, expelling senior U.N. officials and unilaterally withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. This reduced Mali’s security coordination with its neighbors and exposed its border areas to attacks. The juntas in Burkina Faso and Niger also alienated traditional security partners, which led to decreased military pressure against the terrorist groups.
As Western allies scaled down their support for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in response to the coups, a gap was left in the regional security architecture. The consequence is that insurgent groups can consolidate political control, enforce conservative ideology in occupied territories and complicate state efforts to reestablish control of these areas. These juntas have sought alternative partners, especially Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries. The introduction of the Wagner Group into the regional security complex raises concerns given its history of human rights abuses and efforts to extract profit in conflict zones.
Harm to cross-border trade: Coups are disrupting cross-border developmental initiatives in the Sahel. Some key developmental projects include the Trans-Saharan Highway, Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and the Nigerian-Morocco Gas Pipeline. These projects are essential to regional connectivity and integration, which lowers the potential for conflicts over resources, enhances regional resilience to security threats and contributes to long-term stability. Coups not only limit the ability of international partners to work with affected countries; they also undermine cross-border security arrangements such as surveillance systems and joint development of infrastructure at border crossings. They also limit the implementation of joint border control mechanisms to check the movement of illicit goods, weapons and individuals involved in crime or terrorism. Terrorists and transnational criminals can exploit gaps created by weakened cross-border security arrangements.
Weakened regional blocs: The proliferation of coups in West Africa has the potential to weaken ECOWAS. The inability of ECOWAS to stop or reverse coups through sanctions or military intervention could lead to a loss of confidence in the regional bloc. Juntas in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger have been emboldened and formed an alliance to dilute the effectiveness of ECOWAS sanctions such as border closures. The three Sahel countries upped the ante by further announcing their withdrawal from the regional bloc and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, complicating ECOWAS engagements with their respective transitional military leaders. This division and rift within ECOWAS could weaken its influence and anti-coup stance, increasing the possibility of future coups. A weakened ECOWAS has implications for its role in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping. Similarly, regional security initiatives in combating terrorism, organized crime and cross-border security threats could be compromised.
The Way Forward
The current situation in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has affected the states’ capacity to contribute to the regional fight against terrorism, derailed regional cooperative efforts, disrupted cross-border development initiatives and potentially risks weakening ECOWAS. Against this backdrop, the African Union, ECOWAS and the international community need a more nuanced approach. The sanction regime on the juntas is not having the desired deterrent effect, but rather isolates these countries that are crucial to the regional security architecture. Accordingly, the AU and ECOWAS need to intensify diplomatic engagements with the transitional military leaders for a swift return to constitutional order. When constitutional order is restored, the AU and ECOWAS need to push for comprehensive security sector reform in these countries to ensure that the militaries are professional, adequately funded and able to respond to the security challenges they face.
Also, it is imperative for the AU to work closely with ECOWAS to lead the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel, reducing the overreliance on international partners and the risks associated with their premature pullouts. Given the weaknesses of the affected countries and the potential of a spillover of violence, coastal countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo need to carry out regular risk analyses to elevate their state of readiness to respond to threats from the Sahel, and the resulting humanitarian crises. To discourage further coups the AU and ECOWAS should strictly and impartially enforce democratic and governance norms as enshrined in the various normative frameworks. The AU and ECOWAS must take swift and decisive action against leaders who violate the principles of democratic governance.
About the author: Navy Cmdr. Owonam Equere is a seaman officer in the executive branch of the Nigerian Navy. He is part of Nigeria’s Permanent Mission to the Africa Union. He holds a bachelor’s degree in biological sciences from the Nigerian Defence Academy, a master’s degree in environmental management from the University of Lagos, and a master’s degree in defense and international politics from the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. Equere is pursuing another master’s degree in peace and conflict management at the International Peace Support Training Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.