New Strategies
Turn the Tide Against Terror

PLUS
IGAD Opens Center to Counter Extremism
Reclaiming the Digital Terrain

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ON THE COVER:
This illustration shows the tools used by extremist groups for violence, recruitment and indoctrination. It illustrates the challenge of fighting terrorism while highlighting the new strategies needed to defeat it.

ADF STAFF
No country is immune to violent extremism, and no country has solved the riddle of what causes it.

Historically, Africa was not a hotbed for violent religious extremism. That changed in 1998 when it was the site of two major terrorist attacks with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Since then, homegrown groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia have taken root. These groups thrive in areas with weak governance and few economic opportunities. At the same time, internationally affiliated groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida have tried to create new battlefields in Africa as they’ve lost ground in the Middle East.

Between 2009 and 2015, attacks by radical groups rose by 200 percent in Africa, and fatalities rose by 750 percent, according to IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. Even countries that had previously been free from terrorist activity such as Mozambique have had to contend with newly emboldened radical groups.

The human and economic toll exacted by these groups has been devastating. The United Nations estimates that, over five years, the Boko Haram insurgency alone displaced 2.4 million people. In 2017, Somalia suffered the worst terror attack in its history when al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb, killing 587 people.

But there is good news. As terror grabs headlines, African security forces are making gains. African-led coalitions including the African Union Mission in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the G5 Sahel Force are defeating terror groups militarily. Extremists have been denied a safe haven and have been rejected by all peaceful communities in which they seek to operate.

Africa’s leaders also are recognizing that they must defeat the ideology behind terrorism. In Djibouti, the regional economic bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, inaugurated a Center of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2018. This center will share best practices across East Africa, build local resilience to extremism and conduct research into its causes to find solutions.

Although terrorism may not be easily eradicated, there is no doubt that the continent has learned lessons from two decades of fighting insurgencies. The African-led alliances built to confront terror groups are now stronger than ever. These alliances will succeed, thanks to the determination of security forces and the courage and decency shown by civilians. With this united front, Africa has shown terror groups it will do whatever is necessary to win the fight.

On October 14, 2018, people in Mogadishu mark the one-year anniversary of Somalia’s deadliest terror attack, a car bomb that killed 587 people. REUTERS
Moussa Faki Mahamat is the former foreign minister of Chad and the president of the African Union Commission. He addressed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)/Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Joint Summit on Peace, Security, Terrorism and Violent Extremism on July 30, 2018, in Lomé, Togo. His remarks have been translated from French and edited to fit this format.

Regions Must Take Holistic Approach to Security

The security challenges facing West and Central Africa are well-known. Whether it is terrorism, so prevalent in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin; armed rebellions and other forms of violence that are raging in some countries; piracy in the Gulf of Guinea; the persistence of all kinds of trafficking; or clashes related to cattle herding; the situation is a source of deep concern.

A number of factors create fertile ground for the persistence of this insecurity. They include climate change, such as the shrinking of Lake Chad and the silting of the Niger River; the lack of opportunities for youth; the feeling of marginalization — even outright exclusion — that inhabits large parts of our societies; and challenges faced in governance.

I welcome initiatives taken by ECOWAS and ECCAS in recent years to deal with this situation. The creation of the Joint Multinational Task Force to combat Boko Haram, the G5 Sahel Joint Force and action taken to fight maritime piracy are examples of a strong political will.

These initiatives all have paved the way for an African approach to dealing with asymmetric threats. Today’s joint summit reflects the recognition that all the efforts made so far, important as they are, are not enough. It is important to do more. The status quo is clearly untenable.

It is important that we adopt a holistic approach that addresses not only the security aspects, but also the underlying causes of the problems that arise.

Although the fight against terrorist and criminal groups must be relentless, the dialogue must respond to the legitimate concerns of people who sometimes feel that their problems are not sufficiently recognized.

We must mobilize all the necessary support for the successful completion of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic; assist in the holding of transparent and inclusive elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and deploy renewed efforts to hasten the end of the Libyan crisis.

It is equally important to work harder for inclusive development and poverty eradication. In this respect, projects that improve the daily lives of people must be agreed upon and carried out.

Lastly, it is essential that the envisioned actions form part of an overall dynamic of continuous strengthening of governance.

We intend, in the coming period, to articulate our efforts around the following axes:

• Help achieve greater interregional synergy through the establishment of flexible security cooperation arrangements or their expansion where they exist.

• Mobilize more substantial support for regional initiatives through the relevant structures of the African Union, including the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation, and the Committee of Intelligence & Security Services of Africa.

• Promote better articulation between the efforts of ECOWAS and ECCAS, on the one hand, and those of the African Union, on the other, whose instruments must serve as a global framework for counterterrorism.

• Carry out more sustained advocacy at the international level to mobilize greater support for the financing of peace support operations conducted by the countries of the two regions.
Four Somali brothers have imported dozens of Holstein Friesian cows, the world’s top milk-producing breed, hoping they can build up the war-torn country’s dairy industry from scratch.

Parts of the country still are plagued by violence, but a degree of stability in the capital in recent years has begun to attract investment from locals and Somalis living abroad.

Some see opportunities in the livestock industry, whose mainstay is traditional breeds of cattle, reared by pastoralists. These breeds produce little milk. A devastating drought recently killed off thousands of cows and camels.

Yusuf Abdirahman Dahir, 49, who manages Som Dairy and owns it with his brothers, said they so far have spent $370,000 importing the cattle and infrastructure for milk production, processing and distribution.

“We want to revive the Somali dairy industry that got destroyed in the violence,” he said at the dairy facility, a high stone-walled compound where workers tended to the cattle.

The dairy, 2 kilometers outside the capital, produces 600 liters of milk daily from 35 cows. There are 54 dairy cows on the property, but some are not being milked due to calving.

The first batch of Holstein Friesian cows, which are native to the Netherlands and Germany, died due to the heat. In Somalia, temperatures average above 30 degrees Celsius.

Som Dairy imported its first cows in 2016 and has become profitable, Dahir said.

Local farmers have been impressed by the new breed of cows in town, and several have brought their herds to crossbreed them with the imported bulls, Dahir said. Mogadishu residents are developing a taste for fresh milk after years of drinking imported powdered milk that is mixed with water.

Shopkeeper Nuradin Haji Omar buys 20 liters of milk daily from Som Dairy, up from 15 when he began buying in 2017: “We are very thankful to the dairy company for the good business.”
Every year, thousands of Yorubas gather to celebrate Osun, the goddess of fertility and water. The festival held by the West African ethnic group takes place in the Osun-Osogbo Sacred Grove in southwestern Nigeria.

According to UNESCO, which named the area a World Heritage site in 2005, the dense forest of the grove and its river “is dotted with sanctuaries and shrines, sculptures and artworks in honor of Osun and other deities.”

Priestesses prepare offerings and sacrifices to the great goddess: a heady mixture of sacrificed chickens, ochre powder, potato chips and gin. Crowds accompany the Arugba, a virgin whose face is covered with a scarlet cloth embroidered with shells, to the river where the spirit of the water goddess lives.

Belief in the Yoruba gods persists, unstifled by outside religious influences.

“I'm Christian, Muslim and a traditionalist,” said Ayodele Folasade, an employee of the Osogbo museum. “I pray to Allah five times a day, I pray to the Lord Jesus Christ, but I also go to worship Osun by the river. “Yoruba people say that if your prayers don’t work with one God, try the other ones,” she said with a smile. “Pastors or imams say it's not good to have many gods, but almost everybody turns to Osun when they need her.”

Omitola Babaosha, a visitor to the festival, said he believed in the traditional gods but unlike others did not hide it.

“I’m very proud of my heritage, and I don’t care what people say about me,” said Babaosha, wearing a large white tunic. “Whoever you believe in, whatever your religion, at the end of the day you need water to survive.”
Terrorism in Africa

Extremist Groups Threaten Security Across the Continent

BY THE NUMBERS:

A United Nations peacekeeping mission battles al-Qaida-linked extremists and others in Mali. The African Union Mission in Somalia holds al-Shabaab militants at bay. Nigeria has teamed with Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger to battle Boko Haram in and around the Lake Chad Basin.

There are big players and smaller groups launching attacks. The following is a look at what terrorism is, who is using it and what can drive people to participate in it.

Terrorism: A Definition

Although there is no international agreement on exactly what constitutes terrorism, the Global Terrorism Index defines it as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation."

Terrorist Groups in Africa

According to “Terrorism in Africa: A Quantitative Analysis” by Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, 218 known organizations have perpetrated terrorist acts in Africa. However, only a handful of groups are behind most of the major incidents.

The paper’s study period of 1997 to 2015 shows that nine organizations were responsible for two-thirds of all terrorist attacks in Africa. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab were responsible for nearly 50 percent of attacks in the same period.
**Profiles of Terrorist Groups**

**Boko Haram**
The Nigeria-based Islamist insurgency movement has existed since 2002. Its name means “Western education is a sin.” In 2009, it began violent operations to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, declaring a caliphate in areas of control five years later. In 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS. In August 2016, the group split into two factions. Various cooperative efforts between Sahel nations have recaptured most territory, but the human cost has been significant. Boko Haram has killed more than 30,000 people as of August 2018, either through terrorist acts or through clashes with security forces, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Al-Shabaab**
The name means “the youth” in Arabic. Al-Shabaab is a Somalia-based Islamist extremist group that grew out of the former Islamic Courts Union in 2006. It is thought to have up to 9,000 fighters and has imposed strict Sharia in areas it controls. The African Union Mission in Somalia has made progress in taking back territory and ensuring better security in Mogadishu, but the group remains active and lethal. About 18,000 fatalities could be attributed to al-Shabaab as of mid-2017, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The group has killed more since then.

**Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)**
The LRA began in Uganda in 1986 when Joseph Kony began a series of uprisings. The LRA kidnapped thousands of children for use as fighters, porters and wives. Kony claimed he was fighting to defend the Bible’s 10 Commandments. Operations stopped in Uganda in 2006, but the LRA continued attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. Kony still has not been captured, but the group’s influence has decreased substantially in recent years.

**Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)**
This group wanted to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and destroy Western targets, according to Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. The GSPC merged with al-Qaida in 2006, forming AQIM.

**Allied Democratic Forces**
The Allied Democratic Forces began in 1995 in the mountain region along the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda. Its personnel are thought to total several hundred, but the United Nations reported in 2013 that it was between 1,200 and 1,500 armed fighters. The group was particularly active in the late 1990s, but after a period of dormancy it resumed activity about 2005. It is known to recruit and use child soldiers and has attacked United Nations peacekeepers in the DRC.

**Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé)/(GIA)**
The GIA was based in Algeria and was founded by fighters returning from Afghanistan in the early 1990s, according to the U.N. The group is associated with al-Qaida and has been known to indiscriminately target civilians. It has conducted hijackings, bombings and ambushed Algerian security forces. It also has attacked French targets. It is no longer active, but elements from the GIA have joined AQIM and other groups.

**Tripoli Province of the Islamic State**
Starting in late 2014, three groups in Libya pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leader: Tripoli Province in the west, Barqa Province in the east and Fezzan Province in the south, according to a 2016 report in The Wall Street Journal. Tripoli Province is the most dominant. It operates in Libya’s most populous territory, and it controls the city of Sirte on the Mediterranean Sea.

**Terrorist Attacks in Africa by Organization (1997-2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various smaller terror groups</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Forces</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janjaweed</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Global Terrorism Database

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**Figures**

- **STOP au terrorisme**

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**Tunisians demonstrate in Tunis against the return of extremists who fought abroad. The sign says, “Stop Terrorism.”**

**Reuters**

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**Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**
AQIM is a Salafist terrorist group that operates in Africa’s Sahel and Sahara regions. Its origins go back to a guerrilla Islamist movement called the Armed Islamic Group, which opposed secular leadership in Algeria. AQIM grew out of a faction called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). AQIM was particularly active in Mali in the aftermath of a 2012 coup. The group worked with Tuaregs in the northern cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. AQIM began to suffer setbacks after a French-led military intervention in 2013.
Where Terrorists Attack in Africa

Fatalities from Terrorist Attacks in Africa (2000-2016)

The size of the bubbles denotes the number of fatalities in a single attack, ranging from one to 400 during the period noted.

The largest single attack between 2000 to 2016 happened in Nigeria, committed by Boko Haram in January 2015.

Number of fatalities/location of attacks resulting in fatalities
- **Attacks by groups associated with religious ideologies**
- **Attacks by other groups**

**Number of fatalities/location of attacks resulting in fatalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000-2010</strong></td>
<td>1,699</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>6,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011-2016</strong></td>
<td>5,745</td>
<td>33,350</td>
<td>10,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland (2000-2014), and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2015-2016)

*Number wounded in 2015 and 2016 not included  **Up to February 2016
Journey to Extremism in Africa

This represents the route that might be undertaken by an individual most at risk of recruitment by a violent extremist group in Africa, based on the key evidence produced by the Journey to Extremism project.

Place of birth
Most likely to have grown up in highly underdeveloped and peripheral region

Unhappy childhood
with perceived limited involvement of parents

Relatively low exposure to other ethnic and religious groups

33% have four years or less of secular education

51% identify religion as a main reason for joining violent extremist group

57% of respondents report never reading or not understanding religious texts

55% are highly frustrated with economic conditions

Acute sense of grievance toward government
83% agree government only looks after the interests of a few

Trust in police, military and politicians especially low
78% state their trust level is “not at all/poor”

Limited confidence that democratic systems can bring positive change

Source: United Nations Development Programme report “Journey to Extremism In Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment”
Employment is the single most frequently mentioned immediate need at the time of joining.

**Speed of recruitment**
The time from first contact with a violent extremist group to joining is short.

- **48%** within a month
- **80%** within a year

**Tipping point**
71% say government action triggered their decision to join.

**Most regret ever having joined**
If a recruit leaves, it is likely due to losing trust in the organization’s leadership or no longer agreeing with its actions or ideas.

**Most likely to be between 17 and 26**

A billboard campaigning against terrorism is on a road in Maiduguri, Nigeria.

**REUTERS**
RECLAIMING THE DIGITAL TERRAIN
RADICAL GROUPS HAVE FLOURISHED ONLINE.

THEY CAN’T BE SILENCED, BUT THEY CAN BE DEFEATED.

ADF STAFF
PHOTOS BY REUTERS

When it comes to radical recruitment, the medium has changed over the years, but the strategies and the message remain the same.

Islamist extremists have a long history of operating in the shadows and spreading propaganda by any means available. From the 1970s to the 1990s, radical preachers used audiocassette tapes and pamphlets handed from person to person as a means of influence.

In the video era, recruiters often used VHS tapes. One of the founders of al-Shabaab, Ibrahim al-Afghani, made his name by distributing tapes of insurgents fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In the 1990s these tapes became the equivalent of a viral sensation in Somalia and were shown in homes and small theaters.

“The VHS tapes were primitive compared with the slick, high-definition productions turned out by later radical Islamist groups,” wrote Dan Joseph and Harun Maruf in their book, Inside Al-Shabaab. “But they effectively portrayed the war as the most heroic resistance a Muslim group had ever mounted against a modern power.”
Al-Afghani used these videos to draw support from al-Qaida and attract thousands to his radical cause.

Given this history, it is no surprise that extremists have embraced the internet and flourished there. A 2015 analysis by the Brookings Institution counted more than 45,000 social media accounts controlled by ISIS supporters. The group has an affiliated news agency and produces high-quality videos and other material in English, Arabic, Russian, Mandarin, Hebrew and sign language.

“The Islamists’ entry into cyberspace was inevitable,” wrote Haroon Ullah in the book, Digital World War. “In a sense it was nothing new: The Islamists enjoyed a long-established history of skillfully using the latest technologies in reaching out to the public at the time the new social media interfaces surfaced.”

Although digital recruitment is a continuation of an old strategy, the internet has been a game-changer. It lets extremists reach people who previously may have been off-limits for face-to-face encounters. These include women and children. It also speeds up the radicalization process by having people interact in chat rooms with a community of ideologues instead of just reading or viewing material alone.

Because the internet creates an echo chamber in which potential recruits can be surrounded by like-minded people, it has become a competitive space for winning hearts and minds. In the book LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, authors Peter Warren Singer and Emerson Brooking argue that there is now a battle for “likes” or influence.

“If cyber war is about the hacking of networks, ‘likewar’ is about hacking the people on the network by driving ideas viral,” said Singer at an event held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “You have online armies using the very same tactics to accomplish real-world goals.”

If it really is a new kind of war, the question security forces must ask is: “How do we win?”

DIFFICULT TO SILENCE
One strategy to prevent extremists from spreading propaganda through social media is simple: Shut down their accounts and ban them from returning. However, that strategy is easier said than done.

In a 2018 report, the social media platform Twitter reported it had blocked 1.2 million suspected terrorist accounts over two years and 275,000 accounts in the last half of 2017 alone. The company said it relied on reporting from individuals, organizations and governments, and technology that can spot an extremist account and block it before it makes its first tweet.

The company said it was making Twitter an “undesirable place” for people spreading extremist ideology and was gratified to see groups moving away from the site.

But this success is fleeting. History shows that when one account is removed, several more pop up to take its place. One ISIS-aligned Twitter user, Aswarti Media, has bragged about how many times Twitter has shut down its account — more than 600. Additionally, when sites like Twitter become inhospitable, extremists simply move to other platforms. They use encrypted services including WhatsApp, Telegram and file-sharing services through which they can exchange simple PDFs, such as the ISIS magazine, Rumiyah.

“Hate, it turns out, travels faster than Silicon Valley justice,” The New York Times wrote in an article about the effort to silence extremists online.

Similarly, many people preaching extremist messages are adept at not breaking the rules of social media. One of the most popular Islamist preachers in the world, Mohamad al-Arefe, has 21 million followers on Twitter. He has inspired many young men to join ISIS and creates programs he calls “Snap Fatwas” on Snapchat. However, since he is careful not to explicitly call for violence, he does not violate these platforms’ terms of use.

“They cannot stop him, for example, speaking out against Bashar al-Assad’s tyranny, while also speaking favourably about religious law and Islamic government,” wrote Ullah in an editorial published by The Guardian. “But if you put these two ideas together and add some dangerous context, you end up in a bad place.”

FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE
Groups fighting radical recruitment online, like the Google-affiliated Jigsaw, believe the best strategy is to beat terrorists at their own game. In partnership with a group called Moonshot CVE, Jigsaw has launched what it calls the redirect method.
THE STAGES OF ISIS
online recruitment

**DISCOVERY:** ISIS recruiters closely monitor online communities in which they believe sympathetic people may spend time. They make themselves available to answer questions and provide information to those who appear curious.

**CREATE A MICRO-COMMUNITY:** Once a potential recruit is identified, ISIS supporters flock around him or her to reinforce new beliefs. “The recruiters are available in high volume bursts to interact with targets, often publishing 50 or 60 tweets per day, with some prolific users clocking over 250 on given days,” wrote J.M. Berger in an article for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

**ISOLATION:** Potential recruits are urged to cut ties with their family, friends and local religious communities. This isolation allows ISIS to silence dissenting voices.

**SHIFT TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS:** ISIS supporters encourage targets to move their conversations into private or encrypted messaging platforms online.

**ENCOURAGE ACTION:** ISIS recruiters determine what type of action the target is willing to carry out. This could be traveling to join ISIS or conducting a terror attack in their home country. Once this is determined, they encourage the recruit to take action.

Source: J.M. Berger, "Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy"
This strategy is based on the simple premise that most people radicalized online begin by searching for answers to important questions and later get drawn down the path of extremism. If they can be given different answers at the beginning of their journey, they can be saved.

“In most of the cases with my conversations with former ISIS recruits or supporters or extremists, they were people with almost legitimate questions and they went down a bad path,” said Yasmin Green, director of research and technology at Jigsaw. “More information, better information, earlier in the process could have steered them in a different direction.”

The program uses the power of online advertising to detect when someone is looking for information about an extremist group. Then, the program shows that person an advertisement for a YouTube video featuring a cleric or an extremist defector.

Timing is extremely important in this effort. Research shows that once young people make contact with an extremist group and become surrounded by a like-minded “micro-community” of online extremists, they are harder to reach. Once recruits arrange to travel to a war zone or carry out an attack, it is probably too late to dissuade them.

“Radicalization isn’t this yes-or-no choice,” Green said. “It’s a process during which people have questions about ideology, religion, living conditions, and they’re coming online for answers. Which is an opportunity to reach them. … The goal is giving them the chance to hear from someone on the other side of that journey.”

SHOWING THE TRUTH
ISIS propaganda videos have a handful of consistent themes. These include showing that the area the group controls is prosperous and well-governed, demonstrating military strength, pushing religious indoctrination, and highlighting the plight of Muslims around the world.

**FIVE COMMON recruitment narratives AND HOW THEY CAN BE UNDERMINED**

**good governance:** Extremist groups try to show targets that, under their control, communities are peaceful, well-governed and religiously pure.

**rebuttal:** Showing the reality of terrorist-controlled areas undercuts this narrative. Videos of cruel punishments, violence, poverty and desperation in these regions can be a powerful tool to dissuade people from joining extremists.

**military might:** Extremist groups often trumpet their battlefield victories and military hardware. ISIS, for example, shows lines of tanks rolling through city streets.

**rebuttal:** Maps showing the small area controlled by a group and the malnourished, ill-equipped condition of their fighters undercuts this argument.

**religious legitimacy:** Extremist groups tout their narrow, twisted interpretation of Islam as the only authentic version of the faith.

**rebuttal:** Imams and other religious leaders can debunk these interpretations by showing they are not rooted in the Quran or Islamic tradition.

**call to jihad:** These videos claim it is the duty of pious Muslims to immigrate to the “caliphate” and carry out terror attacks as a form of violent jihad. They show fighters in the extremist group living lives filled with adventure, camaraderie and glory.

**rebuttal:** Interviews with defectors and former fighters show that the reality is far different. They tell stories of infighting, fear and inhumane living conditions.

**victimhood of muslims around the world:** These videos highlight the mistreatment of the global community of Muslims known as the “Umma.” They urge the viewer to act to stop the subjugation of fellow Muslims at the hands of infidels.

**rebuttal:** The vast majority of victims of Islamist extremist attacks are fellow Muslims. Demonstrating this dispels the myth that a terror group is the defender of innocent Muslims around the world.

Source: RedirectMethod.org
Officials who have interviewed young people intercepted while attempting to travel to join an extremist group say the recruits who have become immersed in these videos have a distorted and romanticized vision of the world they are entering. Green recounted interviewing a 13-year-old girl who planned to travel to Syria but was taken off a plane in London. The girl described to authorities a picture of what she thought she was going to join, including shopping in malls, marrying a jihadist and living happily ever after. “I thought I was going to go and live in the Islamic Disney World,” she told authorities.

“ISIS understands what drives people, and they carefully craft a message for each audience,” Green said.

Counterextremism groups seek to dispel these myths with videos showing what life is really like in extremist-held territory. They show people lining up for bread in ISIS-controlled territory, Islamic fighters meting out brutal punishment on civilians, and the bloody collateral damage of terror attacks against innocent people.

Although many of these efforts are led by private companies, military and government efforts can be particularly useful since they are on the front lines of the fight against extremists. They are well-positioned to film the reality and interview defectors.

LEARNING FROM IT
Although extremist groups benefit from the openness of the internet, it also leaves them vulnerable to monitoring or having their activities interrupted.

Online recruitment typically goes through several phases, beginning with discovery, in which a recruit makes first contact, to the creation of a micro-community, in which the recruit is surrounded by like-minded thinkers, to isolation, in which he or she is encouraged to cut ties with friends and family before, ultimately, being pushed to action.

Counterterror officials can obtain valuable information during each step. They can collect the usernames and other information of regular recruiters, track repeated themes and tactics used to influence, and, in some cases, intervene before a recruit falls prey to an extremist group.

“One of the virtues of social media is that it forces human interactions into a relatively strict structure, which in turn allows us to diagnose the process behind an interaction, and recognize processes when they repeat,” wrote J.M. Berger, a former expert on extremism for the Brookings Institution who has studied ISIS’ online activity. “We can be smarter and more effective in how we counter ISIS on social media by stripping away the mystique and focusing on the mechanics.”

A shopper looks at a DVD titled Westgate Attack at an outdoor market in Nairobi, Kenya.
Lt. Gen. Robert Kibochi was appointed Kenya’s vice chief of Defence Forces in 2018. Previous posts during his 39-year military career include commander of the Kenya Army and assistant chief of Defence Forces in charge of operations, plans, doctrine and training. He commanded the Kenyan contingent in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2001. He holds master’s degrees in international studies and computer-based information systems and is pursuing a Ph.D. He spoke to ADF from his office in Nairobi. This interview has been edited to fit this format.

**ADF:** You’ve now been a part of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) for nearly four decades. What made you want to make a career in the military?

**Lt. Gen. Kibochi:** My interest in pursuing a military career can be traced from my high school days. I happened to have been in school in an area that was inhabited by the military, just next to Nakuru. This really, in the early days, got me very much interested to become like the Soldiers that I saw.

The Kenyan military institution has been, and continues to be, highly respected. I was very lucky to have been recruited in 1979, and upon training and getting to understand more of the mandate of the Army, I began to realize that serving in the Army was not just a career, it was an opportunity to contribute to the security of my country. I tend to think that that was a very wise decision. It is really the highest calling that one can have in a country.

**ADF:** In July 2018, after being named vice chief of Defence Forces, you visited Kenyan Soldiers serving in Kenya’s Vice Chief of Defence Forces Looks to Finish the Mission in Somalia and Secure the Homeland

The vice chief of Defence Forces is looking to finish the mission in Somalia and secure the Homeland.
in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). What did you take away from this visit, and what is your assessment of the security situation in Somalia?

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: This particular visit in July was to assure continued support as I was transitioning to the new job and to really boost the Soldiers’ morale. Also, to enlighten the senior command of the reality on the ground. The Soldiers are really very keen to engage with the senior leadership on a number of issues that are very important. On the question of the assessment of the security situation in Somalia: Our assessment is that the country is stabilizing following various successes of AMISOM troops, who are gaining ground in the majority of areas. We continue with our mandate to ensure that normalcy returns to the region. Most important, we would like to ensure that we safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of Kenya as the guardians of the security of the people of the republic.

ADF: How do you define mission success in Somalia? In your opinion, when will it be time for Kenya to leave the country?

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: Mission success in Somalia can be defined as resumption of peace and stability under a Somali-led government. I think one of the key issues that was discussed during the strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) summit held at the African Union was the importance of supporting the Somali Transitional Plan. This CONOPS is designed to align itself to that particular transition plan, which goes up to 2021 as the timeline for AMISOM to leave Somalia. As a country we decided to be part of the multinational initiative called AMISOM under the African Union, and we will continue to be part of that effort until the transition — aligning with the requirements of the Somali government — is achieved. To bring security and stability to Somalia, the security forces must be organized, trained up, and equipped for them to
eventually take over the roles and responsibilities that the KDF and AMISOM troops are undertaking in Somalia. Being a neighbor, we very much want to find a lasting solution to the stability of our eastern neighbor.

**ADF:** From Operation Linda Nchi in 2011 to the ongoing AMISOM mission, how has the engagement in Somalia changed the KDF? It has been one of the first missions for the KDF beyond its borders since independence. What have been the most important lessons learned?

**Lt. Gen. Kibochi:** While this was the first large-scale engagement for the KDF, it has always been a premier and mission-capable force. Operation Linda Nchi reinforced this capability. A number of lessons have been learned over time. We’ve been in Somalia now for close to six years, and this engagement has helped identify gaps in doctrine and equipment. These issues have been really helpful as we continue to modernize the force to...
respond to asymmetric threats. The KDF has also put an emphasis on issues touching on the welfare of Soldiers and their families. This includes support and recognition of our veterans who, really, we consider our heroes. We have emphasized the appropriate handling of those who have been left behind, and this has led to a very deliberate establishment of welfare centers across all our camps that are manned by professionals who address the concerns of the troops and their families. It is also important to note the 14th of October, the date Operation Linda Nchi was launched, has been recognized as KDF Day. We have been marking this day annually to honor the Soldiers’ legacy.

So yes, a number of lessons have come out: emphasis on doctrine, emphasis on training and, of course, appropriate combat assets to match the threat.

ADF: Kenya’s border with Somalia has been a source of instability. What strategies are being used to secure this border? It has been reported that Kenya is in the process of building a border fence.

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: The issue of border security is one that requires a multifaceted approach. Our border with Somalia is close to 700 kilometers from the north to the south, and it crosses all sorts of terrain — sometimes very hostile terrain. So, with the deployment of the KDF into Somalia, one of the objectives is to ensure that the threats emanating from across the border are degraded. I’m happy to report that has effectively been going on. Yes, we still have some work to do, but that has been going well. We have also realized a lesson that we need to establish a border security mechanism that is multijagency and that looks at, not just the security, but also the establishment of crossing points to be able to ensure that those who want to cross over in either direction are doing so in a structured manner. That is where the issue
of the fence comes in to ensure that the crossing points are clearly identifiable and to also establish patrol corridors for troops and other security agencies. The other issue is the initiatives to support the local communities by providing socio-economic activities that focus on the people’s needs. Particularly those that touch on the development of water resources for their use and for their animals, the construction of road networks, and the issue of the freedom of movement across those areas. So it is a multifaceted approach that touches on many dimensions that all inform the border security. I think a lot has been done. I visited there recently and was very satisfied that this has helped to improve the security of the border towns.

ADF: From the Westgate Shopping Mall attack to the Garissa University attack, few countries have felt the impact of terrorism on their home soil as much as Kenya. How have these attacks changed the mission of the KDF? How has military training shifted to combat the asymmetric tactics used by these attackers?

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: Terrorism as we know it has proven to be a phenomenon that is not limited to a particular geographic region. Unfortunately, Kenya has also been a target of these attacks. The whole world is facing this generation of warfare. Like all other militaries, the KDF has adapted and acquired modern capabilities to effectively combat these threats. Kenya is engaged in a number of multiagency missions aimed at detecting, preventing and disrupting the aims of these terrorist groups. In terms of our ability to learn, yes we have. Has the mission changed for the KDF? No, the mission has not changed. The mission still remains the defense of the republic and its territorial integrity. But, the tactics have changed. And that has also resulted in a shift toward combat training for asymmetric tactics, which has therefore required that the force be structured to be able to respond to changes to the threat environment. There has been quite a lot of effort toward adapting to the new threats we face as a force.

ADF: Do you think the KDF has a role to play in counterradicalization of young people and preventing terrorist recruitment?

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: You cannot be able to argue that you are fighting terrorists in the field while the source of terrorism, which is radicalization, is not being addressed. So, within the context of Kenya’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, which is a multiagency approach, the KDF has a role to play. Do we take the lead in that effort? No, because there are agencies in that multiagency effort that will take the lead. Do we support the efforts? Absolutely, either through intelligence or through providing any support that is required within this multiagency configuration. It is important to highlight that this multiagency effort has seen a lot of success because we are dealing with these issues collectively and not in silos like in the past.

ADF: As you take on the new role of vice chief of Defence Forces, what are your primary goals? How do you plan to reform the KDF and prepare it to meet the security challenges of the 21st century?

Lt. Gen. Kibochi: I am the vice chief and, therefore, my primary goal is to support my chief of the Defence Forces in achievement of the KDF mission through exercising our core values. For the KDF in the field, because of the mutative nature of the threat, there is a requirement for us to continue to train our troops effectively. I will be supporting heavily on that front. There is also the question of upgrading our combat systems to make sure we are always mission-ready for the defense of the country. I see myself playing a very key role of supporting my chief in ensuring that we continue to improve on our ability to defeat the threat because that is critically important. We must continue to get the right training internally and with partners, like we do with the United States Army. We will continue to partner in those areas that are critical to sharpening our arrowhead, and our arrowhead is the troops who are fighting in Somalia and across the Kenyan borders.
Addisalem Hadgu embraces daughters Asmera and Danayt after seeing them for the first time in 18 years at Asmara International Airport in Eritrea. REUTERS
The cooling of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia is more than just a momentous political event for East Africa. For many on both sides of the long-disputed border, it has been a time of joy, reunion and healing.

Eritrean Airlines began regular flights to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, on August 4, 2018, an early step in improving relations between the two countries after a generation of hostility.

Ethiopian media confirmed that a plane carrying Eritrean transport and tourism ministers and other officials had landed at Addis Ababa Bole International Airport — the first time in two decades such a flight had taken place.

“Upon arrival at Bole, Ethiopia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirut Zemene and other senior Ethiopian officials welcomed the delegation,” according to a Fana Broadcasting Corp. report.

In July 2018, an Ethiopian Airways plane became the first commercial flight from Ethiopia to land at Asmara, Eritrea’s capital, in 20 years.

The thaw in relations has been a boon to family members separated by the border. Addisalem Hadgu, 58, joyously embraced his two daughters, Asmera and Danayt, after seeing them for the first time in 18 years when the Ethiopian Airlines flight arrived at Asmara International Airport.

“It was years of darkness. The separation and longing was unthinkable. Imagine someone who just won a lottery. That is how I feel now,” Addisalem told the United Kingdom’s Independent. “This was unnecessary. I lost my family because of it. We all fought in it one way or another.”

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed offered in June 2018 to make peace with Eritrea two decades after the start of a conflict in which an estimated 80,000 people died.

When the two nations went to war in 1998, both sides deported each other’s nationals. Families like Addisalem’s were divided. In 2000, his wife and two daughters disappeared, the Independent reported. A letter left by his wife indicated that she may have been caught up in a wave of nationalism, common among people on both sides of the conflict.

Since signing an agreement in Asmara on July 9, 2018, to restore ties, the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders have moved swiftly to sweep away hostility. Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki already have visited each other’s country.
THE THREAT AT HOME
As of late 2018, ISIS had lost 97 percent of the territory it once controlled in Syria and Iraq. More important, it had lost almost all means of revenue generation that came from holding that territory. The flow of fighters moving into Syria came to a virtual standstill.

For as long as ISIS has been a force, people have been asking: What will happen in Africa when ISIS fighters return to their home countries? There are three main scenarios:

• Foreign fighters in Syria will return to their African countries of origin, bringing with them a corresponding increase in the threat of domestic terrorist attacks.
• ISIS affiliates in Africa will grow stronger as ISIS shifts its center of gravity from Syria to Libya.
• The collapse of ISIS in Syria will weaken African ISIS affiliates.

Certainly, there are significant numbers of Africans who went to fight under the ISIS banner in Iraq and Syria. Almost 1,000 foreign fighters have returned to Tunisia and Morocco.

Research conducted at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands assessed that those who traveled to Syria are less likely to see themselves as domestic terrorists than those ISIS sympathizers who stayed at home. Moreover, based on an examination of terrorist attacks that were foiled, there were more than twice as many plots involving homegrown ISIS sympathizers as plots involving foreign fighters who returned home from Syria.

In Tunisia, ISIS and al-Qaida are recruiting a new generation of young people to stage terrorist attacks at home, including one in July 2018 near the Algerian border that left six national guardsmen dead.

“This is primarily homegrown,” Matt Herbert, a partner at Maharbal, a Tunis-based security consulting firm, told The Washington Post. “The majority of Tunisians who survived Libya and Syria have not returned.”

One unexpected turn: The casualty rate of the ISIS warriors has been higher than was predicted.

“We’re not seeing a lot of flow out of the core caliphate because most of those people are dead now,” U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. told The New York Times. “Some of them are going to go to ground.”

“I’ve been saying for a long time that there won’t be a ‘flood’ of returnees, rather a steady trickle, and that’s what we are seeing,” said Peter Neumann of the International Center for the Study for Radicalization at King’s College London, as reported by the Times.

This is not to say that returning foreign fighters from Syria do not pose a domestic threat, but in looking at the consequences of the collapse of the so-called caliphate on Africa, there are other likely impacts that may pose a greater threat.

ISIS has seven identified affiliates in Africa: Ansar Beit al Maqdis in the Sinai area, Islamic State in Libya, Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), ISIL Algeria Province, Islamic State in Greater Sahara, Islamic State in West Africa (a splinter group of Boko Haram) and Islamic State Somalia (a splinter group of al-Shabaab).

There are two main narratives that could play out after the collapse of the ISIS caliphate regarding these affiliates.

One possible outcome is that ISIS will shift its center to the African continent, foreign fighters will reinforce and strengthen existing organizations, and the threat from ISIS will grow.
The other scenario is that without strong central leadership and a geographical and territorial base, coupled with the loss of funding sources upon which the Syrian “caliphate” previously relied, the African ISIS provinces will splinter and the ISIS presence will decline or disappear. This is both the most likely outcome and the most dangerous.

A STRONGER ISIS IN AFRICA?

Although ISIS could grow stronger in Africa, several factors argue against it. Based on interviews with captured terrorists, authorities know there are many reasons why people join violent extremist organizations (VEOs). It’s usually a combination of push and pull factors.

Push factors are circumstances that push people to violent extremism: unemployment, poverty, lack of access to basic services, marginalization, and human rights abuses at the hands of government security forces.

At the opposite extreme are factors that pull people in: the need for a sense of belonging, a sense of identity and self-worth, a purpose in life, an ideology. Ideology is just one factor of many, and it is often not the predominant reason why people decide to fight for these organizations. Moreover, research indicates that the dominant ideological influence for militant Islam in Africa is not ISIS teachings, but the Wahhabi sect, a branch of strictly orthodox Sunnis.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that, by and large, ISIS is not well-rooted in the communities where Africa’s most active violent Islamist groups operate. The most lethal violent Islamist groups in Africa, Boko Haram and
AFRICA’S ACTIVE MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS

- AQIM and affiliates
- Al-Qaida-linked groups
- Sinai-focused groups
- Al-Shabaab and affiliates
- Unidentified/unaffiliated groups
- Boko Haram
- ISIS

*a.k.a. = also known as
f.k.a. = formerly known as

Each dot on the map represents a terrorist attack during the 12 months ending September 20, 2018.

FATALITIES IN AFRICA BY YEAR

SCORES OF ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTERS HAVE RETURNED HOME

Number of foreign ISIS fighters who have returned from Syria or Iraq (2016-2017)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number of foreign fighters</th>
<th>Returned fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>3,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>478</td>
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<td>126</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximate numbers from selected countries between March 2016 and August 2017

Source: The Soufan Center
al-Shabaab, predate ISIS and sprung from their local communities. They understand the grievances, and do not rely on ISIS for resources or operational support.

Evidence shows that foreign fighters are moving from Syria to Africa, but most will likely attempt to join another armed group and continue to fight rather than return to their country of origin. However, this does not mean they will necessarily join another ISIS-affiliated group.

With the loss of Sirte in Libya and the lack of resources from ISIS, many of these former ISIS fighters might gravitate toward Mali, the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia. The potential is high that the collapse of the “caliphate” could result in the growth of other VEOs in Africa and strengthen those that are already the most active and the most violent. So although ISIS may wither, the threat from other extremist groups will not.

Analysts are not sure how many African militants went to fight in Syria and Libya, estimating as few as 5,300 fighters to as many as 8,500. That number is the equivalent of six to 10 United Nations battalions — more troops than some entire countries have in their army. They represent an undeniable threat.

So whether ISIS affiliates strengthen in Africa, or whether they wane and other groups profit and grow at their expense, the questions to address are: “What can we do to improve security in the region?” and “How do we address the impact and implications on African security resulting from the collapse of the ISIS caliphate?” Four suggestions come to mind:

• Improve multinational cooperation on tracking terrorist movements, border security, intelligence sharing and early warning systems.
• Continue to improve multinational coordination and pursuit of shared strategic objectives to address the threats within Libya, Mali, the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia.
• Improve reintegration efforts for returning
or captured fighters. If the conditions that led to violent extremism have not improved, deradicalization is unlikely to produce results. Current research shows a 60 percent recidivism rate for returned foreign fighters, and that percentage is even higher for those who were incarcerated.

• Prioritize and allocate resources to create a better balance of the security-governance-development nexus. Use of force alone is not a solution. The three parts of the nexus need to grow simultaneously, and they must be integrated within a strategic plan. That plan needs to be part of a national strategy, and ideally, within a larger multinational strategy.

Fundamentally, improving security is about resources. Resources — money, personnel, time, energy and effort — are the best indicators of priorities. However, if these resources are applied only to increasing the capability and capacity of the security forces without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, failure will surely follow.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that, by and large, ISIS is not well-rooted in the communities where Africa’s most active violent Islamist groups operate.

Daniel Hampton, a retired U.S. Army colonel, is the chief of staff at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University. His military career included assignments in Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. He is the author of “Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping Capacity in Africa,” an Africa Center for Strategic Studies security brief.
EXTREMISM
Roils Northern Mozambique
Yet the group strikes at civilian and government targets with lethality and ferocity, ambushing security forces and hacking men, women and children to death before burning their homes to the ground.

In September 2018, these extremists killed 12 villagers and injured 14 others in the northern Mozambique village of Paqueue, a local person told Agence France-Presse. “Ten people killed were shot by firearms and two burnt (to death) after 55 houses were charred,” the source said. “A person was beheaded after being shot dead.”

Some reports indicate that the group began militarizing as far back as 2015 in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, said James Wholley of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Throughout that time young Mozambicans were sent to other countries to study Islam, where they attended armed training camps before returning. Some Tanzanians may have also participated. The group began to solidify its base and pushed against the regional power structure.

The first major attack was on October 5, 2017, when 30 to 40 members of the militant Islamist group attacked police stations, residents and government officials in Mocímboa da Praia, a town in Cabo Delgado province. “It was clearly sort of a moment or an inflection point that was of the insurgency announcing its sort of metastasization into what could be described as an insurgency and not just a movement,” Wholley told ADF.

Research shows that northern Mozambique has many of the ingredients for fueling unrest and violence. FocusEconomics rated the nation as the world’s second poorest. The nation’s Mwani population, concentrated along the northern coast, is composed of Muslims who have felt marginalized by the government. The region is known for criminal trafficking enterprises in precious gems, timber, drugs, ivory and people. A new, booming extractive industry has brought large companies into the region and raised tensions among locals. Even so, a specific, clear cause for the violence is elusive.

In fact, the movement and the people behind it at this point are largely distinguished by the mystery surrounding them. They have not sought credit for attacks or spouted a coherent ideology publicly. In that way, they can be contrasted with insurgencies such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. “As Islamist militancy continues to spread across Africa, it is moving beyond hotspot countries,” wrote...
Extremists burned huts in Chitolo in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in July 2018. REUTERS
Violence perpetrated by the militants is brutal and results in many deaths and the wholesale destruction of property, particularly homes, which often are burned to the ground.

Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels and Paulo Araujo of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) for the Wilson Center in October 2018. “Violent extremism is now reaching peripheral Muslim communities that, as a small fraction of an overall national population, are ancillary political players and something of an afterthought for the central government.”

A THREAT WITH NO NAME
Wholley compiled a comprehensive report in 2018 on the emerging threat in Mozambique. In it, he describes what is known about the group, the names it uses, its leadership, and a list of attacks and violence that can be attributed to it.

The group has been known by several names:
- **Ahlu Sunnah wa-Jama** is loosely translated as “The Traditionalists” or as the “Followers of the Sunnah and the Mosque.” A former Iraqi terror group and a moderate Somali militia also have used that name.
- **Swahili Sunnah**, which could be translated as “The Swahili Followers of the Sunnah” or “The Swahili Custom or Path,” applies to coastal Mwani and other Swahili speakers and differentiates their identity from other groups living in Mozambique’s interior and the government to the south.
- **Al-Shabaab**, a name that is identical to the Somali insurgent group, shows up in media and government reports, but there is no indication that group members refer to themselves that way. Also, no known affiliation with the Somali group exists.
- **Ansar al-Sunnah** is an early reference to the group and could indicate links to a Tanzanian group of this name, a mistaken association with that group, or an error.
Wholley wrote that the group operates with a decentralized command structure and “no apparent coherent leadership.” Group ideology also lacks coherence beyond violent extremism, crime, and anti-Sufi and anti-government messages. Recruits are young and lack Quranic teaching, and group members number from 200 to 1,500.

“Attacks are allegedly designed to promote insecurity with the goal of enabling criminal enterprise in the region,” Wholley wrote. “Sources allege that clashes are also designed to encourage a heavy security response, which in turn will increase support for the group.”

**ATTACKS MOUNT**

Despite the various names and tenuous ideology, one thing has been consistent: Violence perpetrated by the militants is brutal and results in many deaths and the wholesale destruction of property, particularly homes, which often are burned to the ground.

Two days after the October 5, 2017 attack, security forces responded by killing 14 militants and arresting 52, Wholley wrote. Two police officers were killed. This violent incident is one of at least 14 in northern Mozambique between October 2017 and June 2018. During that time, militants killed at least 55 civilians and seven police officers. Five police officers and two civilians were wounded, four officers went missing, and at least three civilians were kidnapped.

Extremists decapitated 10 people, including some children, on May 27, 2018, after kidnapping them from Monjane and Ulumbi villages, near the coastal town of Palma in the Cabo Delgado province, according to a June 11, 2018, Voice of America report.

Militants also wreaked havoc on property in the region. Wholley records more than 450 homes burned and livestock slaughtered.

**MOZAMBIQUE RESPONDS**

In December 2017, Mozambican government forces raided and bombarded Mitumbate, a village in Mocimboa da Praia, which was thought to be the extremist stronghold, according to an ACSS paper by Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam. The attack, which employed helicopters and a navy vessel, is said to have killed 50 people and led to the detainment of about 200 more. National police said they had restored peace to the area.

By March 2018, police had arrested 470 people and prosecuted 370, including 314 Mozambicans, 52 Tanzanians, a Somali and three Ugandans, according to the ACSS paper.

Martin Ewi of the ENACT program at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, told ADF that criminal prosecutions connected to the extremist violence have shone some light on the still-murky character of the group. It has confirmed to some extent government claims that foreigners are responsible for the violence, although some Mozambicans also are responsible. Tanzania, in mid-November 2018, stopped more than 100 people suspected of violent extremism, from crossing into Mozambique, he said.

Security forces’ responses have included a combination of kinetic military force, such as the December 2017 bombardment, and political and legal action. For example, in January 2018, Mozambique and Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding regarding mutual security along the nations’ shared border.

Under the agreement, Mozambican police and defense forces will exchange information, conduct joint operations, and exchange technical assistance, according to a report from the newspaper Notícias. Cooperation will include fighting corruption, financial crimes, drugs and crimes related to natural resources.

In May 2018, Mozambique’s parliament passed
an anti-terrorism law that provides for prison terms of 20 to 24 years and freezes assets used in crimes, Portuguese news service Lusa reported. The law also allows sentences of 12 to 16 years for those who join terrorist groups and eight to 12 years in prison for acts "preparatory to the formation of a terrorist group."

Mozambique and Uganda agreed in May 2018 to cooperate in the fight against extremist groups. Mozambique Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Jose Pacheco told APA news service that Uganda has agreed to train Mozambican police officers on counterterrorism.

Wholley said regional cooperation is helpful, but it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of Mozambique’s response to the violence. “The fact that the group continues to exist kind of speaks for itself,” he said. “We don’t know what’s going on with their intelligence; we don’t know what [Mozambique is] trying to do with the local community; we don’t know who they’re talking to in the background.”

Counterinsurgency is not necessarily part of the nation’s regular military training, and it has not dealt with an Islamist insurgency before. Troops also may not be proficient in the region’s local languages. Similar problems arose when troops from southern Nigeria faced the Boko Haram insurgency in the north. “So you have all of those difficult operating conditions you see replicated elsewhere,” Wholley told ADF.

Ewi sees parallels between northern Nigeria and northern Mozambique. In the early 2000s, a group calling itself the “Taliban” emerged in northern Nigeria. Ewi said the group was not taken seriously, and it transformed over time into Boko Haram, a militant Islamist sect responsible for killing tens of thousands of people in the Lake Chad basin. The group still poses a significant threat to the region.

“I see that also happening in northern Mozambique,” Ewi said. “Even the debate about who is carrying out these activities — whether foreigners or locals — to me it’s immaterial. We have to look beyond this. We have to look at what is the potential of this group.”

The key to stamping out the insurgency before it can grow, Ewi said, is for Mozambique to form a task force to undertake a robust intelligence-gathering and investigative campaign starting in the north. Then, any connections found to other countries, such as Somalia or Kenya, must be pursued in cooperation with those countries “right to the end.”

“My fear is that if things continue to go the way they are going in Mozambique, this group is going to fully restore itself, and it’s going to become a force to reckon with in Mozambique that might live with the people for a very long time to come.” ❆
CENTER RALLIES EAST AFRICA AGAINST EXTREMISTS
AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT FACILITY WILL USE RESEARCH, ENGAGEMENT TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

ADF STAFF

East Africa stretches from the mountains of Eritrea south through the Great Rift Valley, which burrows from Djibouti across Ethiopia and into Kenya. Somalia cradles its neighbor Ethiopia at Africa’s horn. To the west, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda complete the region that comprises the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), one of eight African regional economic communities recognized by the African Union.

This is a region notable for its rich history and diverse geography and culture. However, in recent years, the region has been notorious for extraordinary instances of violent extremism.

Now the region is organizing to combat violent extremism with the help of the recent formation of the IGAD Center of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). The center, which was conceived in 2015, made operational in October 2016 and inaugurated in a Djibouti facility in April 2018 will help build and develop “soft power” capacities, such as research, in the fight against extremism.
“Counter-terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism are two sides of the same coin — combating violent extremism — but differ radically as strategies, the former prioritizing ‘hard’ approach the other ‘soft’ power,” according to IGAD’s “Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.”

The center was established to share best practices and lessons learned throughout the IGAD region. State and nonstate personnel will work to strengthen coordination and strategies against violent extremism. Key to these efforts is “harnessing the grassroots knowledge of local communities and involving them as active participants,” according to the center’s mission. Efforts will include all IGAD member states and Tanzania. As of November 2018, the center had five permanent staff members and an official serving there on behalf of the French government.

The center’s mandate has five components:
• It will help build partnerships between governments, nongovernmental organizations and others.
• It will help build community resilience against violent extremism through locally led efforts.
• It will assist national governments on technical matters.
• It will help deliver training in preventing and countering violent extremism and other activities by partner organizations to broaden regional expertise.
• It will map research undertaken in the region, analyze gaps in it and commission additional research.

Empowering and equipping effective researchers is one of the areas in which the center already has distinguished itself.

RESEARCH KEY TO CENTER’S MISSION

The center held a workshop in Mombasa, Kenya, in May 2018 to train researchers from East Africa on how best to study violent extremism. Three researchers each from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Tanzania attended.

Dr. Simon K. Nyambura, director of the ICEPCVE, told ADF that ensuring well-grounded empirical research is key to informing policy on preventing and countering violent extremism. “Because the more we think we know about it, and the more we investigate, the more we discover that we know very little,” Nyambura said. “Therefore, research has become critical even for us, that we have continuously kept researching and finding the real drivers, the real factors, the trends.”

Those attending the seminar received $5,000 subgrants to fund research. That research will be compiled into a book and published. The hope is that this process will be repeated in subsequent years.

Research is emblematic of the soft power approach to countering violent extremism. Addressing the factors that lead to extremism begin with gaining a full understanding of the context in which extremism arises in communities, cultures and groups. Empowering these researchers helps IGAD build a body of knowledge regarding gender, religious, economic and historical factors in the region.

The Mombasa workshop focused on two key areas:
• Participants discussed a training manual on “Trust-Based, Qualitative Field Methods,” which had been prepared before the workshop. This information will help researchers build trust with interviewees in the field and effectively present themselves and their credentials to local authorities.
• Country teams identified hypotheses and research abstracts that will form the basis of two research papers from each participating country.

The papers were scheduled to be presented during the center’s first P-CVE Horn and Eastern Africa Researchers Network Conference in late 2018. The plan is to publish the papers.

The center also has participated in or sponsored other seminars since it opened. For example, in November 2018, it held a workshop on amplifying the voices of young African leaders in the fight against radicalization and violent extremism.

A REGIONAL STRATEGY

In 2018, IGAD published its “Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” an effort that the center was instrumental in, Nyambura said. It also is leading implementation of the strategy across the region.

The report identifies four categories of extremists that have worked to recruit and radicalize people in East Africa. They are:
• International terrorist groups, such as pro-Palestinian militants in the 1960s through the 1980s, which later gave way to al-Qaida and the Islamic State in the 1990s and beyond.
• Affiliates of ISIS and al-Qaida, the two major international terrorist groups.
• Indigenous or homegrown terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab, which emerged in Somalia after its civil war.
• Non-Islamist indigenous militant groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army.

The “regional strategy provides the requisite framework for coordinating the responses of communities, governments and organizations to detect, deter and defeat extremist groups.”

The strategy lists three responses to violent extremism. They are counterterrorism, which makes use of “hard” security measures such as military and police forces, covert operations and the criminal justice system. Next is countering violent extremism (CVE), which generally is understood to rely on softer responses that seek to understand, prevent and address underlying causes of extremism. Finally, there is preventing violent extremism (PVE). It is closely aligned with CVE, but it stresses attempts to mitigate threats from populations already engaged in violent extremism.

The more forceful counterterrorism measures have their place in the fight against violent extremism, Nyambura said, especially when confronting groups such as Somalia-based al-Shabaab. But it is through CVE and PVE that he thinks the most progress can be made against violent extremism.

“I think we have to win people’s hearts and minds, especially for the young people, by working with them,” he said. “We must deny the extremists the fertile ground that they use to recruit and radicalize the young people.”

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ADF AFRICA DEFENSE FORUM | 43
The CJTF of Nigeria shows the benefits and challenges of working with civilian security actors.

In parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the military and police can’t guarantee security. Many of these areas are remote, sparsely populated, and have limited security resources. In these regions, civilians have taken matters into their own hands to defend their communities.
Members of local nonstate security groups such as Nigeria's Civilian Joint Task Force often know more about their region and its threats than outsiders do.
A Civilian Joint Task Force member injured in a gunbattle with Boko Haram shows a T-shirt worn by some in the group.
These nonstate security actors include the Civilian Joint Task Force of Nigeria (CJTF), the Arrow Boys of Teso in Uganda, the Zende Arrow Boys of South Sudan and the Kamajors of Sierra Leone, according to the International Crisis Group. Most of these groups started as volunteers waging campaigns against terrorists or militias. Some had state support, but most did not. Abba Kalli, a sector commander of the CJTF in Nigeria, described the group as a child of necessity, born at a critical time in the campaign against Boko Haram.

“The lack of progress in containing Boko Haram by the security forces resulted in civilians joining the fight against the group,” Kalli said. Initially called the Borno Youths Emancipation Scheme, it changed its name to the CJTF to reflect its working relationship with Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a combined security outfit of military and police personnel deployed to battle Boko Haram.

The informal security sector has a long history in Nigeria. Traditional societies relied on groups known as Ndi-nche, or guards, for community protection. Once men reached a certain age, they were expected to help keep watch over their community. In general, the defense groups can be broken into four categories:

- **Neighborhood or community vigilantism:** Community associations organize these neighborhood watch groups.
- **Ethnic vigilantism:** These groups are organized along ethnic lines to defend ethnic interests.
- **Religious vigilantism:** The groups have roots in certain branches of faith.
- **State-sponsored vigilantism:** These groups operate with the support of local governments.

The CJTF began primarily as a neighborhood group and developed into a state-sponsored organization. Its tactics included patrolling, setting up checkpoints, searching people and vehicles at town and village entrances, and investigating reports of suspicious behavior. In regions where farmers were fearful of attacks by Boko Haram, the CJTF sometimes escorted people to the fields and provided security while they worked the land.

From the outset, the group recorded significant victories in the battle against insurgents, an achievement mainly attributed to its knowledge of the operational environment. “The military is a stranger in the town. We know the terrain very well,” Kalli said. In 2013, the CJTF helped dislodge Boko Haram from Maiduguri, pushing insurgents to a rural base in Krenowa, Marte Local Government Area, Borno.
State. The success of the CJTF allowed it to spread into rural communities with new vigilante groups standing up against Boko Haram with and without government assistance.

These successes came with a price. Militants brutally attacked some CJTF members and their host communities for cooperating with security forces.

The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported that Boko Haram declared an all-out war against young people in Maiduguri for joining forces with security officials. The insurgents ruthlessly targeted communities that set up vigilante organizations or helped the military. In September 2013, Boko Haram killed 140 in targeted attacks on CJTF strongholds in Borno State. In May 2014, Boko Haram raided Gambaru Ngala, a border town in northeast Nigeria and killed more than 300 people. In November 2014, Boko Haram also attacked Damasak, killing 50 people in what locals believed to be retaliation against the town’s vigilante group. Similarly, Boko Haram killed hundreds in

Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force sit in a shed surrounded by sandbags at a camp for internally displaced people in Maiduguri, Nigeria.

...
members were linked to diverting food meant for internally displaced people in northeast Nigeria. CJTF members reportedly were uncontrollable even to the security forces.

In some cases, the CJTF has shown a willingness to reform. In October 2018, after being petitioned by UNICEF, the CJTF branch in Maiduguri formally ceased using children as combatants.

Overall, there are benefits and serious concerns about the group and its role in the post-Boko Haram era. IRIN says that after defeating Boko Haram, CJTF may be Nigeria’s next security threat. Previous experience also showed that in a post-conflict period, armed nonstate actors might be recruited as thugs for politicians, criminal gangs, drug couriers or smugglers. To avoid this outcome, the European Union, the British Council and other groups have begun a pilot project to train CJTF members with job skills and offer counseling to reintegrate them into society.

In a post-Boko Haram environment, the positive contribution of informal security groups such as CJTF needs to be preserved. The decimation of the extremist group would not have been possible without the engagement of the CJTF.

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**HOW Security Professionals CAN WORK WITH CIVILIAN SECURITY GROUPS**

1. **Respect their local knowledge**: Local groups understand the history of their region, cultural norms and imminent threats better than anyone. They will know when outsiders come into the area and when local people have become radicalized. Listening to them is an important first step in allocating security resources to meet a threat.

2. **Follow-up on leads**: Nonstate security groups are the eyes and ears for security forces. As such, it is important that the military and police act when alerted to imminent threats. When these groups view security forces as responsive, they are more inclined to cooperate and share knowledge and insight.

3. **Offer training and nonlethal equipment**: Tactical training such as how to inspect a vehicle, how to spot a potential attacker or how to detain a suspect is important. Training in respecting human rights is vital. Nonstate security groups also may need equipment such as walkie-talkies, flashlights, cellphones and metal detectors. However, history shows that arming them can lead to additional violence.

4. **Make sure all are represented**: Historically, some nonstate security groups have drawn too heavily from one ethnic group, religion or have become instruments of a political party. In the worst cases, they have morphed into ethnic militias. It is important that these groups be diverse and reflect the communities they represent.

5. **Hold them accountable**: When nonstate groups commit crimes or abuse their power, authorities must swiftly punish them. This is the only way for citizens to have faith that the group will act ethically and lawfully.

6. **Protect them**: Insurgent groups have attacked and intimidated civilian security organizations. It is important that security forces protect them.

Source: Dr. Ernest Ogbozor

Dr. Ernest Ogbozor, originally from Nigeria, is a scholar practitioner of conflict resolution, peace building and informal security. He is a visiting scholar at the Center for Peacemaking Practice, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, in the United States. His research focuses on preventing and countering violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin.
GROUP REFUTES ISIS BELIEFS

An anti-extremist organization says the ISIS ‘handbook’ is based on distortions of the Quran
In the name of Allah, ISIS fighters have committed unspeakable atrocities.

They have beheaded civilians. They have burned people alive. They have gang-raped children as young as 12 years old. They have not hesitated to slaughter women and children in a war against their enemies. Their enemies are, simply, anyone who is not among them.

ISIS murdered 1,700 fellow Muslims — young army recruits — in June 2014 at a former palace compound of Saddam Hussein near Tikrit, Iraq. ISIS made videos of the atrocity, showing columns of terrified young men marching at gunpoint toward mass graves that they could see were already filled with bodies. Others were marched down steps to a small dock on the Tigris River. Each recruit was dragged forward and shot in the head, with the body falling into the water along the blood-soaked riverbank.

ISIS fighters are Muslims, but what kind of interpretation of the Quran can possibly justify such horrors, encouraging Muslims to kill fellow Muslims?

Dating back to the early years of al-Qaida, extremists have relied on a book titled Management of Savagery. It was written by Islamist strategist Abu Bakr Naji and published on the internet in 2004. It outlines a strategy to exploit regions with weak governments and civil unrest. The ultimate goal was to bring an end to the Saudi monarchy, with al-Qaida taking control of the religious capital of Mecca.

ISIS, however, relies on a Salafist-inspired work called the Fiqh al-Dima, or The Jurisprudence of Blood. The 579-page book lays out an interpretation of the Quran that supposedly justifies atrocities such as beheadings and slavery. It also serves as an operational manual for jihadists.

The manual clearly advocates the “indiscriminate killing” of perceived enemies and encourages extremists to use any means necessary to “snatch away their souls, drive their spirits from their bodies, cleanse the earth from their filth.”

Quilliam, a group that describes itself as “the world’s first counter-extremism organization,” spent two years examining and transcribing the ISIS book. In 2018, it produced a detailed theological rebuttal of ISIS’ “twisted” interpretation of Islamic teachings called Tackling Terror: A Response to Takfir Terrorist Theology, by Salah Al-Ansari and Usama Hasan.

“There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text in almost all western and Arab scholarship,” says the rebuttal. “We hope to expose and deconstruct this unprepossessing yet deeply insidious and pernicious text.”

“The killing of Muslims and the perpetration of terrorism are not only unlawful and forbidden in Islam, but also represent the rejection of faith.”

— Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri
A HISTORY OF MISINTERPRETATION

The authors point out that misinterpretations of the Quran are almost as old as the Quran itself. They quote a Quranic scholar from 1,300 years ago who said, “Learn before you practice your religion, as those who practice without learning usually become so fanatical that killing becomes an essential part of their behavior.”

In modern times, the authors say, Islam has a wide array of interpretations and schools of thought — as is the case with any religion. “When a terror attack occurs, two loud voices unfailingly emerge: Muslims and non-Muslims alike who deny that this has anything to do with the Islamic faith, and far-right populists who seek to paint all Muslims as terrorists,” the authors note. “The Islamic extremists nod along in agreement, since they believe God sanctions such acts of terror.”

Quilliam says ISIS ideology begins with the principle of “excommunicating” all existing political regimes, as they are not implementing the true teachings of Islam and have fallen into a trap of “pre-Islamic ignorance.” ISIS followers are therefore entitled to fight all unbelievers and attack all non-Muslim countries of the world that do not have a treaty with them. They believe this must continue until Islam becomes the only dominant faith.

With this as its goal, the ISIS manual legitimizes assassinations, kidnapping, the taking of hostages, suicide operations, mutilating corpses, beheadings, killing children and nonfighters, taking sex slaves, trading in human organs, using weapons of mass destruction, and genocide.

Quilliam says there are some basic principles underpinning the traditional, correct Islamic interpretations of jihad:
• The Quran teaches that jihad is a lifelong, nonviolent struggle for goodness, justice and truth against evil, injustice and falsehood.
• During his 13-year mission in Mecca, the Prophet Muhammad and his followers were subjected to persecution but were ordered to remain patient and nonviolent. During that time, the Prophet’s followers were tortured and killed, but the response was to remain peaceful and nonviolent.
• During the Prophet’s 10-year mission in Medina, military jihad in self-defense eventually was allowed.
• Military jihad can be declared only by a legitimate authority. In modern times, this means that only legitimate governments have the authority to declare a state of war or military jihad. Vigilante or nonstate actors such as terrorist groups have no Islamic authority to issue a call to arms in the name of jihad.
• Military jihad also was legislated to protect and promote religious freedom. Muslims are permitted to protect the religious freedom of Muslims, Jews and Christians.
• Military jihad always has been tempered by strong ethical restrictions.
• The Prophet spoke of the obligation to avoid killing women, children, old people, peasants, monks and others in war. Muhammad further banned chopping down trees, burning orchards, or poisoning wells or other water supplies in war. “These teachings may be seen as Islamic forerunners to modern warfare ethics, such as the Geneva Conventions, that are also Islamic in spirit and must be seen as binding upon Muslims worldwide,” Quilliam says.
• “The best jihad is to speak a word of truth before a tyrant ruler,” the Prophet said. Jihad is thus a universal struggle for good against evil.
• The outer jihad — the struggle for goodness and truth in the world — is always underpinned by inner jihad, which is the struggle against the self’s base desires.
• All charitable efforts or struggles by Muslims today for goodness, truth and justice against evil and injustice can be termed jihad.

A THREAT TO THE WORLD
Quilliam says the ISIS manual defines jihad as a declaration of war on all those who are not Muslim and live outside the Islamic territory, until they convert to Islam, accept the role of Muslims governing them, or pay a non-Muslim tax as signs of their submission. The authors say that such an interpretation represents a threat to any international world order, because it adopts a borderless territory policy that will be implemented with endless wars.

The authors point out instances in the manual where Quran passages are clearly taken out of context. A reference to people in one passage is interpreted to mean all people, when, in fact, it refers only to a specific group of conquerors from Muhammad’s time.

“One of the key mistakes of the author of this ISIS book, and the ideology that belies it, is the focus on the particulars of Islamic law and ignoring the governing ethics, philosophy and principles,” Quilliam says. That clears ISIS to isolate one piece of text “to support an argument and at the same time, negate the Quran.”

The authors specifically address weapons of mass destruction in their study, describing...
them as anything that causes indiscriminate killing, such as setting fire to an entire village. Such weapons, they write, do not permit a level of discrimination between fighters and noncombatants and are banned by the Quran.

The Quran requires that civilians go unharmed under its rules of engagement. Quilliam says that even if weapons of mass destruction could be used strictly against military targets, they kill and maim in such horrible ways that they violate Islamic teachings on fighting humanely. And lastly, they say, such weapons cause lasting damage to the environment, “a result that must be considered in Islamic moral evaluations because all life has worth as God’s creation, notwithstanding any utility derived by humans.”

**SCHOLARS DENOUNCE EXTREMISTS**

The Quilliam authors are not the first Muslim scholars to condemn extremists. In 2010, Islamic scholar Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri issued a 600-page fatwa that said Muslim terrorists are bound for hell.

A fatwa is a religious opinion regarding Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar. It is often issued to raise awareness and provide clarification regarding a specific issue for Muslims, who then may or may not follow it.

In the bluntest of language, Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri said his research proved that “the killing of Muslims and the perpetration of terrorism are not only unlawful and forbidden in Islam, but also represent the rejection of faith.” His fatwa was necessary, he said, because in the minds of some Westerners, Islam and terrorism had become synonymous.

A summary of Fatwa on Suicide Bombings and Terrorism concluded, “Suicide bombings and attacks against civilian targets are not only condemned by Islam, but render the perpetrators totally out of the fold of Islam.”

Also in 2010, a federation of leading Muslim scholars convened in Mardin, Turkey, to study a fatwa issued by 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyya that had long been misinterpreted. The 15 scholars from countries throughout the Muslim world, including India, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey, said that the fatwa, used by radicals to justify killing in the name of Islam, could not be used to justify terrorism in a modern world that respects faith and civil rights. The same year, Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Scholars issued a fatwa, citing the Quran as stating that financing terrorism is a violation of, and punishable under, Islamic law.

But Tahir-ul-Qadri’s fatwa stood out in terms of its research and detail. The fatwa, since published as a book, includes references from the Quran, the Hadith, the opinions of the Companions of the Prophet, and “the widely accepted classical texts of Islamic scholarship.”

The fatwa condemns terrorism, but it goes a step further in criticizing those Muslims who do not speak up in opposition to violence. “There is no denying the fact that the vast majority of Muslims oppose and condemn terrorism in unequivocal terms and are not ready to accept it as even remotely related to Islam in any manner,” Tahir-ul-Qadri wrote.

“The killing of Muslims and the perpetration of terrorism are not only unlawful and forbidden in Islam but also represent the rejection of faith,” he wrote. “It has been established that all the learned authorities have held the same opinion about terrorism in the 1,400-year history of Islam.”

Tahir-ul-Qadri was specific when it came to listing those people who Muslims can justifiably kill: enemy soldiers in times of war, and no one else.

Perhaps predictably, the Pakistan-based militant Islamic group Tehrik-e-Taliban added ul-Qadri to its death list after his fatwa was published.
Beloved West African Singer Dies

Malian singer and composer Khaira Arby, known as “the diva of Timbuktu,” died at a hospital in the capital, Bamako, in August 2018. She was 59.

Arby was one of the first women to break onto Mali’s music scene in the 1970s, according to news site MaliWeb. Her father did not approve of her singing and made sure she was married when she was 16. She had children and later divorced her husband, saying she left him because she wanted a singing career.

A native of the northern city of Timbuktu, she was notable for performing in multiple languages — Arabic, Bambara, French, Fula, Songhay and Tamasheq. She addressed social issues such as female genital mutilation through song. She was a voice for Malian unity and peace. She toured internationally, but her singing was stifled in 2012 in her homeland when Islamic militants took over the northern part of the country and banned singing in some areas.

Malian were thrilled when Arby performed at the Timbuktu Renaissance festival in 2018.

“Our religion has never banned music,” the singer told the French newspaper Libération in 2016. “The Prophet was greeted with songs when he arrived in Mecca. Cutting music off from us, it’s like keeping us from breathing. But we continue fighting, and it’s going to go on, God willing.”

Kenyan runner Mary Keitany has won the New York City Marathon for the fourth time in five years as Ethiopia’s Lelisa Desisa sealed the men’s title.

Lelisa won the Boston Marathon in 2013 and 2015 but had never won in New York.

Keitany, 37, was second in 2017 but won back the title in 2018 in an unofficial time of two hours, 22 minutes, 48 seconds. She finished almost four minutes ahead of compatriot Vivian Cheruiyot, while Shalane Flanagan of the United States was third.

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The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has picked its first African host of any Olympic competition, formally awarding the 2022 Youth Games to Senegal.

Senegal will host the youth games for ages 14 to 18 in three places: Dakar; a new city of Diamniadio, close to the capital; and the coastal resort of Saly. Senegalese President Macky Sall said a 50,000-seat Olympic Stadium will be built for the government-backed project. The budget for the games is estimated at $150 million.

Senegal’s games are likely to be held in late May 2022. This would be at the end of the dry season to “greatly reduce the prevalence of tropical diseases,” committee Vice President Ugur Erdener said. He pointed to Senegal’s booming economy as an advantage over the bidders from Botswana, Nigeria and Tunisia.

The construction project for the event includes a rail link and an athletes’ village, which will become university accommodations.

“It is not required to have a detailed budget at this stage,” Erdener said, but he noted that Senegal’s government has a “full understanding of the magnitude” of its task.

One African IOC member said the whole continent would share the responsibility of its first Olympics, comparing it to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

“In Africa, when a family organizes a party, all the neighbors chip in and they help organize the event,” said Lydia Nsekera of Burundi. “It doesn’t matter; everyone will be there to help President Macky Sall organize and stage these games.”

The first Youth Olympics were in Singapore in 2010, followed by Nanjing, China, in 2014 and Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2018. Senegal owns one Olympic medal, a silver in the 400-meter hurdles from the 1988 Seoul Games earned by Amadou Dia Ba.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they call him “Doctor Miracle” for his surgical skill and dedication to helping women overcome the injuries and trauma of sexual abuse and rape.

In October 2018, Dr. Denis Mukwege was recognized globally with the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with victims from the conflicts that have ravaged his homeland. He shared the award with Nadia Murad, an Iraqi human rights activist and member of the Yazidi minority who has challenged ISIS.

“Denis Mukwege is the foremost, most unifying symbol, both nationally and internationally, of the struggle to end sexual violence in war and armed conflicts,” Nobel Committee Chairwoman Berit Reiss-Andersen said when announcing the winners in Oslo, Norway.

The 450-bed Panzi Hospital that Mukwege founded in 1999 treats more than 3,500 women a year, though not all for sexual abuse. It provides free consultations, and doctors perform reconstructive surgery on women who have suffered serious injuries.

In a video posted on the hospital Facebook page after the Nobel announcement, co-workers and admirers can be seen swarming around the 63-year-old doctor after he emerged from the operating theater, cheering and hugging him as he slowly made his way past them.

In an interview with the Nobel Foundation, he said he was just finishing his second operation of the day. “It was so touching when I was operating and I heard people start to cry, and it was so, so, so touching,” he said.

His work also put his own life on the line. Mukwege narrowly escaped an attack in October 2012, in which his guard was killed. At the Bukavu hospital, he lives under the permanent protection of United Nations peacekeepers.

“For 15 years I have witnessed mass atrocities committed against women’s bodies,” he said. “And I cannot remain with my arms folded because our common humanity calls on us to care for each other.”
Côte d’Ivoire authorities have seized nearly 400 metric tons of fake medicine over two years. The country is battling the scourge of counterfeit drugs, particularly in Abidjan, which has become a West African haven for the crime.

Counterfeit medicine results in 100,000 deaths annually in Africa, according to the World Health Organization.

“In the course of the last two years, 385 [metric] tons of fake medicines — representing a financial loss of 152 million euros [$173 million] for the pharmaceutical industry — were seized,” said Able Ekissi, a Health Ministry inspector.

“In Ivory Coast, 30 to 40 percent of medicines are bought off the streets,” said Abderrahmane Chakibi of the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi. “They are reputed to be cheaper, and at best they are ineffective and at worst toxic, causing death.”

The illicit sector earns tens of billions of dollars a year, the World Economic Forum estimates. The Switzerland-based forum said that figure has nearly tripled in five years.

The WHO estimates that one out of 10 medicines in the world is fake, but the figure can be as high as seven out of 10 in certain countries.

The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene estimated in 2015 that 122,000 children under 5 died due to taking poor-quality anti-malarials in Sub-Saharan Africa. Anti-malarials and antibiotics are the two most in-demand medicines and are the most likely to be out of date or counterfeit.

The U.S. has pledged $111 million to the G5 Sahel Force to bolster the fight against extremism in the Sahel region.

The 5,000-person regional force includes troops from member nations Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Extremist violence in the region has tripled over the past year and resulted in 895 deaths, according to an October 2018 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

“Since our initial pledge of $60 million in October 2017, U.S. assistance has nearly doubled to approximately $111 million to meet the needs and strengthen the capabilities of the G5 Sahel Joint Force,” U.S. Africa Command public affairs officer Nate Herring told The Defense Post.

“We stand by and are committed to this important African-led initiative as they work to bring peace and security to the Sahel,” he said.

Mali has been hit hardest by extremist attacks since the country was gripped by crisis in 2012, but the region is concerned by the emergence of homegrown groups in the other countries. The European Union raised $474 million from member nations and other donors in February 2018 to support G5 Sahel operations, Bloomberg News reported.
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta announced sweeping reforms to the nation’s police force that change command structure, uniforms, housing and training.

The new structure will merge the Administration Police, a paramilitary security force, with the Kenya Police to form a General Duty Police force, the newspaper *The Standard* reported. The deputy inspector general of police will command the force of 64,252 officers. There will be a new ceremonial uniform, renamed training institutions and new rules on housing allowances. In a September 2018 announcement, Kenyatta said the reforms began immediately and would continue for three years.

The reforms aim to make the police force leaner, more responsive and more respected in the eyes of civilians.

“We usher in a transformative model of policing that promotes professionalism,” Kenyatta said. “With the changes, we expect our officers to approach duty with bravery, honesty and commitment.”

The Administrative Police, which includes a rapid-deployment unit and a border security unit, will guard the country’s strategic installations, protect public officials and dignitaries, and secure the border, *The Standard* said.

Ultimately, Kenyatta said, an effective and respected police force will support economic growth and prosperity in Kenya.

“This administrative move effectively inspires confidence to *wananchi* [ordinary citizens], investors and entrepreneurs to build a strong economy, which create wealth and jobs,” he said.

Kenyan police officers march during a celebration of the national holiday, *Madaraka Day*, in Kisumu. *AFP/GETTY IMAGES*
Throughout nearly six years of civil war, the military of the Central African Republic (CAR) has struggled to restore peace. Fighting with rebels and militias has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and accusations of human rights abuses and ethnic bias have left some civilians in fear of their protectors.

The CAR minister of defense, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, hopes to change course. She’s leading efforts to rebuild the military’s reputation and restore the country’s security.

“We want a professional army that will truly be of service to the people,” Koyara told VOA’s French to Africa service.

Koyara said the country is working on various reforms: background checks on Soldiers and training and troop deployments across the country. Military leaders also plan to establish four garrisons in key areas.

“For there to be a return to security, it is necessary for our security forces, of which the Central African Armed Forces are part, to be reconstructed, because we have experienced the highs and the lows with this army,” Koyara said.

Much of the rebuilding of the Central African Armed Forces has been supervised by the United Nations Mission in the CAR and the European Union. The U.N. has helped vet Soldiers, create a biometric database and rebuild a military camp in Kassai, near the capital, Bangui.

The European Union has trained more than 3,000 security forces in the CAR since 2016 and has recently moved to increase funding for training in the country, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The United States says it is focusing on improving food security for the CAR’s displaced people and providing employment opportunities that make young people less vulnerable to militia and extremist recruitment.

“We need to create a partnership where peace is more profitable than conflict for the people of the Central African Republic,” said Elizabeth Fitzsimmons of the U.S. State Department. “That’s our goal, and we’ll work on a variety of fronts to see how we can accomplish that.”

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**Nigerian Air Force Expands, Modernizes**

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has acquired 30 aircraft and activated 13 grounded ones in the past three years in an effort to expand and modernize its air fleet.

Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall Sadiq Abubakar discussed the acquisitions at the inauguration of the new Headquarters of Air Training Command at the Air Force Comprehensive School in Kaduna.

“I am very happy,” Abubakar said in the speech as reported by the newspaper New Day. “In the last three years, we were able to acquire 18 aircraft; similarly the federal government has paid for [an] additional 12 aircraft.”

He said the NAF believes new hardware acquisitions should be made in concert with refurbishing existing planes.

“Professionalism is also ensuring that we activate what currently we have; hence we embarked on renovation of our grounded aircraft,” he said.

Abubakar said the new facilities include a principal staff officers quarters and a sports complex. The construction was completed in eight months and inaugurated in September 2018.

Abubakar said the NAF is increasing the number of personnel it recruits and trains from 1,000 to 1,500 people annually, New Day reported.

The NAF, including the Air Task Force of Operation Lafiya Dole, has played a key role in turning the tide against the extremist group Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. In a keynote address at the Nigerian Air Force International Air Power Seminar in November 2018, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari spoke about the importance of the Air Force. He commended its success against the insurgency and urged the Air Force to continue to modernize and not “rest on its oars.”

“We have denied [Boko Haram] the ability to hold territory and the freedom of movement to operate at will, and they now resort to skeletal attacks on soft targets.”

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**CAR Defense Minister Hopes to Rebuild Military**

Throughout nearly six years of civil war, the military of the Central African Republic (CAR) has struggled to restore peace. Fighting with rebels and militias has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and accusations of human rights abuses and ethnic bias have left some civilians in fear of their protectors.

The CAR minister of defense, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, hopes to change course. She’s leading efforts to rebuild the military’s reputation and restore the country’s security.

“We want a professional army that will truly be of service to the people,” Koyara told VOA’s French to Africa service.

Koyara said the country is working on various reforms: background checks on Soldiers and training and troop deployments across the country. Military leaders also plan to establish four garrisons in key areas.

“For there to be a return to security, it is necessary for our security forces, of which the Central African Armed Forces are part, to be reconstructed, because we have experienced the highs and the lows with this army,” Koyara said.

Much of the rebuilding of the Central African Armed Forces has been supervised by the United Nations Mission in the CAR and the European Union. The U.N. has helped vet Soldiers, create a biometric database and rebuild a military camp in Kassai, near the capital, Bangui.

The European Union has trained more than 3,000 security forces in the CAR since 2016 and has recently moved to increase funding for training in the country, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The United States says it is focusing on improving food security for the CAR’s displaced people and providing employment opportunities that make young people less vulnerable to militia and extremist recruitment.

“We need to create a partnership where peace is more profitable than conflict for the people of the Central African Republic,” said Elizabeth Fitzsimmons of the U.S. State Department. “That’s our goal, and we’ll work on a variety of fronts to see how we can accomplish that.”
Radio Campaign Saves Lives in Burkina Faso

A radio campaign in Burkina Faso led to a significant rise in sick children getting medical attention and could prove to be one of the most cost-effective ways to save young lives in poor countries.

Scientists say that a radio campaign in rural areas that promoted seeking treatment for three of the biggest killers of children under 5 — malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea — saved about 3,000 lives.

The campaign, which the researchers said used a “saturation” method of intensive radio transmissions over an extended period to promote behavior change in a population, ran in Burkina Faso between 2012 and 2015. It was broadcast on seven stations at a radius of about 50 kilometers, while seven other radio station areas did not broadcast the campaign and acted as controls for comparison.

Routine data from health facilities were analyzed for evidence of changes in treatment-seeking, with data from more than 1.1 million consultations and deliveries evaluated. The results showed a significant increase in life-saving behaviors for the targeted diseases.

Diagnosis rates for malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea rose significantly in all three years of the study, including a 107 percent rise in diarrhea diagnoses in year three and a 56 percent rise in malaria diagnoses in year one. The researchers said there was no change in detection rates for illnesses not covered by the radio campaign, such as coughs and colds.

“Pneumonia, malaria, and diarrhea are three of the biggest killers of children in Sub-Saharan Africa,” said Simon Cousens, a professor at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine who co-led the work. “This research provides evidence that mass media has an important role to play in persuading parents to seek life-saving treatment for children.”

Grandson Publishes Book About Mandela

An entire generation has been born since Nelson Mandela’s 1990 release from a South African prison, where he spent almost three decades for his anti-apartheid activism.

Ndaba Mandela wants to make sure those young people understand his grandfather’s role — and his values — in fighting for racial equality and trying to heal divisions in post-apartheid South Africa.

“That is the very reason why I wrote this book,” Ndaba Mandela says of Going to the Mountain. His goal with the memoir is to show the elder Mandela “not as this huge, great icon” but as a supportive grandfather figure. Mandela died in 2013 at age 95.

The 35-year-old describes his grandfather as courageous and fearless in his quest to end South Africa’s white minority rule, but he says that commitment came at great personal cost.

“That is a man who went against the system, who sacrificed his family, sacrificed his own life for the greater good of his people,” Ndaba said, alluding to his grandfather’s 27 years in detention.

In 1989, 7-year-old Ndaba met his grandfather at Victor Verster Prison, from which the leader was freed several months later. The boy was 11 when he moved in with Mandela and his staff in a house in Johannesburg’s Houghton suburb. He would spend much of the next two decades there — being cared for, and then caring for, his grandfather.

Ndaba’s mother, Zondi, was already gravely ill when he learned that she had HIV/AIDS. She died of its complications in 2003, though a family press release attributed her death to pneumonia.

Ndaba writes that Mandela tried to address the country’s AIDS epidemic in 1991 by promoting safe-sex education, but he backed off when accusations that he was “encouraging promiscuity” threatened his political prospects. When Ndaba’s father succumbed to the same disease in early 2005, Mandela called a press conference “to announce that my son has died of AIDS.”

“It’s impossible to overstate what this meant to the millions of people who live in fear of seeking help or disclosing their HIV status and to the millions more people who loved them,” writes Ndaba Mandela, now an ambassador for UNAIDS, the United Nations effort to curb the disease.
Côte d’Ivoire Will Use Cocoa Waste for Power

REUTERS

Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s top cocoa producer, plans to build a 60- to 70-mega-watt biomass power generation plant running on waste from cocoa pods, part of its aim of developing 424 megawatts of biomass power generation capacity by 2030.

The plant, which will enable Côte d’Ivoire to diversify its electricity generation sources, was among five projects to receive grants from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.

Others included a hydropower project in Kokumbo, in the central part of the country.

The biomass power station, the first in Côte d’Ivoire, would be based in the southern cocoa region of Divo. The U.S. has earmarked $1 million for feasibility studies.

Although Côte d’Ivoire produces about 2 million tons of cocoa annually, thousands of tons of pods are discarded after the beans are removed. They are left to rot or burned after the harvest.

Unlike many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d’Ivoire has a reliable power supply. It exports electricity to neighbors Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo and plans to extend its grid to Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

With domestic consumption rising by about 10 percent a year, the government is under pressure to boost supply at home and aims to increase installed capacity to 4,000 megawatts by 2020, from the current 2,275 megawatts.

ATMs in Kenya Dispense Camel Milk

THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION

Halima Sheikh Ali is the proud owner of one of the few ATMs in Wajir town in northeast Kenya. But rather than doling out shilling notes, it dispenses something tastier: fresh camel milk.

“For 100 Kenyan shillings [$1], you get a liter of the freshest milk in Wajir County,” she said, opening a vending machine advertising “fresh, hygienic and affordable camel milk” to check the liquid’s temperature.

East Africa, one of the world’s biggest camel producers, also produces much of the world’s camel milk, almost all of it consumed domestically.

“Camel milk is everything,” said Noor Abdullahi, a project officer for U.S.-based aid agency Mercy Corps. “It is good for diabetes, blood pressure and indigestion.”

But temperatures averaging 40 degrees Celsius in the dry season, combined with the risk of dirty collection containers, mean the liquid can go sour in a matter of hours. To remedy this, an initiative is equipping about 50 women in Hadado, a village 80 kilometers from Wajir, with refrigerators to cool the milk that remote camel herders send them via small taxis, plus a van to transport it daily to Wajir. There, a dozen female milk traders, including Sheikh Ali, sell it through four ATM-like vending machines after receiving training on business skills such as accounting.

“The [milk] supply and demand are there,” Abdullahi said. “We just have to make it easier for the milk to get from one point to another.”

Asha Abdi, a milk trader in Hadado who operates one of the refrigerators with 11 other women, said she used to have to boil camel’s milk — using costly firewood — to keep it from turning sour. Now, Abdi and the other women in her group send about 500 liters of fresh milk to Wajir every day — a trip that takes just more than an hour by van. They reinvest the profits in other ventures.
VOLKSWAGENS TO ROLL OUT OF RWANDAN PLANT

BBC NEWS AT BBC.CO.UK/NEWS

Rwanda has begun producing locally built cars at Volkswagen’s new factory in the capital, Kigali.

The Polo is the first model being made at the site, and the German automaker plans to reach annual production of 5,000 cars in the first phase by also building its Passat, Tiguan, Amarok and Teramont models.

Volkswagen, Europe’s biggest carmaker, has invested $20 million in Rwanda and is expected to create up to 1,000 jobs. The company plans to sell vehicles and use them in an Uber-like car-sharing system that will let people book rides using smartphones.

Car ownership is low in Rwanda. The country of 12 million people has slightly more than 200,000 private cars registered, according to the country’s tax collection body.

The German company is expanding in Sub-Saharan Africa. It opened a Kenyan plant in 2016.

East Africa Continues Work on Rail, Highway Network

VOICE OF AMERICA

East African leaders have agreed to build a railroad and highway network to improve regional travel, trade and security.

In their 14th meeting on the plan in mid-2018, representatives of eight countries gave Kenya the go-ahead to continue building its standard-gauge railways to the Uganda border. Kenya is finishing the second phase of the rail line between Nairobi and Naivasha.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta told his counterparts that plans are underway to extend the line.

Uganda and Rwanda also are planning to extend railway connections to the countries after Kenya completes its part.

The meeting also included plans to establish a single customs territory and reduce the number of weigh bridges and police checks to speed up the delivery of goods in landlocked countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda.

After oil discoveries in Kenya and Uganda, the leaders agreed to come up with a joint refinery model to ease petroleum exports.

The southern corridor network, which connects Tanzania to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda also is under construction. Countries in the region are focusing on at least 16 infrastructure projects, with the goal of transforming the region socially and economically.
Aliko Dangote, Africa’s richest man, has arranged more than $4.5 billion in financing for his Nigerian oil refinery project and aims to start production in early 2020.

Dangote, who built his fortune in cement, is constructing the world’s largest single oil refinery with a capacity of 650,000 barrels per day to help reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported petroleum. Despite being a crude oil exporter, Nigeria imports the bulk of its petroleum because of a lack of domestic refining capacity.

Lenders will commit $3.15 billion, with the World Bank’s private sector arm providing $150 million, Dangote said. He is investing more than 60 percent of his own money.

“We will end up spending between $12 billion to $14 billion,” Dangote said. “The funding is going to come through equity, commercial bank loans, export credit agencies and developmental banks.”

He said he hoped to finish construction in 2019, with refined products released in the first quarter of 2020.

The financing involves Nigeria’s central bank, the African Development Bank and other international trade banks.

The planned refinery and petrochemical complex is expected to account for half of Dangote’s sprawling assets when it is finished. Dangote said he was looking to acquire more oilfields as his focus shifts toward the oil sector to feed the refinery.

West Africa Works to Share Electricity

Fourteen West African countries with 27 national electricity utilities are working to build an integrated regional power market.

The West Africa Power Pool is completing the physical interconnections to send power across borders. About 7 percent of the region’s electricity is traded among the 10 already-connected countries. It is anticipated that by the early 2020s the most critical cross-border links will be in place, making it possible for electricity to flow throughout West Africa from countries with cheaper, cleaner and more abundant energy resources to those lacking them.

Access to electricity in West Africa is at 52 percent, with shortages of up to 80 hours per month. Electricity there remains among the costliest in the world, at 25 cents per kilowatt-hour, more than twice the global average.

Demand in West Africa often is too low to attract investments in large projects that benefit from economies of scale. Instead, these countries rely on small-scale, expensive oil-fired power generation. Lack of planning has led to a reliance on emergency rental plants, which further inflates costs.

The power pool consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The World Bank estimates the economic benefits of a West African power market at $5 billion to $8 billion per year. The power system also will become more resilient by balancing unexpected energy shortages.

The sizable market created by integrating these 14 countries will be more attractive to private sector investment in power generation.
When the warrior Keita Sundiata learned that his home tribe had been conquered by a neighboring king, he went to war, using a borrowed army and forming a coalition of neighboring kingdoms in what is now Mali. He crushed his enemy’s forces, consolidating what came to be known as the Mali Empire.

He was just getting started. About 1235, he gathered a group of wise men, including the king he had defeated. With them, he composed the Kurukan Fuga Charter, or Manden Charter, one of mankind’s first constitutions. One scholar called it the “declarations of the rights of man.”

Historians believe that among known constitutions and articles of rights, only the Magna Carta predates it, by about 20 years. The Manden Charter established the clans of the Mandinka tribe under one government, explained how it would operate and set down laws by which the people would conduct themselves.

The charter was not written down. Instead, it was passed down generation to generation by griots, skilled storytellers who were responsible for collecting and recounting much of West Africa’s history.

In many ways, the charter is surprisingly modern. It addresses peace, the sanctity of human life, the right to an education, women’s rights, helping the poor and the right to have food. Some of the rules in the charter are as fresh as if they had been written yesterday:

Children’s education behooves the entire society. The paternal authority in consequence falls to everyone.

Never offend women, our mothers.

Vanity is the sign of weakness, and humility is the sign of greatness.

Never betray one another. Respect your word of honor.

The charter divided the new empire into 26 clans. Some were responsible for matters involving Islamic law. Others were charged with defending and leading the empire. Some were given monopolies on certain trades, such as smelting and woodworking. Four clans were responsible for recording the history of the empire through songs.

Some of the rules pertain to practices and customs that are not relevant to modern society. For instance:

Do not ill treat the slaves. You should allow them to rest one day per week and to end their working day at a reasonable time. You are the master of the slaves but not of the bag they carry.

Lies that have lived for 40 years should be considered like truths.

But other principles have stood the test of time:

We should help those who are in need.

You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him.

One of the articles institutes the sanankuya, a specific type of fond behavior in certain relationships, such as that between a man and his mother-in-law. The behavior includes jokes and insults that are intended as signs of a loving relationship.

In 1998, historians in Guinea began reconstructing the charter in order to publish and preserve it. Scholars transcribed and translated the laws and rules preserved throughout different regions of what had been the empire. Even without griots, the charter will live on in history.
WHERE AM I?

ANSWER

Vallée de Mai Nature Reserve, Seychelles

CLUES

1. This 19.5 hectare reserve is a palm forest that is mostly unchanged since prehistoric times.

2. The area has the world’s largest number of coco de mer palm trees, which bear the largest seed in the plant kingdom.

3. The area shows how the tropics looked before the evolution of more advanced plants.

4. British Maj.-Gen. Charles George Gordon believed the area was the original Garden of Eden.
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The magazine is published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command and covers topics such as counterterrorism strategies, security and defense operations, transnational crime, and issues affecting peace, stability, good governance and prosperity.

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