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AFRICA DEFENSE FORUM

INTO THE TERROR SANCTUARY

**Chad
Liberates
Northern
Mali**


**FINANCING
EXTREMISM**
**Good Money,
Bad Outcomes**

**Across
Africa's Arc
of Instability**

Plus

The Fight Against the LRA Takes to the Airwaves





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CORBIS

ON THE COVER:

Members of the Chadian Army assemble near the city of Kidal in northern Mali in April 2013. Chad played a crucial role in stabilizing the region by deploying 2,000 Soldiers as part of an international effort to liberate Mali from extremists.

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In many ways, the continent of Africa is more peaceful today than it has been in decades. A 2012 analysis published in the journal *African Affairs* showed that conflicts on the continent have been decreasing in number, size and brutality since the early 1990s.

But patches of instability remain. The fallout from the Arab Spring has resulted in loose weapons and volatile political environments across North Africa and the Sahel. The terrorist group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, though weakened after the international intervention in Mali, still lurks in ungoverned areas and moves across porous borders. Extremist groups such as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia hold sway over sizable territories.

These groups not only threaten the lives of peace-loving Africans, they could derail the continent's rapidly growing economies. Looking forward, even if interstate conflict and civil wars continue to be rare, terror groups will seek out civilian targets. The mass murder in Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall in September 2013 was a painful reminder of the bloodshed possible at the hands of a few dedicated fanatics.

Nations will need to adopt an all-of-the-above approach to fighting terror. In its Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, the Economic Community of West African States outlined a comprehensive approach to the problem that has three main pillars: prevention, pursuit and reconstruction.

Prevention includes gathering intelligence and countering terrorist narratives that lead to radicalization. Security professionals must also train to recognize the calling cards of terror groups before they attack and work to defend likely targets such as critical national infrastructure. **Pursuit** calls for a multipronged approach, including a strong military that is backed by community policing, border security and banking controls to block terrorist financing. Finally, **reconstruction** deals with rebuilding a society after a terrorist event. It asks officials to address some of the root causes of terrorism, including religious and ethnic conflict, and unequal access to resources.

Building security capacity to meet these challenges will require partnership, fortitude and communication among all nations in the region. The dynamic nature of the terror threat requires intelligence sharing, resource pooling, and joint training programs to ensure a synchronized and united front. Together, we can pave the way for a prosperous and peaceful future.

U.S. Africa Command Staff



Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Rangers secure an area while on patrol near the coastal town of Kismayo, Somalia. The KDF is part of the African Union Mission in Somalia. REUTERS



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CONTINENT'S LIGHT WILL NOT BE DIMMED



Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama addressed the 68th United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 2013, in New York City days after terrorists attacked Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. This is an edited version of his remarks.

Before I left Ghana to attend this assembly, I learned of the terrorist attack that took place in Nairobi, Kenya. I was shocked and deeply saddened to hear of the many lives that were lost to those senseless and cowardly acts of violence.

As the death toll increased, so too did my grief, knowing that each additional number symbolized one more human life. Those numbers symbolized individuals who may have been strangers to you or to me but were of prime significance in the lives of the people who loved them: parents, children, husbands, wives, friends, colleagues.

When independence was upon us and our possibilities felt endless, the world saw how brightly Africa could shine. Then, for decades, that light was dimmed. There was a time when killing seemed almost commonplace in Africa. Indeed, there are plenty of graves that remain unmarked. There was a time when the ruthlessness of dictators seemed to be the order of the day. For decades the corruption, greed and depravity of a few caused the suffering of an entire continent.

We so easily could have succumbed to the wars, the poverty, the diseases — but we did not. We staggered our way through, year after year, but eventually we made it. We survived.

There is no place in today's Africa for hatred and intolerance and the murder of innocent people. Not anymore. Not ever again. So we will mourn our dead. We will console

ourselves and each other through the grief. But we cannot allow terror to defeat us. This must strengthen our resolve.

Ghana has been steadfast in our cooperation with regional neighbors to maintain the security of those nations that are enjoying stability and to restore security to those, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, that have recently emerged from turmoil.

We like to make mention of how the world has become a global village, especially when speaking of technology, culture and travel. The facility of that global village exists for warmongers and terrorist groups as well. They are using it to recruit new members, expand their cells, create inter-continental networks, obtain weapons, and conceal their identities as well as locations.

If we are to fight back, we must also work cooperatively. Nations in the developed world must align themselves with nations in the developing world. We must form partnerships and work together.

Fledgling democracies tend to be fragile. Their limits are still being tested; their characteristics are still being defined. Democracy is not a one-size-fits-all venture. Nor is it a one-time event. It is a system that takes decades to build, a process that pushes you toward a perfection you will never reach, but must try nonetheless.

The reason we are all gathered here today is to find the ways and the means to create a better, more peaceful and prosperous world.



A girl lights a candle during a ceremony in Nairobi, Kenya, on September 28, 2013, paying tribute to those killed in the Westgate Shopping Mall attack.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS



A farmer examines crops in Kumi, eastern Uganda.

CENTRE FOR AGRICULTURE AND BIOSCIENCE

PLANT CLINICS SPREAD *to help* UGANDAN FARMERS

IRIN

“Plant doctor” Daniel Lyazi cuts apart a slime-covered cabbage at a farmers’ market in Mukono, central Uganda, where the devastating cassava brown streak disease first was identified in 2004.

“There’s a small caterpillar which is eating the cabbage, and according to me, it’s a diamond-back moth,” he tells farmers who crowd around his table.

Lyazi advises the cabbage grower to switch pesticides and plant some onions as an additional repellent to moths, and he fills out a form with this prescription before turning to the next “patient,” an undersize cassava tuber.

Free “plant clinics” like this one were piloted in Mukono in 2006 and by 2013 had spread to 45 of Uganda’s 112 local government districts, according to the Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience (CABI), based in the United Kingdom.


CABI adopted the term “plant doctor” for the 1,000 agricultural extension workers it has helped train as part of its Plantwise program. Since 2010, Plantwise has set up

plant clinics in 24 countries, including three in West Africa and nine in East Africa. In August 2013, it opened 13 in Zambia.

Plant pests and diseases are major threats to food security and livelihoods in most developing countries. Farmers’ need for advice was evident at Lyazi’s clinic in Mukono. During a three-hour session, consultations were nonstop, and 17 farmers were given detailed recommendations, verbally and on “prescription” sheets.

Erifazi Mayanja, head of a local farmers’ group, said the clinics are beneficial: “That’s why we have come in great number today, because of the good advice we are getting.”

There is also an exponential effect of farmers receiving advice at a clinic and passing on the information to neighbors with the same problem, said Misaki Okotel of nongovernmental organization Self Help Africa, a partner with CABI. Plantwise reports that, as of 2013, its doctors had advised 200,000 farmers, and the organization aims to reach 800,000 in 31 countries in 2014.





Microchips Protect Kenya's Rhinos from Poachers

VOICE OF AMERICA

Kenyan wildlife officials have begun inserting microchips into rhinos in a bid to combat poachers, who kill the animals for their horns. Officials said the chips and accompanying scanners will let them track the animals and help authorities link recovered or confiscated horns to poaching cases.

The Kenyan Wildlife Service received the equipment from the World Wildlife Fund, whose Kenya spokesman Robert Magori said each rhino will have one chip implanted in its body and a second chip embedded in its horn.

"When a rhino is killed and the horn is hacked off and taken away, if this horn is confiscated and the microchip tag can be identified, it can be tracked back

to a poached animal and it can actually show and prove that this was a poaching incident," he said.

Poaching incidents are on the rise in Kenya, which has a relatively small population of about 1,000 rhinos. Magori said poachers killed at least 23 of the animals in 2012 and had killed at least 10 as of October 2013.

He expected the microchips will help deter thieves who are tempted to hack off rhino horns and then try to smuggle them out of the country.

"They will have no idea where the microchips are, and so it could be extremely dangerous for them to go through ports of entry as well as any immigration areas without them being noticed," Magori said.

Rhino horns are often sold in Asian countries where some consumers believe they have healing properties. But experts say they are worthless as a cure for diseases. The horns are made from the same material as human fingernails.



Officers from Kenyan Wildlife Services implant microchips in a sedated black rhino in November 2013 to prevent poaching of the endangered mammal.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES



REUTERS

Rwanda Plans to Offer Free Wi-Fi Nationwide

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

People surf the Internet at a free Wi-Fi spot at Kigali International Airport. Kigali is setting up free citywide wireless connectivity.



wanda is trying to reinvent itself as a regional high-tech hub by rolling out free citywide, and eventually nationwide, wireless connectivity.

"I came to use the Internet. Sometimes I download video and books," said South Korean development worker Lee Il-mo, 31, a resident of Kigali for the past two years. "Before, I went to restaurants or coffee bars and I had to buy

a drink, but here it's a free area," he said, sitting in Kigali City Tower — a zone slated as the city's new tech hub and one of the first steps of the "Smart Kigali" project.

In September 2013, the Rwandan government announced it had started to cover the capital with wireless hot spots. This was the first step of a plan to provide Wi-Fi coverage to all schools and public buildings, markets, bus stations and hotels in the city and, eventually, to the entire country.

Jean Philibert Nsengimana, Rwanda's minister in charge of information technology, said he wanted to see the plan "accelerate growth of the Internet sector" and attract more investors. "Connectivity is one of the most important draws for business in this age of digital economy," he said, asserting that free Wi-Fi was merely a step in the direction of a much bigger infrastructure goal — that of fourth-generation, or 4G, access.

In June 2013, the Rwandan government contracted with South Korea's KT Corp. to build a 4G network to deliver to 95 percent of the country, up from the estimated 10 percent who have 3G access. "Broadband access," said Nsengimana, "has to be considered as an essential, just like water and electricity."

Rwanda is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa, and the World Bank's ease of doing business index for 2013 ranked Rwanda 52nd out of 185 countries, the third best in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The government now wants to push economic growth to 11.5 percent for each of the next five years, drive poverty from 45 percent to below the 30 percent mark, and reach middle-income status by 2020.

BENDING THE CURVE

Bringing Peace to Africa's 'Arc of Instability' Will Require Action in the Security Sector and the Halls of Government

ADF STAFF
PHOTOS BY REUTERS

The 7,000-kilometer cross-continental journey that begins in the Horn of Africa and stretches across the Sahel into West Africa will pass through numerous conflict areas. The band of territory is rife with poverty, illicit trafficking, war, terrorism and ethnic unrest. The path shares common characteristics that have led it to be known by some as the “arc of instability.”

In Somalia, al-Shabaab militants capitalized on years of lawlessness to dole out murder at home and beyond. Rebel groups hold sway in parts of South Sudan and, farther north, factions continue to clash in Darfur. In Libya, weapons flow across the border into neighboring countries. In Mali, a complicated stew of ethnic and ideological groups has thrown that nation's north into chaos.

The arc of instability is an attempt to characterize a diverse group of countries that may share little more than climate and vast open, often ungoverned, spaces. Language, culture and religion often differ, sometimes within a single nation. If left unchecked, the arc “could transform the continent into a breeding ground for extremists and a launch pad for larger-scale terrorist attacks around the world,” the United Nations Security Council was told in May 2013.



ORIGINS OF THE ARC

Something as amorphous as the arc of instability is difficult to describe and even harder to remedy. Its origins are equally complicated. Nations along the arc typically share some general characteristics:

An arid and harsh climate.

According to a United Nations Environment Programme report, the Sahel has been called “‘ground zero’ for climate change due to its extreme climatic conditions and highly vulnerable population.” Its growing population faces poverty, food insecurity and instability. This can lead to mass migration, which can further destabilize areas. Competition over scarce water and grazing areas also leads to conflict.

Ungoverned spaces. Many of the countries, including Sudan, Chad, Niger and Mali, have vast territory far from capitals or large cities. In Sudan, the far-western region of Darfur has been a continuing scene of violence and instability. In Mali, the north has been an ongoing challenge to the government in the capital Bamako, which is about 1,500 kilometers from Kidal, 1,200 kilometers from Gao and about 1,000 kilometers from Timbuktu. French and Chadian forces had to liberate all three northern cities from extremists in 2013 during Operation Serval.

Dissatisfied groups. Some distant regions in the nations along the arc are home to ethnic groups that consider themselves neglected by the central government. An example is the Tuaregs, Berber people who are nomadic, pastoralist and spread across several Sahel and North African nations. Their rebellion in northern Mali in early 2012 was the latest of many clashes with the central government.

External actors. Ungoverned spaces leave room for outside forces such as smugglers, drug runners and extremist groups to move freely. South American drug shipments frequently land in West Africa and are ferried through the Sahel and North Africa on their way to Europe. Sometimes illicit goods travel along ancient caravan routes in the Sahel and Sahara regions.

Rudolph Atallah, a senior fellow at the think tank Atlantic Council, told *ADF* that landlocked countries in the arc such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia have to rely on neighbors' seaports for goods and support. If a problem emerges in one country, it easily can become a problem in several more.

"When Côte d'Ivoire had a coup in 2002, it split the country down the middle," Atallah said. "The food supplies and other supplies that were actually making their way up into those landlocked countries of Burkina [Faso], Mali, Niger ... they slowed down to a trickle. And it took several years for that to shift over to Ghana." Such conditions can exacerbate existing poverty. At the same time, organized crime increased in the region as illicit trades grew in these landlocked countries.

In the midst of this, Atallah said, shifting population demographics and severe poverty have pushed people


toward new ideologies. Various terrorist and extremist groups thrive in areas where government aid and institutions are at their weakest. "So this is an area where people are disgruntled, local economies have been extremely weak, they haven't been able to reach those people that are marginalized," he said. "And many of them are just trying to take matters into their own hands."


Many conflicts have arisen along and near the arc over the years. Civil wars have beset Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire south of the arc. Chad has had numerous coups. Somalia has been in disarray since the early 1990s. Sudan and South Sudan have been at odds. Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi fell. Many of the weapons from Libya flowed out of the country and into the hands of other groups. Many of those groups are present in Mali, an active hot spot along the arc.

THE CHALLENGE OF MALI

Mali offers a textbook example of how these diverse forces can come together to create instability. Exhibiting characteristics common to many countries in the arc, Mali has limited arable land and resources, a vast and sparsely populated north, disaffected ethnic groups, and external actors in the form of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) extremists, traffickers and former loyalists to Gadhafi.

Militiamen from the Ansar al-Dine Islamic group sit on a vehicle in Gao in northeastern Mali in 2012. Ansar al-Dine, which translates as "defenders of the faith," imposed Sharia in Timbuktu with the blessing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.






NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM IN THE MAGHREB AND SAHEL REGIONS SINCE 2001

Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia



Terror incidents are defined as events believed to be the work of terrorist groups that result in death, injury and kidnapping of civilians, government officials or security professionals. Also counted is destruction of property and threats to life and property in which attacks are thwarted and bombs are defused.

Source: Yonah Alexander of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies



A Libyan man waves his nation's flag in advance of the first anniversary of the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi. After the fall of Gadhafi, weapons began to flow out of Libya into the Sahel.

The volatile mixture exploded into conflict in 2012. Tuaregs, who live in the nation's northern desert, rebelled after years of dissatisfaction with the government. In January 2012, the Tuaregs attacked northern towns, which led to residents fleeing into Mauritania, according to a BBC timeline. In March 2012, the Malian army overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré, accusing him of failing to respond effectively to the Tuareg rebellion. By April, Tuaregs had taken control of the north and declared independence.

The presence of groups such as Ansar al-Dine, an Islamist rebel group that translates as "defenders of the faith," and AQIM shows how easily outside groups can move about in ungoverned spaces. Also present in Mali is the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which merged with terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Masked Men Brigade, according to the BBC. Belmokhtar is accused of executing a deadly siege at an Algerian gas plant in January 2013. MUJAO, an AQIM splinter group, historically has been most interested in profiting from criminal activity in the region, according to the Civil-Military Fusion Centre.

In January 2013, French forces launched Operation Serval, entering the country to reclaim northern territory taken by insurgents. In the spring, French forces gave way to troops sent in by the Economic Community of West African States, an operation called the African-led International Support Mission



Peacekeepers from Burkina Faso patrol Timbuktu on election day in July 2013 as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

in Mali. Now the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is patrolling the nation and trying to maintain order in this fragile setting.

NO EASY SOLUTIONS

Having diverse nations in different regions, each with unique challenges, makes an overall solution to the arc of instability virtually impossible. Monetary aid to these countries is essential, Atallah said, but it must be accompanied by oversight and accountability. That rarely happens. Addressing poverty, ensuring strong, ethical government — all are also crucial to preserving stability. But what can militaries and security forces do of their own accord to help ensure stability across the arc? That question has no easy answer.

Dr. Dona J. Stewart, senior fellow at Joint Special Operations University, told *ADF* that ultimately, military activities in unstable areas have to be linked to political, economic and development goals. That requires extensive planning. It's certainly outside the control of Soldiers and security forces.

"One of the major roles for militaries is providing the security to allow other forms of development — political, economic, educational, health — to take place," Stewart said. "You can't have those types of development unless you have security."

This is achieved best when security is "carefully calibrated" with political goals in a place like Mali, where

tensions between the north and south are entrenched, Stewart said. Individual commanders and Soldiers can achieve this delicate balance by doing several things.

"First of all, they need to have a good understanding of the social-cultural context in which they're operating," Stewart said. This is especially important in a place like Mali. Malian Soldiers from the south should be sensitive to and knowledgeable of the cultures of the vast north. The 12,640-person MINUSMA mission comprises 35 nations from Africa, Asia, Europe and North America, magnifying the need for cultural sensitivity.

Discipline also is crucial, and it goes hand in hand with cultural concerns. The two principles can empower Soldiers to "judiciously apply force when needed, but also have the skill set to find solutions to problems that may not necessarily need force," Stewart said. Examples could include working with humanitarian aid agencies or addressing infrastructure problems.

Success also can depend on how forces view counterterrorism. Stewart said the past decade has seen counterterrorism as "specific kinetic activity against specific targets." That tactic can be open-ended.


"Our understanding has increased to realize that the indirect types of activities are absolutely crucial for developing any sort of outcome that's going to be enduring and lasting," she said. "And for this arc in particular, it's going to be indirect types of activities that are going to be really necessary to develop." □



Into the TERROR

ADF
STAFF

SANCTUARY



Chadian Soldiers
cheer as they
prepare for
deployment into
Mali in January
2013. REUTERS



Gen. Oumar Bikimo, seated right, discusses strategy with officers outside Menaka in eastern Mali as they prepare to move north toward Kidal. FATIM

CHAD'S INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN MALI OFFERS LESSONS IN RESOLVE AND SACRIFICE

A column of about 100 Chadian light vehicles, mostly Toyota Land Cruisers, left Chad's capital, N'Djamena on January 20, 2013. The convoy curled around the Lake Chad basin before reaching the border with Niger. Days earlier, nearly 200 armored vehicles, including 90 Eland armored cars and 17 BMP tanks, were airlifted to Niger's capital, Niamey.

At the Niger border-crossing, Brig. Gen. Abdraman Youssouf Mery, commander of Chad's elite groupement speciale anti-terroriste (SATG), halted the convoy and gathered his officers around him.

"We are going outside of our borders now," he recalled instructing the men. "We are going to help the population, our fellow Africans, so we have to respect the laws and the rules of these foreign countries and respect human rights. Remember, we are going there to bring peace to our neighbors."

The mission was an ambitious one. Four days earlier, the Chadian National Assembly had voted unanimously to endorse military action in Mali. Although Chad has modest means and shares no borders with Mali, the country reached into its own pocket and paid \$121 million to send 2,000 of its Soldiers to join the fight.

It was, according to President Idriss Déby Itno, a "just cause" and a "duty" for Chad.

"Africans need to understand that they have a role to play when it comes to stability and peace on the continent," Déby said on January 16, 2013. "It is time for Africans to put themselves at center stage."

There was little time to waste. Groups aligned with al-Qaida had captured more than two-thirds of Mali. Pushing south, they took the strategically important town

of Konna and appeared headed for the capital, Bamako.

In an act of supreme arrogance, Abdelmalek Droukdel, emir of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a 10-page manifesto to his fighters outlining what an al-Qaida-governed state would look like for decades to come. Islamist fighters began meting out harsh justice in many cities they governed, including public whippings. More than 250,000 Malian civilians fled the country.


DESERT FOXES

Mery's convoy pushed on, covering more than 1,500 kilometers in three days despite stopping often to greet local dignitaries at Nigerien villages. Chadians are known for their ability to cross vast spaces in a short time. This is a necessity in a nation measuring nearly 1.3 million square kilometers, with widely dispersed population centers. In wars against Libya in the 1980s, the Chadian Army also became known for a dazzling attack style that allowed them to surprise and outmaneuver the well-armed Libyans. The French called it "rezzou TGV" in reference to the ancient raiding tactics used by Saharan nomads called *razzia* and TGV, a French acronym for a lightning-fast train.

"They are intrepid, efficient and with their

own aesthetic (turbans and sunglasses)," wrote researcher Géraud Magrin. "They lead attacks with a column of Toyotas equipped militarily and sent at top speeds."

The Chadians knew they were uniquely qualified for the fight in Mali's mountains. The salient feature of northern Chad is the volcanic Tibesti mountain range, one of the world's most desolate places and a magnet for terrorists and traffickers. In 2004, when the extremist Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat set up in the Tibesti Mountains, it was the Chadian Army that drove them out and arrested a top commander.



Gen. Mahamat Déby attends a press event near the Adrar des Ifoghas in northern Mali in March 2013.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

“Mali is almost like Chad — it’s nearly the same environment,” said Gen. Mahamat Déby, the son of Chad’s president and the second in command of the Chadian forces in Mali. “We have the Tibesti [Mountains] in Chad — the Soldiers are hardened to it. They’re trained for any terrain — the desert, the mountains, the forest. It doesn’t make a big difference to us.”

3,000-KILOMETER JOURNEY

By January 25, the Chadian intervention forces, known as the Forces armées tchadiennes d’intervention au Mali (FATIM), crossed the Malian border and headed toward Menaka, a town of squat mud-brick houses about 100 kilometers from the border.

The giant convoy advanced slowly, with contingents separated at intervals of 5 to 6 kilometers. “We sent scouts out ahead and divided into three columns,” Mery said. “Our thought was that at any time we were driving, the terrorists could come out. We didn’t want to take any risks.”

At dusk they reached Menaka and encircled the village to block all entry and exit points. The next morning, the Chadian officers went in to meet the village elders. They found that the previous occupiers, the extremist group the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), had fled but left behind evidence of a three-month reign. There were black flags hanging from walls and crude paintings of swords on the village gates. Schools and market stalls were locked shut.

At the sight of the incoming Soldiers, excited children climbed onto roofs cheering and began ripping up the black flags. “They cried out for liberty,” said Gen. Oumar Bikimo, the commander of FATIM who had more than 30 years of experience under his belt and had commanded a multinational peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic. “It was, for them, a renaissance, if you will.”

A delegation of village elders gathered under a patch of acacia trees and offered a herd of goats to feed the visiting Soldiers. Under the hardship conditions, the gift was

worth more than 1 million Central African francs. “They said, ‘We will have a feast,’ ” Mery said. “I said, ‘No, we are too numerous, and we have our own food. We are here to help you, not you for us.’ ”

Villagers recounted that under MUJAO control they were not able to smoke cigarettes, chew tobacco or even eat kola nuts. The small community radio station, Radio Aadar, had been forced to cease playing music and switch to sermons. Men were made to grow their beards, and women caught speaking to a man in public risked being whipped.

“Right now, we’re trying to re-establish the social life,” a village elder said. “The population was really traumatized. They were also restricted of certain rights. Today you can see the rights have returned. If you listen to the radio, if you see the youngsters walking in the street with their mobile phones, that tells you that liberty has returned.”

The reception told the Chadian forces that their enemy had made a tactical retreat. Mery, Bikimo, Mahamat Déby and the rest of the Chadian commanders knew that they had to push farther north where fighters would be waiting for them.

The next day, the FATIM forces set off toward rebel strongholds in the mountainous region bordering Algeria, a distance of 3,000 kilometers from their starting point. There was no direct road leading from Menaka to Kidal, the regional capital in northeast Mali, so the convoy traveled over sand and through brush despite the danger of ambush. GPS coverage was spotty in the area, and the heavily laden trucks, typically hauling 250-liter barrels of water or fuel, food, bedding, weapons and up to 10 men, sometimes became stuck in the sand.

Mery and other leaders stayed in regular communication with the Chadian Operations Center in N’Djamena, which passed on the latest intelligence. At the same time, French forces operating under the name Operation Serval were conducting bombing raids on terrorist targets near the Malian cities of Mopti, Konna and Gao, and were coordinating their activity with the Chadians.





“We didn’t know the region, and we didn’t have a local representative with us; we were alone,” Mery said. “We had a team of about 15 French liaison officers with us. They communicated with the [Operation] Serval, and they helped logistically. Particularly if there were injured or sick Soldiers, they arranged to airlift them.”

The Chadian forces arrived in Kidal in the afternoon of January 30. On the previous night, the French forces had landed at the airport with fighter jets and helicopters. Two Chadian contingents encircled the city and occupied entry points and the deserted military barracks. A third contingent entered the city.

On the first day, many in Kidal stayed shuttered inside their homes out of fear. In this dusty trading outpost with a population of 25,000, perhaps only one-third of the residents had remained. A visiting film crew termed it a “village of phantoms.” Days of bombing by the French Air Force to take out logistic depots and training camps in the area had also jangled the nerves of the local populace.

Chadian Soldiers operate in the Valley of Ametetai in northern Mali as part of the Chadian effort to liberate the region. FATIM

FATIM Timeline

The Chadian intervention forces, known as the Forces armées tchadiennes d'intervention au Mali (FATIM), deployed in 2013 on a mission to liberate the northern part of the country from extremists.



1

JANUARY 16

The first Chadian contingent leaves N'Djamena to fly to Mali.



2

JANUARY 20

Chad's groupement speciale anti-terroriste (SATG) and other units of the Chadian Army leave by road.



3

JANUARY 23

The FATIM arrives in Niamey, Niger.



AREA SHOWN

BURKINA FASO



7

FEBRUARY 4

Troops arrive in Aguelhok.



8

FEBRUARY 6

Troops arrive in Tessalit.



9

FEBRUARY 11

Troops leave Tessalit. Chadian forces spend 10 days patrolling the border north of the Adrar des Ifoghas.



10

FEBRUARY 22

Troops convene near Abeibara, then enter the mountain range to the west. Heavy fighting with extremists continues from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.



FEBRUARY 23 TO MARCH 3

Clearing operation continues in the Adrar des Ifoghas. French and Chadian forces collect vast stores of weapons, vehicles and intelligence.



4

JANUARY 24

The Chadian forces regroup at the Malian-Nigerien border.



5

JANUARY 26

Menaka is liberated.



6


JANUARY 30

Troops arrive and liberate Kidal.



A convoy of Chadian Soldiers returns to Kidal after a "ratissage," or clearing mission, in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains.

FATIM



ADF ILLUSTRATION

The FATIM Operation by the Numbers

**2,000**

Chadian troops deployed

**100**

Toyota Land Cruisers

**200**

armored vehicles, including 90 Eland cars and 17 BMP tanks

**1.4 million**

liters of fuel consumed

**\$121 million**

equivalent U.S. dollars spent

**3,000**

kilometers traveled between N'Djamena and Tessalit

Human Cost

**36**

Chadians killed in action

**74**

Chadian Soldiers injured

**200**

AQIM or enemy combatants killed

**24**

AQIM or enemy prisoners captured by the SATG

**1.3 million**

Malians liberated, including the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu

**MARCH 1**

Chadian forces announce that they have killed al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Commander Abou Zeid.

**MARCH 2**

Fighting continues in the Ametetai Valley. Two Chadian Soldiers are killed, as well as numerous militants.



11

MARCH 3

Troops leave the Adrar des Ifoghas for Aguelhok.



12

MARCH 11-28

FATIM forces return to the Adrar for a final clearing operation to eliminate the remaining widely scattered fighters.



13

MAY 13

The first Chadian Soldiers return from the mission. The day is made a national holiday.



A Chadian armored vehicle is destroyed after hitting a land mine in northern Mali. The occupants of the vehicle were injured in the blast but survived. **FATIM**

The FATIM forces immediately sensed the situation was different than in Menaka. Kidal had been a bastion of resistance for the Mouvement National de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), the Tuareg-led independent movement. For months, there had been an uneasy alliance between the MNLA and various extremist groups, including Ansar al-Dine (Defenders of the Faith), whose notorious founder Iyad Ag Gali is a Kidal native. The MNLA eventually kicked out the extremist groups, but they refused to let any members of the Malian Army enter the town.

“We were welcomed, but the difference in Kidal was the close presence of terrorists,” Bikimo said. “You have to understand, their base was not far from there. Later, [in Kidal] we would be hit with a suicide attack in the middle of the market. We lost four of our men, and more were injured. That’s why I say there was a difference.”

Evidence of the recent struggles was everywhere in Kidal. Angry graffiti spray-painted on the walls denounced both the government of Mali and AQIM. The separatist flag of the Azawad flew outside some homes and shops. Many in town also feared reprisals and inter-ethnic fighting, so part of Chad’s responsibility was to conduct patrols to prevent bloodshed between civilians.

The French and Chadians brokered an agreement with the MNLA to work together to secure the region.

In quick succession on February 4 and 6, the Chadian and French forces moved north to liberate Aguelhok and Tessalit, two cities that sit at the base of the Adrar des Ifoghas. In Tessalit, the FATIM forces waited for days while the French airlifted heavy equipment, such as tanks and Caesar 155-millimeter truck-mounted artillery systems.

INTO THE ADRAR

On February 11, FATIM forces received the green light to advance toward the extremists’ mountain hideout. For 10 days, the Chadian units made a tour of the outside of the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, traveling along the Algerian border. Methodically, they sealed off the northern perimeter to ensure that fighters could not flee across to Algeria. Another FATIM contingent left Aguelhok driving along the northern side of the Adrar, and the two contingents met near the tiny town of Abeibara north-east of the mountain chain. They were drawing a noose around the AQIM sanctuary. “We wanted to see — are there people who are crossing over? Who is entering, who is leaving?” Mery said.

On the morning of February 22, the Chadian forces assembled at the eastern edge of the mountain range. French forces had given them the GPS coordinates of certain spots where the terrorists were likely to be hiding, including wells or water sources, but the Chadians knew the fight was not going to be easy. Aerial bombings had little impact here, and the complex network of AQIM caves, tunnels and sheltered hideouts could only be found on foot. Locals told FATIM Soldiers that the central government had been absent from the region for at least 10 years.

The convoy of hundreds of Chadian forces advanced through the single entry point to the east of the Adrar, a dry riverbed called the Tigharghar Wadi. They traveled about 30 kilometers inside before reaching the AQIM logistical base, where fighters seemed to have been expecting an attack from the western front, but were prepared to fight the Chadians coming from the east.

"I think they were waiting for our arrival," Bikimo said. "You cannot say that they weren't prepared, because they were already positioned. Well, that tells you that they were waiting for something."

The fighting lasted from about 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. It was a battle at close quarters, with AQIM extremists spraying rounds with Kalashnikovs and blasting rocket-propelled grenades. When the fighters were cornered, they would retreat inside cave-like dwellings, only to detonate themselves rather than surrender. "They carved out individual positions where you can't imagine there would be a position," Bikimo said. "They used all tools at their disposal."

The Chadians, initially taken by surprise, redoubled their efforts. Climbing rock mounds to take high positions and fighting meter by meter and "rock by rock," they eventually turned the tide.

"Sincerely, they were not prepared to give themselves up," Bikimo said of the enemy. "We took some captive, despite their efforts, but otherwise they would have killed themselves. All the leaders refused to give themselves up."

The costs were heavy. Among the dead was the commander of the Chadian Special Forces, Abdel Aziz Hassane Adam, a veteran who had led peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In total, 26 Chadian Soldiers died as a result of the battle, with 53 more injured. On the opponents' side, the deaths totaled nearly 100.

The fruits of the operation were plentiful, however. The Chadians captured a radio and, from that day forward, were able to listen in to AQIM chatter. A local interpreter helped them decode enemy movements and changing strategy.

The Chadians also took 24 prisoners and this group shed some light on the diversity of the militants operating in the mountain range. They included Hausa-speaking Nigerians, a Tunisian, a Burkinabé and a fighter who may have once been associated with the Polasario independence movement. The Tunisian fighter who had

recently been trying to kill Chadians was hooked up to an intravenous drip and bandaged by Chadian medics.

The area was heavily mined with improvised explosive devices. During the next seven days, the Chadians lost three vehicles to land mines, but Mery said the totals could have been much worse without the work of the Chadian deminers who painstakingly cleared the pathway, digging out mines with spades.

From February 22 until March 3, the Chadians made a full circle of the Massif de Tigharghar, a 790-meter-tall rock formation, and cleared a 70-kilometer stretch known as the Valley of Ametetai, a terrorist stronghold. The contingent's responsibility was to drive the fighters out of the valley toward the west where the tanks of the French 1st Marine Infantry Unit were positioned.

1. Vehicles like this one were rigged to explode and scattered throughout the Adrar des Ifoghas.

2. Chadians discovered a weapons cache in the Adrar des Ifoghas.

3. A Chadian deminer discovers a roadside bomb.

FATIM



1



2



3

Movement was often difficult, with jagged rocks puncturing tires and mine detectors halting movement to investigate possible threats. In some places, the pathway shrunk to less than 5 meters wide, and whipping wind shot sand at piercing speeds. The extreme heat meant some Soldiers required 10 liters of water per day to stay hydrated. Visitors nicknamed the terrain Mars for its extraterrestrial appearance.

"The climatic conditions were really challenging," said Gen. Bernard Barrera, French commander of Operation Serval. "It was 45 degrees Celsius every day, with some points higher than 50 degrees Celsius. Every one of our Soldiers was carrying more than 30 kilograms of equipment. Honestly, this is a sport for the young. These conditions provoked tendinitis, there were swollen hands, and we were hit with stomach illness."

During the clearing mission, French and Chadian forces found a veritable treasure trove of terrorist goods. They uncovered a Caterpillar-brand bulldozer parked under a tree and covered with branches. The vehicle had been used to dig pits for burying weapons, vehicles and land mines. There were piles of RPG tubes and little laboratories called "garages" in which explosive devices could be made. They found nitrate, a functioning generator and even explosive vests ready to be detonated. Scattered about were abandoned vehicles rigged to explode upon contact.

"We gave instruction to Soldiers not to touch anything," Mery said.

Soldiers also found items of intelligence value, including satellite phones and computers. Phones were later analyzed by the French, and Mery was told they contained important contact information and call records. One of the most disturbing discoveries was the passport of Michel Germaneau, a French national who was taken hostage by AQIM and executed in 2010.

On March 1, Chadian forces announced the death of Abou Zeid, who was listed as the commander of the AQIM katibah, a group that controlled the trafficking and kidnapping activities in the Adrar. Having personally overseen the execution of at least two hostages and the kidnapping of more than 20, Zeid, an Algerian national, was considered among the most violent commanders in the AQIM hierarchy.

By March 4, the Chadians left the mountain range, and despite taking fire nearly every day and sleeping in difficult conditions, the men were exhilarated, Mery said. "Once we freed the Adrar, morale really was high," he said. "Because the Soldiers were determined to succeed in their mission and it was a success. We lost men — some of our best men, in fact — but we brought victory to the Malian people."

From March 11 to 28, the Chadians and French forces combed the mountain range again on a "ratissage," or clearing mission, to look for stragglers, particularly in the area around the Ametetai Valley. On March 12, they had a skirmish with extremists, killing six and losing one Chadian Soldier.

By the end of the month, the FATIM and French forces were able to confidently say the Adrar was free of extremists for the first time in decades.

After the mission, the Chadians were welcomed home as heroes. President Déby declared May 13 a national holiday of "recollection and recognition." "The values of peace and democracy that you embody and defend triumphed over fundamentalism," Déby said.

When asked about the legacy of the intervention and the place in history, Bikimo was more modest. "We're Soldiers with a capital 'S,'" he said. "It was a political decision [to intervene], and certainly we are the ones who execute it."

But he allowed himself a measure of satisfaction at a job well done. "We left Chad with pride and, thank God, the mission was completed with pride." □

Islamist militants who were captured in the Adrar des Ifoghas are held by Chadian forces in March 2013. FATIM



Perspectives on an INTERVENTION

On February 21, I spoke by telephone to Gen. Oumar Bikimo, commander of the FATIM. I told him this: “My general, you must push on! We cannot lose any more time, or the war risks becoming long and difficult.”

I said it for the simple reason that those who were fighting on the side of the Malian people — aside from the French Army — were too slow in joining us. That’s why I took the risk to send you into the fire, knowing that you would lose men. It follows the African adage, “When you want to kill a lion, you must go straight at him and not simply follow in his footsteps.” You went directly at the narcotraffickers, who were organized and war tested. Furthermore, they waited for you on the terrain they prepared in advance.

Your engagement lasted seven hours. You were at the heart of the operations. You had the means to save lives, thanks to your armored vehicles, but knowing that armored vehicles can’t scale hills, you decided to leave them behind and make the final assault on foot. This assault was certainly deadly, but it permitted the international community in Africa and in Mali to gain some time.

Without this assault, the war would have lasted at least six months. Thanks to this assault, you decapitated the horde of terrorists, you exterminated them, even if it was at a heavy cost.



GEN. OUMAR BIKIMO

commander of the Forces armées tchadiennes d’intervention au Mali (FATIM), in an interview on February 5, 2014

The Chadian contingents depended for nearly six months on the funds of our own Chadian government. Whether it was the logistical domain or the financial domain — there are always contributions from partner nations — but the main effort was made by the Chadian government.

The lessons learned? You can’t separate them from one another. It’s all part of the life of the Chadian National Army now. It’s an experience, an experience that we lived through and now we must take away the positive and let fall what is negative. We hope there has been more positive than negative. Above all, it was a national mission.



**CHADIAN PRESIDENT
IDRISS DÉBY ITNO**

*during a speech given
May 13, 2013*

It is true that the Regional Economic Communities, be it ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, along with the African Union, try to find solutions to the crises in Africa. Within the African Union, there is an architecture for peace that is being established. But you saw in Mali that it required the intervention of France and the intervention of Chad, who is not an ECOWAS member, to restore peace. ECOWAS has 15 members but was unable to mount a force to face the situation in Mali.

African institutions are working, but they don’t yet have the operational capacity to deal with situations such as terrorism. There is a movement to establish a Rapid Intervention Battalion, asking the states that have capacity to voluntarily participate in it. That’s still a project that is gestating; it hasn’t come to fruition yet.

Chad is a country that’s known civil war and foreign intervention on its soil. We are a country half Muslim, half Christian. And we’re very diligent about the peaceful cohabitation between the religious communities. We are a Sahelian country, like Mali. And we know that the challenges of terrorism don’t have borders, especially where no natural boundaries exist. The war imposed upon us meant that our Army has become extremely professional, especially in that terrain. Therefore Mali, ECOWAS, the international community and France strongly asked us to intervene. And there is a national consensus that we have to fight terrorism and fundamentalism, because it is likely to affect us as well. We paid a high price, more than 30 deaths, but I think that it was absolutely necessary.



MOUSSA FAKI

*Chadian minister of foreign
affairs, during remarks made
on September 5, 2013*

REKINDLING THE FLAME

Lion Rouge Launches a New Era in U.S.-DRC Cooperation

ADF STAFF
PHOTOS BY U.S. EMBASSY, KINSHASA

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the United States teamed up in September 2013 to conduct Lion Rouge. The 26-day military cooperation event brought together 225 FARDC officers and more than 40 U.S. personnel. One of Lion Rouge's goals was to consolidate multiple security-related training events that previously took place across the DRC, in order to maximize resources and synchronize efforts.

Organizers chose the Kitona Air Base (BAKI) as a focal point for the training because of its location — near where the Congo River and the Atlantic Ocean meet — in addition to its facilities. BAKI is home to an infantry school, noncommissioned officer training, a nursing school and an artillery school, as well as a teaching hospital and a large airfield. The timing of the event coincided with new recruit training for 3,000 Soldiers. Most important, however, the location allowed contact with the civilian community living around the air base, whose members were incorporated into the Lion Rouge training events.

Some of the highlights at Lion Rouge 2013 included the following:

- Kitona hospital personnel received medical training, practicing the diagnosis of ear infections and malaria, open-wound care, taking vital signs, patient monitoring and patient education. In addition, the U.S. donated 250 medical books and journals to the hospital and the FARDC nursing school.
- Agriculture specialists from the Texas-based Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture spent time at a farm where vegetables, swine and poultry are raised to feed Soldiers at Kitona. They assessed farming techniques and gave advice on how to increase production.

- A public health analysis of the base was jointly conducted by the U.S. and Congolese team, which made recommendations on how water distribution, food preparation, waste management and general sanitation could be improved to prevent disease outbreaks.
- A FARDC Magistrates Judicial Seminar was conducted focusing on human rights law, international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, ethics and preventing corruption, and international criminal law. Sessions stressed the appropriate way for the military to interact with civil society.
- A Gender-Specific Issue Seminar was offered, with 41 female Soldiers and nine female police officers participating.

Among those invited to the events were the mayor and the police chief of Muanda, local educators and clergy members, who came away impressed with the professionalism of the Lion Rouge training. The Kitona Air Base commander, FARDC Brig. Gen. Moustapha Mukiza, summarized the success of Lion Rouge and placed particular emphasis on a public health report recommending improvements: "With your report and support in the future, I know that we can make BAKI a great place for our Soldiers and their families."

Plans are underway for Lion Rouge II in 2014, with officials considering adding international narcotics and law enforcement training to the curriculum. They also would like to include international partners, such as the United Nations and the European Union. □



FARDC Soldiers attend a class on civil-military operations during Lion Rouge at Kitona Air Base in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



Soldiers parade during the Lion Rouge closing ceremonies at Kitona Air Base.

*“With your report and support
in the future, I know that we can
make BAKI a great place for our
Soldiers and their families.”*

— FARDC Brig. Gen. Moustapha Mukiza,
Kitona Air Base commander

U.S. Army Lt. Col.
Michael McCullough
hands a Lion Rouge
flag to FARDC Brig.
Gen. Moustapha
Mukiza, Kitona base
commander, during
the event's closing
ceremonies.




A **WAR** *of* WORDS

ADF STAFF



ADF ILLUSTRATION

COUNTERING EXTREMISM ONLINE REQUIRES CREDIBILITY AND PERSISTENCE



It is a heated battle in which emotions run high and shots fly back and forth. But in this confrontation, participants use words instead of weapons, and they are limited to 140 characters per volley.

For several years, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, a public affairs officer for the Kenya Defence Forces, has been fighting an informational war on Twitter with the terrorist group al-Shabaab. He uses the social media site to antagonize his opponents, to correct misinformation and, most important, to speak directly to civilians, keeping them informed about the fighting on the ground in Somalia. The ultimate goal, he said, is to win a battle of ideologies.

"We have used the same platform as al-Shabaab to undermine its agenda," Chirchir said in an interview with Sabahi Online. "Establishing our presence and command in cyberspace was critical for us in fighting the enemy."

Sometimes, the tweets are humorous. In one, Chirchir wrote to the al-Shabaab Twitter account, HSMPress, telling them they must stop "denying women to wear bras."

Other times his tweets seek to point out the hypocrisy of the group. After a bombing raid left 30 al-Shabaab militants dead in 2013, Chirchir wrote: "If only [Médecins Sans Frontières] were still operating in Somalia." Al-Shabaab had forced the aid group out of the country in August 2013 through repeated attacks that jeopardized the safety of the doctors.

Chirchir, widely known as "the Tweeting Major," said he is online from 6 a.m. until past midnight each day and finds it vitally important to push back in real time against the claims made by al-Shabaab.

"The old traditional way of doing things is getting overtaken," Chirchir said in an interview

with NTV. "By embracing social media at this particular time of the operation, we want to show everybody, give them a clear picture of what is happening right from the battlefield to their homes and their laptops and their phones."

A NEW FRONTIER

In the war against extremism, the Internet is a vibrant space for recruiting adherents and refuting extremist ideology and false claims. Counterterror experts have found that it is cheaper to win the battle of ideas online than to fight a hardened fanatic on the battlefield or in a metropolitan area.

But the war of ideologies requires stepping outside what many consider a comfort zone. It requires engaging the enemy on fairly equal footing. Neither side controls the medium of expression, and attempts to stifle online speech tend to be ineffective. For instance, after the terror attacks in Kenya at the Westgate Shopping Mall, Twitter shut down numerous accounts linked to al-Shabaab. The strategy failed. New accounts quickly sprouted to take the place of the banned ones, and the accompanying attention may have benefited al-Shabaab.

"Given their largely porous structures, censorship of their media messages cannot be properly focused," wrote analyst Jamie Kerr. "If seriously intent on limiting the online operations of al-Shabaab on their network, Twitter will struggle and end up in a 'cat and mouse' scenario where they close one offending account and a new one simultaneously opens."

Furthermore, efforts to shut down terror websites or social media accounts can obscure a valuable tool for intelligence gathering. The tweets often include kernels of important information, and the lists of people who follow an extremist Twitter feed sometimes include terror sympathizers or financiers.

Former al-Shabaab fighters at an event in 2009 describe their decision to defect from the extremist group.



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

So, how can one craft an effective anti-terror message? Researcher Michael Pizzuto determined that any campaign to combat terrorist ideology first must succeed on two levels. It must be credible, and it must be compatible. A credible message comes from a source that the audience perceives as trusted and authentic. For example, a religious scholar will have instant credibility on matters of religious doctrine. A compatible message is spread in a voice and a medium that is accessible and understandable to the audience. For instance, an online-only message would not be compatible with a population that gets its information from radio. Likewise, a dense academic study probably would not be compatible with an uneducated youth.

The aim, wrote Pizzuto, “is to disable a terrorist’s most powerful weapon — ideology — and not only prevent future recruits from joining the ranks of terrorist organizations, but also implant an alternative message within a terrorist organization itself, causing an increase in defectors.”

This strategy, which Pizzuto calls “alter-messaging,” must have a clear objective in mind. Analyst Liat Shetret of the Global Center on Cooperative Security said an effective messaging campaign has four important goals:

1. WEAKEN CULT PERSONALITIES

Many terror groups are able to recruit the young and impressionable by promoting attractive “cult” figures. The groups take great pains to portray these figures as wise, just and nearly invincible. Past personalities of this type used by al-Qaida have included Anwar al-Awlaki and Osama bin Laden. Mokhtar Belmokhtar played a similar role for the North African group

al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

These figures release recruiting videos, are discussed in chat rooms, and often disseminate religious and political diatribes on the Internet. But the same technology can be used to point out the hypocrisy of these figures. This can be accomplished by demonstrating a disparity between their avowed beliefs and the way they live their lives. For instance, the reputation of the late founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was damaged by revelations that he lived lavishly, was highly educated and drove a Mercedes-Benz. This lifestyle was at odds with his public statements, in which he rejected Western culture and education.

2. CHALLENGE EXTREMIST DOCTRINE

Many fanatical groups rely on a twisted interpretation of Islam to motivate and ensnare recruits. These interpretations tend to be easy to refute and, in the hands of a credible messenger (such as a religious scholar or ex-fighter), a doctrinal challenge to extremist groups can swing some fighters intellectually. Mauritania has had some success with this through its program of sending imams into prisons to debate captured Salafist fighters awaiting trial. Some of these debates were broadcast on public television.

3. DISPEL THE GLORY OF THE TERRORIST LIFESTYLE

The terrorist cause is typically portrayed by its supporters as honorable, glorious and just. The reality of day-to-day life is far different. Effective countermessaging should emphasize the isolation, physical pain of the participant, and the pain inflicted on victims by these groups. In 2012, The

Associated Press interviewed al-Shabaab fighters who had fled the group and recounted horrible conditions. They said food was scarce and al-Shabaab leaders killed some of their friends in front of their eyes. “I felt like I was caged like animals,” one ex-fighter said. “We weren’t even allowed to call our parents.”

Terror groups also go to great pains to dehumanize those they target. Effective countermessaging gives voice to these victims and confronts terror adherents with the true, human cost of their actions. Organizations including the Global Survivors Network, which has collected testimony from victims of terror attacks on six continents, have successfully highlighted the pain caused by terror.

Some organizations have found that defectors make the best messengers because they have instant credibility with the audience. Terror expert Dr. Omar Ashour of Exeter University in the United Kingdom said these voices are powerful and persuasive to young ears. “For the first time in the history of Jihadism we are provided with a ‘critical mass’ of former militants who rebelled, not only against the current jihadists’ behavior but also against the ideology that motivates them,” Ashour wrote. “Their message to the younger generations of potential sympathizers and recruits is quite powerful: ‘We were the pioneers of Jihadism and the authors of a large part of its literature. Here are our experiences and here is what went wrong.’”

4. OFFER A VOICE THAT IS “STREET SMART” AND LOCALLY DEVELOPED

Terror groups tend to recruit on the margins of societies. Recruiters often target young people who feel disconnected from the mainstream and are financially desperate. This explains why slums in many parts of the world have been fruitful ground for future extremists. To sway this at-risk population away from terror, a narrative that is written in the voice of academics or the elite will not be effective. It must sound authentic and resonate with this group.

A successful example of this is Waayaha Cusub, a group of Somali hip-hop artists based in Kenya that has gained a following of young people who connect with the group’s music and its lyrics that denounce al-Shabaab. The group also earned respect because some of the musicians have been attacked by the terror group but refused to be silenced.

GOVERNMENTAL ROLE

Government agencies, the military and police are clearly capable of producing a counterterror message that reaches a large audience. They have access to sophisticated public relations infrastructure and can spread their message online, in print, by radio or television in most cases. The question is: Can they be credible?

In the eyes of extremists, a message from a military or government source denouncing terror is almost equivalent to an endorsement. They believe that their cause is just and that the government or the military is the enemy. To be denounced by those organizations is a badge of honor.

So, what can security professionals do to push back? Pizzuto says that where credible messengers such as terrorist dropouts exist, governments can support them so they are better able to spread their message. “Efforts should focus on external elements that do not influence the message or messengers in any way, such as providing resources (e.g., financial, housing) to defecting terrorists,” he wrote. “These individuals may face unforeseeable financial hardship and estrangement from their family after leaving a terrorist organization and, in some cases, assistance to defectors has been ‘highly effective’ in terms of preventing recidivism.”

Pizzuto feels it is best, however, for the government to stay in the background in messaging campaigns. Public awareness efforts about the harm terror visits upon victims and the economy are most effective when organized by civil society groups and do not have an explicit government or military seal of approval.


Recent history shows that too much government involvement can backfire. The British Quilliam Foundation, which advocates against Islamic extremism, was discredited in the eyes of some when news spread in 2011 that it was partially funded by the British government.

With that in mind, security professionals may find it most effective to stick to facts when they engage extremists online. Chirchir of Kenya has regularly used his platform to dispel myths pushed by al-Shabaab, including pronouncements that the militants shot down a Kenyan fighter jet and sank a Navy vessel.

Chirchir also lists the daily successes of the Kenyan Defence Forces and African Union Mission in Somalia troops, complete with numbers of al-Shabaab fighters killed or captured. “We broadcast our gains and hit the minds of its fighters blow by blow,” he said.

One of Chirchir’s most popular tweets warned Kenyans and Somalis against selling donkeys to al-Shabaab because the animals were being used to carry weapons.

It is difficult to calculate the effect of this type of online engagement, but on January 9, 2014, al-Shabaab leaders issued a statement that some perceived as a white flag of surrender in the information war. Beginning in 15 days, the group said, all Internet and mobile phone service would be banned in areas al-Shabaab controlled. The group, which once prided itself on being tech savvy, began walking door to door and confiscating Internet-enabled mobile phones in Somali villages. □



Men toss squash onto the banks of the Niger River in Niamey, Niger. Historically, Niger has relied on subsistence farming to power its economy. In recent years, the Sahel nation has worked to capitalize on extractive industries, primarily uranium and oil. REUTERS

NIGER POISED TO TRANSFORM ITS ECONOMY



ADF STAFF

The wide, languid Niger River is Africa's third-longest at 4,200 kilometers. It stretches in a boomerang shape from Guinea up as far north as Timbuktu, Mali, before dipping southward through Niamey, Niger, and ending in the Atlantic Ocean.

Although the river is too shallow in many places for large boat traffic, small-scale merchants have used it as a commercial highway for centuries. An observer who stands on its banks in Niamey, Niger, at the right time of day will see boaters wielding long, thin paddles as they glide along in dugouts loaded with squash, fish or other goods.

This mighty river soon will have even more to offer. A multibillion-dollar hydroelectric project, the Kandadji Dam, is underway 100 kilometers north of Niamey. The project promises to bring electricity to hundreds of thousands of people and increase the Niger River Valley's irrigated cropland from 10,000 to 55,000 hectares.

Like the river, the nation of Niger stands at an economic crossroads, with the potential to transform itself into a powerhouse in the global extractions industry based on deposits of uranium and oil.

Historically, Niger has gotten by on small, traditional business ventures. Subsistence farming still makes up a third or more of the country's economic output, and about 90 percent of the Sahel nation's nearly 17 million people depend on it.

In recent years, the nation has positioned itself to become the world's second-largest uranium producer after Kazakhstan. Niger is negotiating with French nuclear company Areva to continue operation in the country. Areva also has invested in a new uranium mine at Imouraren. Security concerns have delayed that project, but it's expected to open in late 2015. If it does, it will be the second-largest uranium mine in the world. Niger is the fourth-largest uranium producer now, according to Reuters.

Niger already has seen impressive increases in economic growth in the past few years. Reuters reports that the nation's growth will rise to 7.5 percent in 2014 from 5.9 percent in 2013.

As with many African nations rich in natural resources, Niger will have to find a way to convert its resource wealth into tangible benefits for its population. "We're realizing the importance of getting the right contracts in our extractive industries," Mahaman Laouan Gaya, secretary general of the mining ministry, told *The Guardian*. "The uranium issue is helping us to achieve transparency and everyone is watching us to see what the outcome is."



GOOD MONEY, BAD OUTCOMES

**CHARITIES AND NONPROFITS
CAN BE CO-OPTED TO FUND TERRORISM,
SO VIGILANCE AND MONITORING ARE CRUCIAL**

ADF STAFF

About 10:30 a.m. Nairobi time on August 7, 1998, a truck loaded with more than 900 kilograms of TNT trundled up to the back entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. Seconds later, the truck exploded, damaging the embassy, destroying the Ufundi Cooperative House nearby, and ravaging the Cooperative Bank building. The explosion killed 213 people and wounded thousands, with hundreds of them maimed or blinded.

Minutes later, a bomb detonated outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. That explosion killed 11 and injured 85. In all, 224 were killed and more than 4,500 were injured in the dual attacks. They soon were attributed to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network. But another force also was behind the attacks, according to the United States Treasury Department: a Saudi Arabia-based charity called the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF).

A former director of the AHIF branch in Tanzania helped the advance team that planned the bombings, and the charity's Comoros Islands branch was used "as a staging area and exfiltration route for the perpetrators," according to a

Foreign Policy article that quoted the Treasury Department. Before the 9/11 attacks three years later, al-Qaida was funded "to the tune of approximately \$30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors," according to a study for the 9/11 Commission.

The nexus of charities and terrorist groups continues to be a problem today. In countries such as Tunisia, says *Foreign Policy*, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and charities "are providing the infusion of funds that have allowed extremist groups to undertake the hard work of providing food, social services, and medical care. Jihadists, meanwhile, have discovered that they can bolster their standing within local communities, thereby increasing support for their violent activities."

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Nigeria's Boko Haram terrorist group and Somalia's al-Shabaab are among the biggest exploiters of charities and NGOs on the continent, observers say. With many groups come many methods for exploiting charities.



Tunisian security forces inspect the area of a failed suicide bomb attack near the Riadh Palms Hotel in Sousse in October 2013. Nongovernmental organization funding has allowed extremists in Tunisia to ply the population with aid to build support. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

CHARITIES AND TERRORISM

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog, lists four ways in which charities and nonprofit groups can be co-opted or used to finance terrorism:

- **Front charities.** In these organizations, everyone — from donors to workers to aid recipients — knows that the “charity” is a fraud that exists only to fund terrorism.
- **Organizations that defraud donors.** The charities tell donors that money will be used for legitimate programs. The money is then diverted to fund terrorism.
- **Charity branch offices that defraud headquarters.** Small satellite offices mislead an umbrella group or headquarters about how money is being used.
- **Charity workers who abuse their positions.** Individual workers distribute aid to terrorists without anyone else knowing.

FATF drafted Special Recommendation 8 to help countries determine when a terrorist organization is posing as a nonprofit. The recommendation calls for financial transparency, oversight, and enforcement through police, regulatory bodies and government agencies.

“This is very serious,” Henrique Dominguez, vice president of EFG Bank Luxembourg said. “The purpose [of the FATF recommendation] is to ensure that nonprofit organizations are not misused by terrorist organizations.” Dominguez said oversight authorities should check that a charity has a physical address and a Web presence, and also look for a donations history and large cash donations. Authorities also should scrutinize foundations set up after a tragedy, such as an earthquake or tsunami, when governments are preoccupied and donors are eager to provide funds.

Ira Morales Mickunas, who analyzes organized crime and terrorist financing for Milersen LLC, said that it’s unclear how much money filters through nonprofits and charities on its way to terrorist groups because some of these organizations have two sets of books. But she said money laundering accounts for trillions of dollars globally.

Zachary Scott-Singley, Counter Threat Finance Branch chief for U.S. Africa Command, told *ADF* that all four methods identified by FATF exist in Africa. Most efforts occur through the use of front charities and organizations that defraud donors, he said. The other two methods of co-opting charities are difficult to quantify because illicit activity occurs on such a small scale.



Al-Shabaab militants display weapons believed to have been recovered from Burundian peacekeepers in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2011. Al-Shabaab has funded its operations through an extensive mix of local taxation, abuse of charities and sales of goods such as charcoal. REUTERS

A WIDE-RANGING PROBLEM

A case connected to Somalia offers an example of the smaller extreme. In 2012, a court in the United Kingdom sent identical twin brothers to prison for three years after they admitted raising money for terrorism in Somalia. Mohammed Shabir Ali and Mohammed Shafiq Ali, 25 at the time, were part of a network that supported their older brother while he attended a “terrorist training camp” in Somalia.

Prosecutor Timothy Cray told the court that taped phone conversations between the two men and their brother indicated they planned to collect donations under the guise of being a charity. The brothers reportedly raised money at a street stall like legitimate fundraisers.

Large-scale charitable financing of terrorism has been linked to AQIM and Boko Haram. North African terror groups in the Sahel and Sahara rely heavily on revenue sources such as trafficking in cars, cigarettes and weapons. Even so, charities continue to fund extremists. Qatari and Saudi charities have provided support to jihadists in Mali such as Ansar al-Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.

When Boko Haram started in 2002 and its focus was northern Nigeria, the group was financed mainly by

Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. It also relied on extortion at home. International investigations have since pushed Boko Haram to adopt methods similar to its ally, AQIM, such as kidnapping for ransom. As al-Qaida has morphed from a central, monolithic organization to a decentralized group of affiliated groups, fundraising also has shifted to local and regional activities, according to the American Center for Democracy.

It’s not uncommon for charities to support and fund extremist groups in Africa from abroad. Scott-Singley said charities that support illicit activity like to operate in ungoverned spaces, but they prefer to have their headquarters in places where they can have access to legal protection. They want to be able to use the legal system, if necessary, to protect the money they collect, and having a physical address in a major world capital tends to give donors confidence.

STRIKING A BALANCE

When considering a response to charities’ support of terrorist organizations, one-size-fits-all countermeasures may not always be best. Regulations must be structured so that they don’t harm legitimate nonprofit efforts. Sometimes, this can be difficult. One example of this is



evident in the practice of *hawala*, which means “transfer” in Arabic. In this system, money can be transferred through bartering, wire transfers and between relatives. *Hawala* is an informal value transfer system, and such accounts can remain open and active for years. They also can be difficult for law enforcement agencies to monitor.

The difficulty in regulating *hawala* without harming legitimate commerce is illustrated by a 2011 case in the U.S. state of Minnesota. Banks there announced that they would halt wire transfer services to Somalia. The banks were concerned that continuing the service would violate government rules prohibiting the financing of terrorism. Minnesota is home to a large number of Somalis, and many of them send money — typically \$50 to \$200 per month — to family members in Somalia who rely heavily on the remittances. In fact, according to the United Nations Development Programme, Somali emigrants living in North America and Europe send back about \$1.6 billion annually. Somali Abdirashid Duale, chief executive of Dahabshiil, one of the largest money-transfer businesses in Africa, told *Africa Renewal* in May 2013 that the money is a “lifeline for many Somalis.”

When the last Minnesota banks stopped transmitting remittances, Somalis there worried about how their family members would survive. “They don’t know what to do. They live on money we send monthly to buy food, and they will not have money next month,” Amina Hassan, an American of Somali descent told *Twin Cities Daily Planet* in January 2012. “We don’t know what we’re going to do; we’re just waiting for Allah, for God.”

Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud told *The New York Times* in September 2013 that his country must replace its informal money transfer business with a banking sector. But acting too quickly could have dire consequences. Mohamud said that if Somali expatriates suddenly lose the ability to send money to relatives, it could actually help al-Shabaab recruit more disillusioned youths. “We need to break that vicious circle of generations losing hope,” he said.

FATF’s Recommendation 8 states that it wants to “safeguard and maintain the practice of charitable giving and the strong and diversified community of institutions through which it operates.” The organization offers some guiding principles for oversight

of nonprofit organizations and charitable efforts:

- **Cooperation.** Government, charities, donors and recipients should work together to oversee nonprofits. Both seek transparency and accountability, despite “a degree of institutional tension.”
- **Proportionality.** Oversight

by government and financial institutions should be “flexible, effective, and proportional to the risk of abuse. Mechanisms that reduce the compliance requirements without creating loopholes for terrorist financiers should be given due consideration.” Small, local organizations may not require specific oversight.

- **Flexibility.** International standards should allow for differences in the way individual nations approach legal and regulatory matters while staying committed to accountability and transparency.
- **Consistency.** Different countries may have different ideas about what constitutes a charity, but there should be agreement that such activity does not include anything that supports terrorism in any way.
- **Self-regulation.** Nonprofits in many countries have watchdog organizations or accrediting institutions. Nations should encourage and strengthen self-regulation to decrease misuse of charities by terrorist groups.

WHAT SECURITY FORCES CAN DO

Prevention of terrorist financing often starts with a review of financial and banking sectors so that money flows can be detected and tracked. Those efforts depend on African countries having sufficient laws and enforcement frameworks in place. Scott-Singley said his office has worked with U.S. Treasury officials to bolster training and help countries approach compliance with FATF standards. Some countries are in the beginning stages of the process, and the hope is that they can serve as a model for engaging other willing nations.

Even though those efforts occur on a legislative and government level, there are steps African military and security professionals can take to address the problem from the ground up. When Soldiers and police officers capture or arrest terrorism suspects, they need to understand that their work does not stop there. “The other important piece is follow-through,” Scott-Singley said.

Once suspects are in custody, security forces should sift through information and materials they find — phone records, financial ledgers, laptops — “and if they see any kind of mention of certain groups, nonprofit organizations, any illicit ties to other companies, front companies, that’s something that they should start taking note of and using for further operations,” he said. Doing that can help security forces work information “up the ladder” to find the kingpins and organizations behind lower-level criminals.

“Nobody is too small,” Scott-Singley said. “If you see something, you need to say something.” □

Somali women receive a mix of maize and sorghum from local nongovernmental organizations in southern Mogadishu in 2010. The United Nations’ World Food Programme had suspended much of its work in southern Somalia due to threats and unacceptable demands from al-Shabaab. REUTERS



ADF STAFF

Early Warning Systems Help with Alerts, Defections

These days, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) can scarcely make a move without it being documented and passed on. Consider these incidents:

- **JANUARY 10, 2014**

A 38-year-old LRA soldier who spent 20 years in captivity defects in Djemah in the Central African Republic (CAR) after walking six days in the bush. He had listened to radio broadcasts urging LRA members to give up their arms.

- **FEBRUARY 9, 2014**

After hearing defection messages over helicopter speakers, four Ugandan LRA soldiers defect to security forces. They had been in captivity for 12 years.

- **MARCH 1, 2014**

Terrified villagers report seeing suspected LRA forces 5 kilometers from Obo in the CAR.

Even the most mundane incident, such as the March 1 sighting, is noted and passed on via a system of radio stations throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and elsewhere. The incidents also are documented by Invisible Children, an organization started by three Americans.

The radio network dates to 2007, when a Catholic priest helped set up the LRA early warning system with a network of radio transmitters originally used by missionaries in the DRC. The network has grown dramatically since then and is now used to alert villagers, United Nations workers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of LRA sightings.

The LRA has existed for more than two decades. Led by Ugandan Joseph Kony, it had its roots in opposing the Ugandan government but now has no coherent political agenda. It has proved to be mobile

and difficult to eradicate, moving through areas in the northern DRC, the CAR and South Sudan.

Officials estimate that since 2008, the LRA has killed more than 2,600 civilians and abducted more than 4,800 others. In 2013, LRA soldiers killed 75 people and abducted 459. In February 2014, LRA soldiers killed only one person and abducted 76.

Kony's soldiers sleep in jungle camps, under trees and brush that hide them from drone monitoring and satellite surveillance. They do not use two-way radios because their signals can be tracked, and they don't attack large villages that might be able to quickly summon help.

LRA leaders are experts in exploiting the region's rugged terrain. In December 2008, the DRC, Sudan and Uganda launched Operation Lightning Thunder, a military offensive against the LRA in the north-east DRC. The operation weakened the LRA by cutting off food and supplies and destroying some camps. But the group did not disappear; instead, its members scattered across the rough country and later responded with a series of bloody attacks on civilians in Sudan and the DRC.

Such attacks are where early warning systems can be most effective. The growing network of high-frequency shortwave radios now connects rural villages in the DRC and parts of the CAR. Starting with the missionaries' network, other transmitters have been added to fill the gaps. All the radio transmitters are increasingly working with the Invisible Children's Early Warning Radio Network.

Invisible Children, a nonprofit NGO, was founded in 2004 to support and protect Kony's victims. In March 2012, the organization began an Internet video campaign called Kony 2012 that was viewed more than 40 million times within three days. The video is largely responsible for the worldwide attention focused on Kony.



REUTERS






An elderly Congolese refugee listens to a radio in a camp in western Uganda.

Early Warning Network

ADF STAFF

Invisible Children, in conjunction with other groups, established the Early Warning Radio Network to spread the word of the movements of the Lord's Resistance Army. The network now monitors parts of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. The system consists of radio stations and mobile satellite phones, totaling 83 locations.



RIGHT: John B. "Lacambel" Oryema encourages the peaceful surrender of Lord's Resistance Army soldiers on Mega FM, a radio station in Gulu, Uganda.

FAR RIGHT: In September 2013, 30 community leaders in Bobi, Uganda, recorded messages to loved ones, urging them to escape from the Lord's Resistance Army.



INVISIBLE CHILDREN

INVISIBLE CHILDREN

THE HISTORY OF THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

ADF STAFF

- **1986**
Yoweri Museveni overthrows President Milton Obote and becomes president of Uganda, a position he holds to this day.
- **1987**
Alice Lakwena, a self-proclaimed Acholi priestess, forms a rebel group, the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces. Another rebel group, the Uganda People's Democratic Army, forms with Joseph Kony as a "spiritual advisor."
- **1988**
The Holy Spirit forces are defeated, and Lakwena flees to Kenya. Kony recruits the remaining people in her movement and forms the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army, which becomes the Lord's Resistance Army in 1993.
- **1991**
Kony launches a military campaign. From April to August, his rebels seal off the northern districts of Apac, Lira, Gulu and Kitgum from the rest of Uganda. Kony and his troops begin murdering, maiming and mutilating civilians. They also begin destroying villages and taking children prisoner to train them as soldiers.
- **1993-1994**
Uganda begins peace talks with the LRA. In February 1994, the LRA rejects President Museveni's demand to surrender and launches armed attacks against Ugandan Army units and civilians. LRA soldiers plant land mines on main roads and footpaths in the northern part of the country.
- **1995**
A new Ugandan constitution legalizes political parties but maintains the ban on political activity. The LRA kills more than 200 people and carries out the first large-scale kidnapping of children. At year's end, the LRA is forced out of its base in southern Sudan.
- **1996**
The LRA commits more mass atrocities. Ugandans flee their homes in fear of the LRA and are moved to "protected villages" in Gulu. Conditions at these villages create a crisis of their own.
- **1997**
In January, the LRA kills 400 people in Lamwo County and Kitgum district, and thousands more flee their homes. The government resolves to fight the LRA, ruling out peace talks.

Expanding Networks

The early warning system in the DRC is only part of a larger picture on the African continent. In 1985, there were fewer than 10 independent radio stations in all of Africa, according to the World Association of Community Broadcasters. By 2005, the DRC alone boasted more than 200 radio stations.

Working with other groups, including Human Rights Watch, the Invisible Children Early Warning Radio Network has capitalized on this radio infrastructure. Two times a day, villages in the network check in and report on recent events and sightings. The reports, in turn, are routed to network hubs. The information alerts villages of threats, can help mobilize military forces in the region and solicit help from humanitarian workers.

Defections Encouraged

A key component of the radio network is a defection messaging initiative, in which local radio stations broadcast calls for LRA rebels to come home to their families. The messages often target specific rebels by name, with family members included in the broadcasts. The defection campaign includes helicopters playing messages over speakers and airplanes dropping leaflets about amnesty and forgiveness. Invisible Children reports that about 320 people escaped from the LRA in 2013, and 16 soldiers defected. Nearly 2,300 people have left or escaped from the LRA since December 2008.

Getting LRA soldiers to defect and surrender has been a key component for years in the war against Kony. Military writer David Axe said the tactics first were used in the northeastern DRC town of Dungu in 2009. In 2008, the LRA attacked the town, forcing its 20,000 residents to temporarily flee. Since then, the town has been the base of operations for many NGOs and other organizations trying to help LRA victims, as well as persuade LRA soldiers to desert.

The network has had a tangible effect on Kony and his troops. With the DRC better informed, Kony has been forced to move the bulk of his troops to the relatively lawless CAR, which it first invaded in 2008. He left behind a skeleton crew of soldiers to operate along the eastern DRC. It was these soldiers, estimated to number no more than a few dozen, who were the first targets of the Dungu radio broadcasts. It was believed that, with Kony absent, the soldiers would feel they could defect without facing reprisals.

The radio broadcasts are aimed at three audiences: kidnap victims, hardened LRA soldiers and DRC residents. The kidnap victims are urged to escape. The LRA soldiers are told that they can surrender without fear of punishment. DRC citizens are given current information on LRA movements.



INVISIBLE CHILDREN

'Regional Cooperation is Essential'

ADF STAFF

Africa Defense Forum spoke with Sean Poole (pictured), Invisible Children's program manager of Counter-LRA Initiatives, in March 2014. He's directly involved with the radio network that tracks LRA movement. Here are excerpts from the interview:

What's your job with Invisible Children?

I'm involved in information collection on the LRA in Central Africa. Our information collection network includes 83 locations in the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the CAR (Central African Republic).

We built our network from what was available when we started. About 75 percent of our locations are high-frequency stations. Each station costs about \$18,000 to \$20,000 over the course of the three years it takes to get it installed and running. The other 25 percent are Thuraya mobile satellite phones.

Do you have any presence in Uganda, where the LRA started? When did you expand the network into the CAR?

The network is not in Uganda. The network started activities in the CAR in 2011.

Do listeners avoid contact with the LRA based on the radio broadcasts?

That function occurs; it's just not something we report on our website. What we produce publicly is information on attacks, displacements and lootings.

From the sighting reports on your website, it seems that the LRA is a bit less violent than it has been in the past.

There is a trend of less violence among the LRA. These days, they are taking people hostage and using them as porters, releasing them after three days. It's because of the overall trend of the LRA in a weakened state. The LRA is more interested in looking after the people they already have than in trying to look after new hostages.

Boko Haram, Nigeria's extremist group, destroys radio stations and kills the

people staffing them. Has that been a problem with the LRA?

We haven't had problems with attacks on radio stations like other countries have had with Boko Haram. We do a good job of concealing our stations and protecting them. Our stations are so low profile, I think the LRA may not even be aware of the network.

Did you learn any lessons from conflicts in other parts of the world?

We learned a lot from the conflict in Colombia involving FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Many of the members of FARC would want to go home if they could. The government had an effective defection campaign.

What can other countries learn from your network?

What we're actually gathering is open-source information that can be applied to a variety of problems. It's a good problem-solving approach.

We also learned that once the Congolese got involved with tracking the LRA, we saw much more cross-border collaboration. The kind of regional cooperation we have now is something that should be applied elsewhere, and not just with the military. A lot of these affected communities straddle the border of the DRC and the CAR, and regional cooperation is essential.

What's the future of the LRA?

They have a propensity for beating the odds and have found a way to survive in spite of seemingly insurmountable odds. They're like a virus; they can always grow back. I think Joseph Kony will be eventually killed or captured. If that happens, it would be the beginning of the end of the LRA.

- 1999

Parliament passes an amnesty bill offering immunity to rebels who surrender. The LRA attacks Gulu at the end of the year, ending any hope for peace.
- 2001

The United States puts the LRA on its list of terrorist organizations.
- 2002

Sudan and Uganda sign an agreement aimed at containing the LRA. Uganda launches Operation Iron Fist, aimed at wiping out Kony's forces. The LRA responds by attacking refugee camps in northern Uganda and southern Sudan, killing hundreds of people. The Ugandan Army evacuates more than 400,000 people threatened by the LRA.
- 2004

In February 2004, an LRA unit attacks the Barlonyo refugee camp in Uganda, killing more than 300 people, most of them women and children.
- 2005

The LRA moves its base of operations to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It intensifies attacks on civilians in refugee camps.
- 2008

Uganda suspends the Juba Peace Talks indefinitely after Kony refuses to sign a binding peace agreement. At the end of the year, Ugandan, Congolese and southern Sudan Soldiers launch Operation Lightning Thunder against the LRA in the northeast DRC. The LRA responds by killing hundreds of civilians in the region.
- 2009

The Ugandan Army withdraws from the DRC after chasing LRA rebels in a three-month operation.
- 2011

The U.S. sends 100 troops to help Uganda fight the LRA.
- 2012

Uganda announces it will lead 5,000 African Union forces to fight the LRA in the DRC and Central African Republic.
- 2014

The United States discloses that its mission to help track down Kony could extend well into 2015.



This FM radio tower in the Central African Republic broadcasts messages to Lord's Resistance Army soldiers, urging them to surrender.

INVISIBLE CHILDREN

Because of the atrocities, many rural DRC residents will quickly kill anyone they believe to have LRA ties. Villagers have been known to kill LRA soldiers who were attempting to desert. Now, radio broadcasts urge listeners to allow the LRA soldiers to surrender unharmed. To that end, the United Nations established "surrender posts" where rebels could go to turn themselves in along the border with South Sudan. More recently, the United States has established posts of its own.

As 2014 began, villages throughout the region were stepping up their use of radio stations to transmit messages to individual members of the LRA, urging them to desert. One such broadcaster is John B. "Lacambel" Oryema, who hosts a radio program called *Dwog Paco*, which means "Come Back Home" in Acholi. He broadcasts from a state-owned station in northern Uganda.

Oryema has been broadcasting his messages to the LRA since 2001. He solicits messages from community members to target specific LRA members.

"I try to make it in such a way that they would be happy to hear their names, happy to hear that their parents are here surviving, their parents are longing to see them," he said. □

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CUFFING TERROR

Africa's Police Are on the Front Lines of the Fight Against Extremism

ADF STAFF
PHOTOS BY REUTERS

Fighting terror goes beyond military confrontations and high-profile missions like special forces raids to free hostages. The day-to-day work of dismantling terror networks is much more mundane. It involves traffic stops, passport verification, community outreach and intelligence gathering. Often police with deep knowledge of their communities are in the best position to accomplish the work. This is especially true in large, diverse metropolitan areas.

But not all police departments have embraced counterterror work or have been trained to do so. Research by security experts offers guidelines on how police can improve their ability to detect and disrupt extremists and dismantle terror networks.

Preliminary Crimes

Terror organizations tend to leave a trail of their activities. Experts say that in the months leading up to an attack, there are often a large number of “preliminary crimes” associated with the group. The key to identifying this trail is educating police about the warning signs, said Dr. Paul Howard, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute who studies crime trends. This means police must keep terror in the forefront of their minds every time they stop a vehicle, examine identification

or arrest a suspect for a petty crime.

“Terrorists do not operate in a logistical vacuum,” Howard wrote. “They do not typically enter their host countries with access to large amounts of hard currency and therefore must engage in a wide range of illegal activities to finance and prepare for their operations.”

Howard said preliminary crimes associated with terror tend to include:

- Credit-card fraud
- Counterfeiting
- Identity theft
- Narcotics trafficking
- Smuggling
- Money laundering

These crimes warn of something much larger. Howard compared an emphasis on preliminary crimes to a reform in New York City where police began arresting people who jumped subway turnstiles to avoid fares. The crackdown led to an overall drop in subway crime, and police discovered that many of those arrested had outstanding warrants, possessed drugs or had illegal firearms.

“Terrorism’s equivalent to fare jumping in the New York City subways are illegal border crossings, forged documents, and other relatively minor crimes that terrorists use to fund their operations,” Howard wrote.



CNI

An essential part of any police counterterror effort is identifying likely attack targets. These sites are usually called critical national infrastructure (CNI) and are prized by terrorists because they have the most wide-ranging economic impact, and attacks against them can affect a nation's psyche. CNI tends to be in the following sectors:

- Communications
- Government
- Emergency services
- Transportation
- Energy / water
- Finance

In addition to these sectors, it is important for police to consider symbolically important targets, including places of worship, national monuments and economic centers such as malls, banks or stock exchanges. Once these sites have been identified, police should allocate extra resources to protect them and work with leaders at the sites to ensure safety.

Police "must create ongoing working relationships with these sites through 'trusted partners' within the organization with whom they will share intelligence, develop contingency plans, and coordinate operations in the event of an emergency," Howard wrote.

This partnership will be a balancing act. In most countries, the critical infrastructure is largely privately owned; a study of the U.S. found that 85 percent of CNI is in private hands. Yet, many private owners do not have the resources to protect the infrastructure from a large-scale attack.

Police can help bridge this capabilities gap by offering advice and training on a variety of protection measures, including access control to facilities, evacuation plans, emergency communications systems and employee background checks. Police also can partner with business owners to perform a risk assessment of their facilities to identify weaknesses.

Members of the South African Police Special Task Force provide security outside a courthouse east of Johannesburg.

Community Policing

For police to stay one step ahead of terror groups, they must also embrace new types of police work. Community policing requires officers to engage with people in nontraditional ways, both to keep abreast of local developments and to win over allies who are in the best position to alert them of unusual activity.

These types of police activities require officers

to serve as one part investigator and one part social worker, according to Dr. Basia Spalek of the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. Unlike undercover work, community policing is not a matter of infiltrating extremist groups or cultivating informants, although this work may be necessary in some cases. Instead, it involves giving special attention to ethnic minority, expatriate and religious minority communities in cities where terror groups tend to recruit. Police can build bonds by visiting places of worship and homes, attending wedding ceremonies and funerals, and listening to concerns from people in these communities. Police must also show active interest in pursuing cases that specifically affect these community members, such as hate crimes.

Through this work, citizens will view police as allies and be more likely to tip them off to suspicious activity. One innovative policing unit of this type is the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), created in the United Kingdom in the early 2000s. This unit has won support from community leaders in London's sizable and diverse Muslim community. The MCU has tallied a number of high-profile accomplishments, including facilitating the change of leadership at the Finsbury Park mosque in London, which had become a haven for extremists.

"The MCU has succeeded in reclaiming a mosque from hard-core violent extremist supporters," Spalek wrote. It "helped to put together community-based initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism in London; provided support to minority sections of the Muslim population who have experienced stigmatization in relation to them being categorized as 'suspect communities'; enhanced trust in policing with sections of the Muslim population by supporting victims of racist and Islamophobic attacks; and has introduced Muslim police officers into counter-terrorism policing."

The connection between police and civilians is vitally important in many African countries, where corruption has led to the police being held in low esteem by much of the population. In Kenya, for instance, a report by Transparency International found that police have the worst reputation of any institution surveyed. This lack of respect makes citizens unwilling to cooperate.

"Due to the tainted record, the number of ordinary people who fear police officers is still high," said Abubakar Barusi, a Kenyan human-rights advocate. "People who are at the community level believe it's like betraying oneself to [tip off] the police about crime."

Through INTERPOL, police around the world can access criminal databases, investigative tools, targeted training and secure communication lines, among other crime-fighting tools that most West African countries cannot afford."

— MARTIN EWI, senior researcher at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies

To combat this perception, Kenya has launched a national Community Policing Project that seeks to encourage cooperation and trust between citizens and police. Likewise, in 2013, the police chiefs of the East African Community agreed to set up regional centers of excellence, including a center in Uganda dedicated to community policing.

Intelligence Sharing

Although policing terror may start at the local level, it cannot end there. According to Martin Ewi, an expert on international threats and transnational crime with the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, African nations must do a better job of sharing intelligence. Ewi found that although political and economic integration have progressed in recent years, this has not occurred with intelligence sharing.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM WESTGATE

ADF STAFF

On September 21, 2013, a group of al-Shabaab-linked terrorists stormed the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi and, using assault rifles and grenades, conducted a four-day siege that left 67 people dead. The incident was a national tragedy, one of the deadliest terror attacks against a civilian target in recent African history. It was also cause for self-reflection on the part of Kenya's military and law enforcement, which asked what could have been done to prevent the attack or save lives once it began. Below are some "lessons learned" from multiple sources:

HAVE AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN: In the first moments of the attack, there was an understandable panic in the mall. Based on closed-circuit footage, store employees and shoppers appeared to have been unaware of how to find the six emergency staircase exits in the 33,000-square-meter mall. Store security personnel also did not use the mall's public address system to give instructions to frightened shoppers. An emergency plan constructed and practiced ahead of time in coordination with the Kenyan police could have led to a smoother evacuation.

CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF FIRST RESPONDERS: Many of the first responders from the Kenyan Police and other groups wore plain clothes. This lack of identification made it easy for them to be mistaken for the attackers. Confusion as to who was a "friend or foe" led to shooting injuries. There also was a reported lack of communication and coordination between the Kenyan police and military responders.

OUTER PERIMETER CONTROL: The first security professionals on the scene did not adequately establish a secure perimeter around the mall to block people from entering or leaving.

PRIORITIZING WESTGATE AS A POSSIBLE TARGET: There were reportedly conversations among the National Intelligence Service, the inspector general of police and the criminal investigations department about the risk of an attack on Westgate. If the mall had been prioritized as a possible target, a risk assessment and emergency plan could have been put in place.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN EASTLEIGH: It appears the attackers spent four months in Nairobi preparing for the attack. They made numerous purchases including a vehicle and SIM cards for mobile phones. They also were often visible at a local gym. Community policing in Nairobi's predominantly Somali neighborhood of Eastleigh might have yielded clues about the young men's activities before the attack.

BORDER ENFORCEMENT: *The Star* newspaper of Nairobi reported that the men trained in Somalia, flew to Uganda and crossed into Kenya on foot before making their way to Nairobi. It is unclear whether they were ever stopped and asked for identification, but police at roadblocks have been known to allow people to pass through without identification in exchange for a bribe. This practice negates national efforts to secure the border.

Sources: KenyaCitizenTV, Jillo Kadida of *The Star*, Agence France-Presse, New York City Police Department



Civilians flee the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi after gunmen opened fire on September 21, 2013.

"The main obstacles to practical cooperation have been state sovereignty and the view that practical counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly at the police-to-police level, impinges on state privacy," Ewi wrote. "This is even more pronounced with

regard to cooperation between police and other law enforcement agencies such as gendarmerie, intelligence agencies, the army, customs, and port/border authorities. The relationship is often characterized by competition and mistrust."

This lack of intelligence sharing can have catastrophic effects. There have been instances where internationally wanted terror suspects have been arrested and released by authorities who were unaware of a suspect's importance simply because intelligence was not shared by another nation or domestic agency.

Ewi recommends a greater role for Interpol to share intelligence about extremism, drugs and other cross-border crimes. "Through Interpol, police around the world can access criminal databases, investigative tools, targeted training and secure communication lines, among other crime-fighting tools that most West African countries cannot afford," Ewi wrote. "For example, Interpol has a high-tech 24-hours-a-day seven-days-a-week global communication system (I-24/7) that enables police in different countries to communicate with one another, share critical information, facilitate mutual legal assistance, and undertake joint operations."

There are burgeoning regional initiatives to accomplish this. The West African Police



Information System was developed by Interpol in 2010 and works to centralize and share information from law enforcement agencies in participating West African nations. The East Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization does much of the same work for East African nations, including holding training events and sharing information related to terror groups.

In the wake of the terror attacks by al-Shabaab-linked gunmen in the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, some security experts are calling for greater cooperation, particularly between Somalia and Kenya.

"Kenya's National Intelligence Service and Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency should pool their resources to develop a comprehensive regional terrorism databank and come up with a forum for agents to regularly meet and compare intelligence data and analysis," Sabahi Online reported in October 2013.

"Such a databank would have names of suspected terrorists, their updated pictures, location and recent movement, associates and their communication logs and source of funding," Somali Ambassador to Kenya Mohammed Ali Nur told Sabahi Online.

Lack of information flow is not just a problem between nations. Intelligence should be shared among law enforcement agencies within a nation. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, a national commission determined that better information-sharing between government agencies and between the federal

government and local law enforcement offices could have prevented the attacks.

Most notably, three of the 9/11 hijackers were stopped separately for traffic violations not long before the attacks. All three had overstayed their allotted time on their immigration documents, one had an outstanding warrant in another state, and at least one of the men was on a CIA watch list. However, because local police did not have access to this information, each man was allowed to go free.

In 2010 congressional hearings on the issue, numerous observers pointed to the importance of information-sharing that involves local police on the beat.

"The diffuse nature of today's terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorism plots will come first to federal authorities who will then share this information with state and local authorities," said Brian Michael Jenkins, a terrorism expert. "It is just as likely — perhaps more likely — that local law enforcement could be the first to pick up clues of future conspiracies."

To rectify the shortfalls, the U.S. has instituted the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative in which police on the beat are encouraged to share encounters or information that could be terrorism-related. Through a nationwide network, this information is vetted and disseminated to local and federal agents across the country. □

South African police officers patrol streets in Bekkersdal, west of Johannesburg, during service delivery protests in October 2013.

Members of Equatorial Guinea's police special forces screen fans entering a stadium to watch the opening match of the Africa Cup of Nations football tournament in 2012.

AFTER SETBACKS IN SOMALIA, AL-SHABAAB MILITANTS STAGE HIGH-PROFILE ATTACKS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

TERROR TURNS OUTWARD



An al-Shabaab insurgent participates in a rally in Mogadishu, Somalia. African Union Mission in Somalia forces have dealt several setbacks to al-Shabaab in recent years. Some believe these losses have prompted attacks outside Somalia. AFF/GETTY IMAGES

ADF STAFF

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NEXT TO HER 9-YEAR-
OLD DAUGHTER, SY,
AND 21-MONTH-OLD
SON, TY.



A Kenyan Soldier searches Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall during a violent siege by al-Shabaab militants in September 2013. The 80-hour gun and grenade attack killed nearly 70 people and wounded about 175 others. The image was taken from AFP TV. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Wambua grabbed a shard of broken glass and held it out to her son, who is fascinated by — and a little scared of — insects, saying: “ ‘Look, dudu’ — dudu is a Swahili word for an insect. I said: ‘Ty, look. Dudu is coming to bite you.’ That would scare him a little, and so he would keep quiet. And we played that game for almost an hour. It was amazing he just kept still.”

Wambua and her children pretended to be dead for more than four hours in hopes of escaping the gunmen. At one point, al-Shabaab militants came so close to them that Wambua could smell gunpowder and hear the clink of spent shell casings as they hit the floor.

“That’s the point when I started singing a song about the resurrection because I thought we were all going to die,” Wambua told the BBC. Soon, a man called out “Mama” to her, and touched her daughter gently. He identified himself as a police officer, and he and his colleagues led the mother and children out of the mall to safety.

Many others were not so fortunate. After an 80-hour siege in September 2013, terrorists had killed nearly 70 men, women and children, and injured about 175 in the gun and grenade attack. The brutal extremist group, which for years has terrorized Somalia, had again struck outside its home base, attacking a civilian target in Kenya, which has participated in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Opinions differ on the meaning of the attack. Some see it as a sign of a weakened terror group lashing out against a soft target. Others see the group as adapting, using new tactics, and believe it is a harbinger of more attacks to come. One thing is certain: The response by Kenya and other East African nations to the tactical shift by al-Shabaab will be critical to ensuring that the terror group is further isolated and weakened.

THE RISE OF AL-SHABAAB

Al-Shabaab grew out of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 after years of civil war and chaos under a series of warlords in the 1990s. The courts tried to bring order to Somalia, but they collapsed under pressure from the Transitional Federal Government and an invasion by Ethiopia. The Ethiopian invasion eliminated more moderate elements of the ICU, leaving behind strong, radical fighters bent on imposing an Islamic state in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, which means “the youth,” emerged. “Al-Shabaab was always a radical wing or radical element within ICU,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Al-Shabaab militants soon found that governing was more difficult than insurgency. Their brutality and practices are inconsistent with Somali culture, Felbab-Brown said. Also, according to a paper published by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, three factors came together in ensuing years and weakened al-Shabaab: the formation of AMISOM, mismanagement of the 2011 regional drought, and internal clan divisions.

THE TIDE TURNS IN SOMALIA

AMISOM, which the African Union set up in 2007, got off to a rocky start. Ethiopia’s invasion in 2006 was effective against the ICU militia but unpopular with the Somali people. AMISOM began with only Ugandan troops, but Burundi soon joined, and Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Kenya sent troops later. By 2011, the operation had gained traction, and AMISOM forces pushed al-Shabaab militants out of the capital, Mogadishu. About a year later, AMISOM retook the southern port city of Kismayo, the third-largest city in Somalia and an important financial hub for the terror group, which had been using the port to raise money through the export of charcoal.

“The one important thing is to move beyond the sort of parochial rivalries that characterize intelligence and security services in East Africa and get them to engage in better, more honest intelligence sharing.”

VANDA FELBAB-BROWN

a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution



An al-Shabaab member participates in an event outside of Mogadishu, Somalia. The group's refusal to allow foreign food aid into its controlled areas in 2011 exacerbated the severity of a famine.



REUTERS

A Kenya Defence Forces Soldier, part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), mans a gun in the coastal town of Kismayo in November 2013. AMISOM's ability to take the southern port city from al-Shabaab is considered one of its top successes.

At one time, al-Shabaab was making about \$500,000 per month by exporting charcoal to Gulf states, according to Lt. Col. Geoffrey Kambere of the Uganda People's Defence Force. The militant group also raised significant money by taxing imports and exports at the port. According to a United Nations report, at its height, al-Shabaab was taking in \$35 million to \$50 million per year in custom tolls and business taxes in Kismayo and two other ports.

Internal leadership divisions led up to military setbacks. The group's merger with al-Qaida is believed to have caused a rift between Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, also known as Godane, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was less devoted to global

jihadist goals. Godane has been called "al-Shabaab's Osama bin Laden." Aweys was taken into custody in summer 2013, reportedly after defecting.

The East African drought of 2011 also took a heavy toll on al-Shabaab's influence. "Although the drought affected the entire region, it was only in the southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle areas controlled by al-Shabab where it also led to a famine," the CTC paper said. "According to the United Nations, around three million people in al-Shabab-controlled areas of Somalia were without enough food. This was in large part due to the militia's refusal of foreign aid, which it saw as an attempt to undermine its authority and help spread Western influence."

By this time, remaining popular support for al-Shabaab was beginning to decrease. As the militants lost ground to AMISOM, financial opportunities dwindled. The group resorted to tribal taxes, livestock theft, kidnapping for ransom and consorting with pirates. "This kind of behavior is damning evidence that the radicals' practices are unrelated to Islam because Islam forbids stealing livestock from poor people and using the money to finance unjust wars against the people," Somali lawmaker Mohamed Omar Gedi told Sabahi Online in July 2012.

AL-SHABAAB LASHES OUT

In the wake of these setbacks, al-Shabaab has stepped outside Somalia with high-profile attacks. The Westgate massacre came in September 2013, and a month later, two al-Shabaab militants died when the bomb they were working on accidentally detonated in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Officials arrested several others in what is believed to have been a plan to bomb Addis Ababa Stadium as fans watched a World Cup football qualifier between Ethiopia and Nigeria, the *Sudan Tribune* reported.

Despite the brutality of the Westgate attack, some consider it a validation of the AMISOM strategy in Somalia. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the top U.S. diplomat for Africa, told reporters in October 2013 that the attack showed that al-Shabaab is hitting "soft targets because other targets are being made harder for them to go after."

"It highlighted to us we were pursuing the right strategy," Thomas-Greenfield said, according to *The Citizen of Tanzania*. "We need to bolster that strategy."

Kjetil Tronvoll, senior partner with the International Law and Policy Institute in Oslo, Norway, told *ADF* that military gains have no doubt redirected al-Shabaab's focus in East Africa from a "Somali-based ideology to a more jihad-transnational-based ideology." Because of that, more attacks are likely, he said.

Intelligence analysts say a retreat from imposing Islamist rule might have resulted in the group diverting resources toward attacking AMISOM troop-contributing countries. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. told the U.S. Congress in 2013 that he expects al-Shabaab to "remain focused on local and regional challenges" and "continue to plot attacks designed to weaken regional adversaries, including targeting U.S. and Western interests in East Africa."

Kenya, like many other East African nations, has a sizable population of Somalis. Some estimates put the total at 1 million, and many live in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, known as "Little Mogadishu." Less than two months after the Westgate attack, Kenya, Somalia and the United Nations signed a repatriation agreement urging many Somali refugees to return to their home country, according to *The Christian Science Monitor*.



A disabled Somali boy holds a poster during a rally against al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in February 2014.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Anti-Somali sentiments were common in Kenya before and after the mall attack. Felbab-Brown said Kenyans have long been quick to cast a suspicious eye toward Somalis. That kind of scapegoating may be just what al-Shabaab is counting on.

FASHIONING A RESPONSE IN EAST AFRICA

Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson College in the United States and an expert on Somalia, said the Westgate attack signals that al-Shabaab is hoping for a “violent backlash” against hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis living and working in Kenya.

One expert said the Westgate attack signals that al-Shabaab is hoping for a “violent backlash” against hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis living in Kenya.

“The Westgate attack is the latest sign of the group’s weakness,” Menkhaus wrote for the website ThinkProgress. “It was a desperate, high-risk gamble by Shabaab to reverse its prospects. If the deadly attack succeeds in prompting vigilante violence by Kenyan citizens or heavy-handed government reactions against Somali residents, Shabaab stands a chance of recasting itself as the vanguard militia protecting Somalis against external enemies. It desperately needs to reframe the conflict in Somalia as Somalis versus the foreigners, not as Somalis who seek peace and a return to normalcy versus a toxic jihadi movement.”

Tronvoll agrees. He said East African security forces must be careful not to “stigmatize all Somalis as potential threats and terrorists.”

“That can then propel a self-fulfilling prophecy, pushing people or alienating people away from the state, so to say, and pushing them into other, more radicalized processes,” he said.

Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, a specialist in African

counterterrorism with CyberPoint International, said adopting community policing and engagement practices would be one way to approach Somali communities in East Africa. Doing so would allow security forces to patrol safely while finding partners in the community who could provide information and counter violence. “From that, you get ideally the sorts of relationships where the security forces can get tips, can get information, can develop an information network, and can try to shift their actions more to prevention or patrolling ... as opposed to just responding when something has already gone wrong,” she said.

“I think you have to start with a set of local security officers who understand the benefit of doing things differently.” If security forces can find people in these communities who share an interest in undermining al-Shabaab, “then you empower those people to take on a local security role.”

Authorities also must understand that as al-Shabaab undergoes an ideological shift, the group can use local grievances as a way of “getting a new foothold in neighboring countries,” Tronvoll said. For example, if Kenyan or Ethiopian authorities stigmatize Somali populations, that could lead to resentment that al-Shabaab could exploit for recruitment. Minimizing the threat will require East African security forces to work together. Intelligence sharing is crucial. That occurs to some extent now, but efforts will have to be enhanced, Tronvoll said.

“I think they need to define some new structures,” he said. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community already foster cooperation in the region, but “to lift it up a level, you need a new subregional structure, a mechanism to pool both intelligence sources’ information.” Joint task forces also could trace al-Shabaab’s recruiting network throughout East Africa. “You need a more fitted structure to address this subregional problem.”

Felbab-Brown agrees that regional cooperation is essential. “The one important thing is to move beyond the sort of parochial rivalries that characterize intelligence and security services in East Africa and get them to engage in better, more honest intelligence sharing, and focus on the counterterrorism threat.” Ultimately, internal intelligence sharing within national agencies will be as important as external intelligence sharing among East African nations, she said. □

KENYAN-BORN CYCLIST

HOPES TO TAP INTO AFRICA'S TALENT POOL

REUTERS

The 2013 winner of the Tour de France, Chris Froome, says Kenya has a rich pool of endurance athletes and that the next great cyclist is out there somewhere.

Kenyan-born Froome said his country's success in middle- and long-distance running shows that the East African nation is awash with gifted athletes capable of competing in the world's toughest endurance races.

"It seems that there is so much talent here," Froome told reporters in Nairobi as he sat next to Kenyan rider David Kinjah, who was his childhood mentor. "You just have to look at the natural ability of runners to see that Kenya has a lot of talent, but in cycling it's not going through; it's being stopped."

Froome won a medal for Kenya in the All Africa Games in 2007, but in 2008 he switched allegiance to Britain after receiving little financial support in his homeland. He said the same problems are now facing other Kenyan riders.

In his youth, he took up cycling when he met Kinjah and began crisscrossing Kenya's lush highlands with his mentor's team of young riders, mostly teenage boys from the tiny village of Mai-I-Hii on the outskirts of Nairobi. Froome said one of the reasons he returned to Kenya was to help cyclists like Kinjah, who work with young men who have talent but no money. His plan is to launch his own foundation and start raising money.

Chris Froome, right, walks with his mentor, David Kinjah.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES



MANDELA FILM

premieres in South Africa

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

A long-awaited film on the life of anti-apartheid hero Nelson Mandela premiered in his native South Africa on November 3, 2013, stirring emotional memories of the country's turbulent history. The film opened a month before Mandela died at age 95.

The movie *Mandela: Long Walk to Freedom*, largely based on his autobiography of the same title, traces the life of the revered leader from his childhood in the rural Eastern Cape to his election as the country's first black president in 1994.

After spending 27 years in prison for activism against the racist regime, he preached equality and forgiveness in the bitterly divided nation, winning him worldwide admiration as a peace icon.


"The film will be a very big contribution to our history,"

said George Bizos, Mandela's close friend. Bizos was the lawyer who defended Mandela during the 1963-64 trial in which he and fellow activists were convicted of sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Mandela is played by British actor Idris Elba, and Mandela's ex-wife Winnie is played by Naomie Harris, also of Britain. "This story is so much bigger than me, bigger than any one of us," Elba said.

Elba immersed himself in the part, accurately replicating Mandela's accent and even speaking Xhosa in one scene. "It's a massive honor for someone like me to play Mr. Madiba," he said, referring to Mandela by his clan name.

Tsepo Nakedi, 37, said he had not fully understood the country's bitter history until after watching *Mandela*. "Sometimes we disrespect our history," Nakedi said. "Now we know the sacrifices that Mandela made — I know the amount of hate and frustration he went through."



Nelson Mandela's wife, Graca Machel, and actor Idris Elba attend the premiere of *Mandela: Long Walk to Freedom* in Johannesburg. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Togo's FIRST WINTER OLYMPIAN *wants to inspire Africa*

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Togo's first competitor at the Winter Olympics, cross-country skier Mathilde-Amivi Petitjean, did not expect to win a medal at the 2014 games in Sochi, Russia. Instead, she hoped to inspire African athletes to compete in winter sports.

"I think all the people in all [African] countries are happy for me," said Petitjean, who turned 20 a week after the race. "It's good for African countries that they see it's possible to participate in the Winter Olympic Games."

Petitjean crossed the line in the women's 10-kilometer classical race February 13, 2014, in 68th place, less than 10 minutes behind winner Justyna Kowalczyk of Poland.

Petitjean was born in Niger to a Togolese mother. The family moved to Haute-Savoie in the French Alps when she was 2. Becoming a skier, then, wasn't as unusual for her as it is for most Togolese girls. "I practiced cross-country since I was 12 years old," she said. "It happened by chance. I tried it and continued doing it."

Her Olympic adventure started in March 2013, when she received a Facebook message from an official from the Togolese ski federation, asking whether she would be interested in representing Togo at the Sochi Games.

"I spoke with my family, and they said, 'It's OK, let's go for Sochi!'" Petitjean said.

Her career has been made possible by her own family, overcoming a lack of funds from the Togo federation. She now hopes that competing at the Olympics and the subsequent media attention will help attract sponsors.

"It's very difficult because the team hasn't got money for training," she said. "It's hard for such a little team to continue."

Her Olympic debut has her longing for more, and her focus already has turned toward the 2018 Winter Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea.



Togo's Mathilde-Amivi Petitjean competes in the women's 10K classical-style cross-country race at the 2014 Winter Olympics.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

EU Signs Road Grant **With Ethiopia**

REUTERS

The European Union has signed a development grant with Ethiopia worth \$287.26 million to help finance road construction and projects targeting maternal health and drought resilience.

As of 2014, Ethiopia, Africa's second-most-populous country after Nigeria, was midway through a five-year economic plan that foresees almost tripling the country's road network and beginning the building of 5,000 kilometers of new railway lines.

Addis Ababa's big infrastructure push is aimed at connecting remote regions and has propelled the economy to double-digit growth for much of the past decade.


Once run by communists, Ethiopia's economy is now Sub-Saharan Africa's

fifth-biggest, leap-frogging Kenya after a decade of robust growth. But it remains one of the world's largest aid recipients.

In November 2013, the United Nations said Ethiopia was making slow progress in improving maternal health and that the rate of maternal mortality — dying in childbirth — was among the highest in the world.

The International Monetary Fund projects the Ethiopian economy will expand 7.5 percent in each of the next two budget years.

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A laborer works at a railway station site in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As of 2014, the country was midway through a five-year plan to improve its roads and railway lines.



REUTERS



AFRICA GETTING 'White Space' Internet

REUTERS

At Cape Town's Elswood Secondary School, even the metal grills welded into its walls did not deter burglars from ripping out the copper cables that delivered Internet service to the students.

But Elswood's pupils were saved by alternative technology — free wireless connection via unused parts of the TV spectrum known as white space. It's being provided by a consortium led by Google as part of a wider trial.

Africa is the world's last major untapped market for Internet access. Only 16 percent of its billion people use the Internet — half the penetration rate of Asia, according to the International Telecommunication Union.

Most Africans who can access the Internet do so via mobile phones. This pushed broadband usage to 11 percent in 2013 from just 2 percent in 2010. But mobile phone companies are reluctant to build costly antennas and networks in remote rural areas

— meaning hundreds of millions of Africans still have little prospect of going online.

Television networks leave idle gaps between channels to protect themselves from interference from other networks. The technology uses these "white spaces" to transmit and receive wireless data signals.

The adapted TV radio waves can travel up to a

10-kilometer radius, making them ideal for connecting off-grid villages. They penetrate walls better than mobile signals, and they're cheap to provide. Building a white space antenna costs one-tenth of the amount needed for a normal telecoms base station.

Africa's thinly populated airwaves make it ideal for the technology because of the abundance of available spectrum. Microsoft is running pilot projects in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa with the aim of launching commercial projects thereafter. Google is sponsoring trials in schools, including Elswood, across South Africa.



Students use computers to study at Elswood Secondary School in Cape Town, South Africa.

Tanzania Attracts More Tourists

REUTERS

Tanzania, famed for its safari parks beneath snow-capped Mount Kilimanjaro, estimated that it attracted 40 percent more tourists in 2013 than in 2012.


The country estimated it hosted 1.5 million visitors as it broke into new Asian markets. In the year ending in September 2013, tourism earned more hard currency than gold exports for the first time in years.

Tourism raked in \$1.8 billion in the 12 months ending in September 2013, up from \$1.61 billion a year earlier.

The country is intensifying efforts to tackle poaching of elephant ivory and rhino horns. Poaching has surged across Sub-Saharan Africa, where armed criminal gangs are slaughtering elephants to feed Asia's demand for ivory, as well as rhinos, whose horns are ground into powder for use in Asian medicines. The powder has no proven medicinal benefits.

A lioness yawns while resting with her cub at Tanzania's Serengeti National Park. Wildlife is an important tourist attraction in Tanzania.

REUTERS



Algeria, Tunisia Mobilize to Secure Borders

MAGHAREBIA.COM

In a move described as the largest border mobilization in recent history, Algeria announced in October 2013 that it would send thousands of troops to secure the eastern and southern frontiers to halt the infiltration of terrorists.

"Algeria is making a considerable contribution in the fight against terrorism and organized crime," Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra said at a news conference. "The Army and security forces are working to strengthen national security and are aiming for the country to become a source of stability for neighboring and sisterly countries."

The Algerian Army also tightened security measures on its eastern border after the

assassination of two members of the Tunisian National Guard. The Tunisian Army conducted a large security operation in the area after the attack. The leadership of the Algerian Army declared a state of maximum alert and transferred additional ground forces to the border with Tunisia, including armored units backed by attack helicopters and special forces, the newspaper *El Bilad* reported.

The report described the mobilization as the most extensive movement of military forces to date on the eastern border. The deployment consisted of more than 12,000 Soldiers made up of special forces, infantry and the gendarmerie.

A communication line also was opened between the leadership of Algerian ground and air operations and their Tunisian counterparts to accelerate intelligence sharing.



REUTERS

Nigeria Plans to Build, Export Military Vessels

ADF STAFF

The Nigerian Navy announced plans to build commercial warships that can be exported to other African countries.

Vice Adm. Dele Ezeoba, Nigeria's chief of Naval Staff, made the announcement in November 2013 while inspecting the second patrol ship under construction for the Nigerian Navy at the Naval Dockyard on Victoria Island, Lagos. Ezeoba said the country's

shipbuilders are now skilled enough to build patrol ships between 10 meters and 38 meters long, according to the newspaper *Punch*.

"The Nigerian Navy will no longer buy a ship of between 10 and 12 meters in size, because we have the capacity and capability to build them in our dockyard," he said.

Ezeoba believes Nigeria has the potential to become a continental

leader in shipbuilding and says the sector could create hundreds of thousands of jobs for Nigerians. In 2012, Nigeria unveiled the 31-meter NNS Andoni, a seaward defense boat built at the dockyard in Lagos. Ramping up shipbuilding capacity is part of Nigeria's Vision 2020 initiative that emphasizes self-reliance, according to the security journal *Jane's Defence Weekly*.



AP/GETTY IMAGES

U.S. PARTNERS WITH LIBYA TO TRAIN SOLDIERS

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to train 5,000 to 8,000 Libyan Soldiers in a continuing effort to bolster security in the North African nation.

Defense spokesman Col. Steve Warren said the Army will train the troops in Bulgaria on basic, general-purpose skills.

The 24-week training program is part of a larger U.S. and international effort to shore up security in the country and region in the aftermath of the 2011 fall of longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi. Militia violence increased in the final months of 2013 in sections of the country where the Army and police were unable to disarm them.

Libyan Army Soldiers stand in formation during a graduation ceremony in May 2013.



NIGERIAN NAVY

The 31-meter NNS Andoni is Nigeria's first domestically manufactured military vessel.

Ghana Seizes Cocaine at Sea

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

In November 2013, Ghanaian authorities impounded a South American ship carrying 400 kilograms of cocaine and arrested its five-member crew, according to the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), Ghana's anti-narcotics agency.

The ship was registered in Guyana, and the street value of the drug was estimated at \$50 million, authorities said. U.N. estimates place the drug value at approximately half that amount. "The vessel had been monitored at the high seas, and when she got into the Ghanaian waters, the Ghana Navy and NACOB officers arrested and escorted her to the Sekondi Naval Base," authorities said in a statement.

In recent years, Ghana has become a transshipment point for traffickers moving cocaine and marijuana to Europe and the United States. In 2012, police at London's Heathrow Airport intercepted a 1.5-metric-ton shipment of marijuana and a 7.5-kilogram shipment of cocaine hidden in peels of plantains, a staple food of the West African nation.

Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire to Resolve Maritime Boundary

REUTERS

West African neighbors Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire aim to settle a long-running dispute over their maritime boundary. The move could defuse sometimes-tense relations between the countries and smooth the way for oil and gas exploration.

The countries have never officially defined the boundary, and their maps showing offshore waters currently overlap.

Oil exploration in Africa's Gulf of Guinea has accelerated since Ghana discovered its giant Jubilee oil and gas field in 2007 and brought it online in record time in late 2010. The field is estimated to hold 2 billion barrels of oil reserves and another 1.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

Côte d'Ivoire, meanwhile, drilled only a handful of offshore exploration wells during a decade-long political crisis that ended in 2011. It now wants to expand its oil and gas industry and says that some offshore areas claimed by Ghana lie within its territorial waters.

With the return of political stability, the economy of Côte d'Ivoire, the world's top cocoa producer, grew 9.8 percent in 2012. But the government aims to diversify, given that cocoa accounts for 40 percent of exports.

Its potentially lucrative and largely undeveloped offshore blocks, meanwhile, have generated renewed interest as well.

A boy walks on a pier in Adiake, Côte d'Ivoire, near the border with Ghana.



REUTERS



MOSQUITO TRAP COULD REDUCE MALARIA IN KENYA

THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION

A solar-powered mosquito trap is helping lower the incidence of malaria on Rusinga Island in Western Kenya.

The device, invented by Kenyan and Dutch researchers, uses a solar roof panel to power an electric fan and mosquito zapper, installed on the outside of traditional tin-roofed mud and daub houses. Nylon strips, laced with artificial human scent, draw mosquitoes to the trap, and the fan sucks them into the device, the researchers said.

Dr. Shanaz Sharif, Kenya's director of public health, predicted the device could help "reduce the burden of public spending toward treating malaria, which is about \$100 million per year."

Rusinga Island is known for its nearly year-round heat and its high prevalence of malaria. But the sunshine also makes it particularly suitable for solar-powered devices. So far, the inventors have tested it in 470 households. Besides capturing mosquitoes, its solar panels can power two light bulbs and a mobile phone charger.

Backers of the device hope to begin selling it commercially in 2014. The device also aims to reduce dependency on insecticides and mosquitos' growing resistance to them. Residents of Rusinga Island, home to 22,000 people, say they think the device is helping protect them against malaria.

Peter Otieno, 23, who has one of the devices in his home, said that an added attraction is that "we do not have to go through all the trouble of using insecticide-treated nets on our beds in this hot weather."

CONGOLESE DOCTOR CALLS FOR END OF RAPE AS WAR TOOL

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Pioneering doctor Denis Mukwege has called for zero tolerance of rape in his native Democratic Republic of the Congo, where tens of thousands of women have been brutally attacked by the army and militia members.

"I think we have drawn a red line [for some war crimes] but when it comes to using rape as a weapon of war, we equivocate," he said in November 2013.

Mukwege, who was in Stockholm to receive the Right Livelihood Award, has set up a hospital and foundation to treat rape victims.

Women are frequent targets in conflict-torn eastern DRC, and the doctor told harrowing stories of women who had been raped in public in front of their husbands and children and arrived at the clinic with catastrophic injuries. Mukwege said rape as a weapon of war had



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

dramatic consequences for women and for the country.

Every year, his hospital's main program for victims of sexual violence takes in more than 3,500 women and provides them with reconstructive surgery.

"The inability of DR Congo to sort out its problems, followed by the silence of the international community, is a major drama of our

time," the doctor said. "We are in the 20th year of atrocities, and I think that the more the years go by, the more we see the groups, the militias improve their tool of torture."

Mukwege pointed to a United Nations resolution adopted in 2000 as an example of good intentions. "But there is not a solid red line yet which says: This limit cannot be passed," he said.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls on all member states to take specific measures to protect women and young girls, especially against rape.

Mukwege has been targeted for his outspoken stance on this issue. In October 2012, he narrowly escaped being murdered after a group of armed men broke into his home in Bukavu. He was forced into exile in Belgium and returned to his hospital in January 2013.

Regional Stock Markets Have Record Years

THE EASTAFRICAN

Strong foreign investor participation in 2013 pushed regional stock markets in Africa to performance records.

Most investors who put their money in the stock markets got handsome returns, especially at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), which closed 2013 as the best-performing market in Africa and fourth best in the world.

Data analyzed by *The EastAfrican* indicates that investors showed a strong appetite for companies in

the financial, manufacturing and investment sectors. "With relatively stable macro-economic factors, the country as a whole is poised for growth," according to Old Mutual Securities. "However, a smooth transition which began [in 2012] through the dispensation of the new devolved government will determine the stock market's and the economy's performance."

Stock exchanges in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda all recorded positive years. The All-Share Index, which evaluates the performance of Rwandan stocks, rose by more than 130 percent. The Tanzania Share Index almost doubled, jumping 95 percent.

Analysts say the region's exchanges benefited from falling inflation, which freed consumer spending, while the relative improvement of the global economy also revived international capital flows.



REUTERS

East Africa Moves Toward ONE CURRENCY

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

At a November 2013 summit in Kampala, Uganda, five East African countries signed a protocol to establish a monetary union, a first step toward creating a single currency.

Leaders from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda inked the framework to set up a single market modeled after the eurozone. In addition to using a single currency, the East African Monetary Union is designed to result in the free movement of workers, goods, services and capital within the five countries, which have a combined population of 135 million.

It would also lead to the creation of a customs union — due to be set up this year. “We now have the framework required to unlock the promise of integration,” said Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. He said the union would “eliminate the cost of juggling different currencies, thereby reducing transaction cost.”

“Businesses will find more freedom to trade and invest more widely, and foreign investors will find additional irresistible reasons to pitch tent in our region,” the Kenyan president said.

However, it will likely be about a decade before the conditions required for setting up such a union are fulfilled, the group estimated. Participating countries each will have to meet macroeconomic criteria such as inflation targets. In addition, the bloc will have to establish a central bank.

The East African agreement comes 21 years after the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty was signed February 7, 1992. That agreement ultimately led to the euro in 1999.



Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, left, and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta talk at an event to commemorate the signing of the monetary union, the third pillar of integration for the East African Community. AFP/GETTY IMAGES

ETHIOPIA'S WIND FARMS BUILT FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE



AFP/GETTY IMAGES

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

From the sky, the 84 glimmering white turbines at Ashegoda wind farm shoot up from the ground like huge spokes, standing out high amid vast expanses of yellow wheat.

Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, mostly populated by cattle farmers who grow the country’s staple grains, is an unlikely site for a modern French-run wind farm, Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest. With its multibillion-dollar projects in wind, hydropower, solar and geothermal energy, Ethiopia’s pioneering green energy efforts aim to supply power to its nearly 94 million people and boost its economy by exporting power to neighboring countries.


“Ethiopia stands alone in Africa as using green energy for transformative growth,” said Ahmed Soliman of the think tank Chatham House.

Current energy production capacity stands at 2,177 megawatts (MW), with ambitions to reach 10,000 MW by 2015.

Ashegoda’s turbines have a total capacity of 120 MW, making it the biggest on the subcontinent. The project was built by France’s Vergnet Group, and it is the first of several planned wind farms in the country.

Ashegoda, 780 kilometers from Addis Ababa, is part of ambitious plans to transform Ethiopia into a middle-income, carbon-neutral country by 2025. The \$313 million wind farm, funded by the French government and several private French banks, is an indication of growing interest from European companies in Ethiopia, where Chinese, Indian and Turkish investments also are growing.

The country also wants to be a regional supplier of electricity. Ethiopia is already exporting power to Djibouti and Sudan. A line to transport energy to Kenya is under construction.



The semifunctional Inga dam is on the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With a flow second only to the Amazon, the mighty Congo sends 42.5 million liters into the Atlantic every second.

REUTERS

INGA DAM PROJECT Seeks to Illuminate THE CONTINENT

REUTERS

Deep in the bowels of the giant Inga hydroelectric dam that straddles the mighty Congo River stands a fading map named “The motorways of electric power from Inga.”

From a dot in the western Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), lines extend across the African continent. They run south through Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, and north to Sudan and Libya, reaching as far as Morocco.

For decades, governments dreamed of harnessing the Congo River’s enormous energy at the Inga rapids with an expansion of the dam that is large enough to power half of Africa. Years of conflict and misrule in Congo meant the project was never realized. Instead, in the cavernous halls of Inga’s two dams, water drips from the ceiling and rusted pipes sit above puddles. Five of the 14 turbines no longer spin at all, a sign of the decay.

A deal with South Africa has revived talk of the giant hydro project, which could power a continent full of expanding economies. “We had to find a buyer for this energy. Otherwise we cannot build Inga,” said Bruno

Kapandji, Congo’s minister of energy and hydropower. “South Africa is a solvent and credible buyer.”

After a year of talks, South Africa promised to buy at least half the electricity from Inga III, a \$12 billion dam that, once built, will produce 4,800 megawatts (MW). Much of the rest of the energy produced may go to the DRC’s power-starved mining industry.

The amount is nearly three times of what is produced by Inga’s two existing dams, which are decades old and have been crippled by neglect, government debt and risk-averse investors.

Success for Inga III would help to raise investors’ confidence in the remaining five stages of the Grand Inga project. At an estimated cost of \$50 billion to \$80 billion, Grand Inga would produce 44,000 MW, dwarfing all other hydroelectric projects in the world, including China’s Three Gorges Dam.

“This incredible feat of human ingenuity, when completed, will have the capacity to power Africa, and, indeed, to export electricity beyond the continent,” South African President Jacob Zuma said at a signing ceremony in Kinshasa, DRC.



A SOLDIER'S VOICE ECHOES THROUGH THE AGES

A recently translated letter written 1,800 years ago shows that a Soldier's life then was much like a Soldier's life now.

The Egyptian Soldier, Aurelius Polion, wrote the letter while serving as a volunteer in the Roman Legion, in the Pannonia Inferior province in eastern Europe. He was probably posted in what is now western Hungary.

Polion wrote the letter to his mother, his sister and his brother. In it, he frets that they are not keeping in touch with him. "I am worried about you because although you received letters from me often, you never wrote back to me ...," he wrote on the thin paper known as papyrus. He goes on to say that he has written six letters with no response. "While away in Pannonia I sent [letters] to you, but you treat me so as a stranger," he wrote. "I shall obtain leave from the consular and I shall come to you so that you may know that I am your brother."

Although the Roman Army had a postal system, he appears to have entrusted the letter to a comrade who was returning home.

Archaeologists discovered the letter more than a century ago outside a temple in what was once the Egyptian town of Tebtunis. Historians have also found ancient contracts, petitions, declarations and tax receipts in the town. The majority of the documents date to the first three centuries A.D., when Egypt was under Roman rule.

The sheer number of documents found at the site meant that not all of them were translated. The poor condition of Polion's letter was also a problem. It sat for a century, waiting for technology to catch up with it. Grant Adamson, a doctoral candidate at Rice University in the U.S. state of Texas, translated the letter using infrared images to make the writing more legible. Polion wrote it mostly in Greek. *The Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* published the translation in early 2014.

If Polion did get permission to take leave, it would have taken him at least a month to travel from his station in eastern Europe to Tebtunis.

Egyptians of that time would have volunteered in the Roman Army for the same reasons people volunteer for armies today — as a paying job and to perhaps see the world. Polion may have enlisted in the Army and left Egypt not knowing where he was being sent — as is often the case today. And like today, Soldiers of that time occasionally had problems communicating with their families at home.

WHERE AM I? 

CLUES

- 1** The walls that surround this city were built between the 13th and 16th centuries.
- 2** It is said to be the fourth-holiest city of Islam. It has 82 mosques and 102 shrines.
- 3** Today, 368 narrow alleys provide access to townhouses packed inside the city walls.
- 4** In a nighttime ritual, men feed hyenas outside the city's walls.

ANSWER:
Harar Jugol,
a fortified
historic town
in Ethiopia

SHARE KNOWLEDGE

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.....(**author guidelines for ADF submission**)

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- If possible, include a high-resolution photograph of yourself and images related to your article with captions and photo credit information.

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